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Summary
The thesis examined subgroup-superordinate group relations, and in particular 
compared the Ingroup Projection Model (IPM: Mummendey & Wenzel, 1999) with 
the Common Ingroup Identity Model (CIIM: Gaertner & Dovidio, 2000). The 
subgroups were British and German or English and Welsh. The superordinate groups 
were The EU and NATO (Studies 1 and 2) or The EU and Great Britain (Study 3). 
Alongside relative prototypicality (IPM), power differentials and the degree of 
ingroup identification and superordinate category identification, as well as social 
reality constraints were considered. Study 1 (quasi-experimental, British-German, 
A  =43) revealed that the lower-power group (the British) demonstrated higher 
evaluative ingroup bias than the higher-power group (the Germans), and bias was 
fully mediated by the degree of ingroup identification, and, against the backdrop of 
The EU, by relative power. Relative prototypicality did not predict ingroup bias. In 
Study 2 (experimental, British-German, N=  181), the Germans were higher in 
allocation-based ingroup bias, the British in evaluative ingroup bias. Here, relative 
prototypicality and relative power mediated allocation-based ingroup bias in the EU 
condition. In the German sample, high dual identification saw the highest levels of 
evaluative ingroup bias. Study 3 (experimental, English-Welsh, N=  184) 
additionally measured the perceived legitimacy of sub-group relations. The higher- 
power English sample scored higher on allocation-based ingroup bias, and the lower- 
power Welsh on evaluative ingroup bias. Correlations supported IPM, that is, higher 
relative prototypicality was associated with higher ingroup bias. However in contrast 
to the predictions of IPM, lower relative prototypicality in the Welsh sample 
mediated higher evaluative ingroup bias in the EU condition, as did higher ingroup 
identification. Furthermore, no effects of legitimacy were found. Finally, simple 
slope analysis demonstrated that, consistent with CIIM, an esteemed superordinate 
category can promote intersubgroup harmony.
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Chapter 1 Introduction
Social psychologists have long been interested in intergroup and intersubgroup 
relations. Under which conditions is inter(sub)group conflict likely and under which 
conditions might relations be more favourable? On the one hand, a wealth of studies 
have examined inter(sub)group conflict in a laboratory setting, where contextual 
factors can be manipulated and controlled. The groups are sometimes created by the 
experimenter (such as minimal group studies) and are sometimes natural social 
groups such as student samples. From these studies, significant lines of evidence 
regarding inter(sub)group relations have emerged, and thus furthered our 
understanding of inter(sub)group processes.
On the other hand, however, a naturally occurring social group comes with its own 
unique identity, history and content. Some members may be more committed to the 
group, and others less so. When making any comparisons between in- and outgroup, 
members may well draw on a shared superordinate group in the comparison process, 
and this superordinate group too may mean different things to different ingroup 
members. Finally, past relations between two subgroups could be of a nature that 
mutual liking or one-sided or mutual disliking reflects the general quality of relations 
between the two subgroups. These factors (and others, such as power differentials) 
are taken into consideration in the following studies.
It is, therefore, not surprising that findings from real-life group research often 
contradict the evidence found in the laboratory setting. For example in the minimal 
group setting, ingroup favouritism has been regularly identified irrespective of the
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size of the group or its degree of power over the outgroup (e.g., Tajfel, 1972). In real- 
life studies, this is not necessarily the case. A powerful group may easily demonstrate 
its superiority against a less powerful group and, for example, claim more resources 
than the outgroup (e.g., Hornsey, Spears, Cremers, & Hogg, 2003; Jetten, Spears, & 
Postmes, 2004). In contrast, the less powerful group may feel that laying claim to 
more resources than the outgroup is risky and with possible negative consequences; 
therefore it may seek other ways of claiming superiority, and show ingroup bias on 
the dimension of negative attitudes towards the more powerful outgroup.
The thesis examines intersubgroup relations between national groups, where groups 
share a common past and are both subsumed under a shared superordinate category. 
In other words, relationships are three-way lateral (ingroup-outgroup) and 
hierarchical (subgroup-superordinate group). The in- and outgroup are either Great 
Britain and Germany (Study 1 and Study 2) or England and Wales (Study 3). The 
superordinate categories are either The EU and NATO (Study 1 and Study 2) or The 
EU and Great Britain (Study 3).
The fundamental questions posed throughout the studies are: How favourable are 
intersubgroup relations? To what degree might the respective superordinate category 
affect the quality of subgroup relations, and does perceived relative ingroup 
prototypicality with the superordinate category improve or harm subgroup relations? 
To what degree might power differentials account for the quality of subgroup 
relations? What roles do the degrees of ingroup identification and/or the degree of 
superordinate category identification play in subgroup relations? When examining 
each of these questions, the social realities of the groups are given full consideration.
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Chapter 2 comprises a review of the literature. Firstly, two ‘parent’ theories of 
intergroup relations are presented. These are Social Identity Theory (SIT: Tajfel, 
1974, 1978; Tajfel & Turner, 1986) and Self-Categorization Theory (SCT: Turner, 
Hogg, Oakes, Reicher, & Wetherall, 1987). In broadest terms, SIT examines why 
and how people behave as ingroup members; SCT distinguishes between personal 
and social identity. Secondly, four models of subgroup-superordinate group relations 
are compared and contrasted. These are (a) the Common Ingroup Identity Model 
(CIIM: Gaertner, Dovidio, Anastasio, Bachman, & Rust, 1993; Gaertner & Dovidio,
2000), (b) the Intergroup Contact Model (ICM: Brown & Hewstone, 2005), (c) the 
Integrative Model of Subgroup Relations (IMSR: Hornsey & Hogg, 2000a) and (d) 
the Ingroup Projection Model (IPM: Mummendey & Wenzel, 1999). In some 
respects the predictions of some of these models overlap, in other respects there are 
contradictions. Thirdly, the roles of power and legitimacy in intersubgroup relations 
are discussed. Finally, due to unique qualities associated with national identity, the 
chapter concludes with a brief overview of contributions from other disciplines and 
from qualitative social psychological research on national identity.
Study 1 is reported in Chapter 3. In this quasi-experimental study, British and 
German participants were requested firstly to give their opinions on the two 
superordinate categories NATO and The EU. Thus qualitative data were gathered. 
Further data were empirical. Relative power under and relative prototypicality of the 
superordinate categories were measured, as well as the degree of ingroup 
identification and the degree of identification with the respective superordinate 
categories. Ingroup bias was measured on the dimension of attitudes. Findings
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showed that relative prototypicality, relative power and the degree of ingroup 
identification mediated ingroup bias in some instances.
Study 2 is reported in Chapter 4. The experimental study examined the subgroup 
relations between Great Britain and Germany in three conditions; under NATO 
membership, under EU membership and, as a control condition, at the ingroup- 
outgroup level only. In contrast to Study 1, here ingroup bias was measured on two 
dimensions; evaluative and allocation-based. Findings showed that both relative 
prototypicality and relative power mediated allocation-based ingroup bias, but only 
in two instances. On the other hand, interactions between ingroup identification and 
European identification moderated evaluative ingroup bias.
Study 3 is reported in Chapter 5. This was to some degree a replication of Study 2. 
However, the national groups under investigation were England and Wales, the two 
superordinate categories Great Britain and The EU. Furthermore, as well as 
perceived relative prototypicality and relative power, the perceived legitimacy of 
relations was added to the model. One form of relative prototypicality and the degree 
of ingroup identification were found to mediate evaluative ingroup bias. Relative 
power played no role in ingroup bias, nor did the perceived (il)legitimacy of 
relationships. Examining ingroup bias as a function of ingroup and superordinate 
group identification, high superordinate category identification did ‘limit the 
damage’ that high ingroup identification caused on evaluative ingroup bias and on 
received respect.
The thesis concludes with Chapter 6, the General Discussion.
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Chapter 2 Literature Review
The literature review begins with section 2.1, where the two ‘parent’ theories of 
intergroup relations are presented. Section 2.2 compares and contrasts four models 
that examine subgroup-superordinate group relations. Here terms such as 
recategorization, mutual intergroup differentiation, dual identification and relative 
prototypicality are introduced and discussed. Section 2.3 addresses two key factors 
that may affect inter(sub)group relations; perceived relative power and the perceived 
legitimacy of power differentials. Section 2.4 visits areas outside of social 
psychology that have contributed to our understanding of the uniqueness of national 
identity -  areas such as social and political theory. The focus then turns to the 
qualitative work of some key researchers of national identity (e.g., Billig, 1995; 
Condor, 1996, 2006; Reicher & Hopkins, 2001).
At the end of sections 2.1 -  2.3, the material will be brought into the context of the 
thesis. Some implications of and questions arising from the preceding material will 
be highlighted. The questions will draw on Great Britain and Germany and The EU 
and NATO (the two subgroups and superordinate categories in Study 1 and Study 2). 
The questions start simplistically, increase in complexity, and may be considered as 
an ‘aperitif to the actual research question.
2.1 Social Identity Theory & Self-Categorization Theory: The theoretical 
background
Social Identity Theory (SIT: Tajfel, 1974, 1978; Tajfel & Turner, 1986) and/or Self- 
Categorization Theory (SCT: Turner et al., 1987) are the point of departure in this
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thesis. SIT’s theoretical underpinnings offer an explanation of why some groups 
(ingroups) might discriminate against other groups (outgroups). At the heart of SIT 
lies the assumption that ingroup members will strive to attain, maintain or enhance 
positive distinctiveness over the outgroup. Demonstrating ingroup bias, that is, 
entering into social competition, is one means to do this (others are described later 
below). Identifying oneself as a member of a particular ingroup requires the process 
of self-categorization (SCT). SIT, then, is motivational in its essence, and SCT, 
which builds on SIT, is generally regarded as a more cognitive-perceptual process.
2.1.1 Social Identity Theory (SIT)
Henri Tajfel, the father of Social Identity Theory, was a victim and survivor of 
National Socialism. His motivation was to find an explanation as to why such 
atrocities can occur. As a starting point he drew upon Realistic Conflict Theory 
(Sherif, 1966), where Sherif had demonstrated successfully that aggression is not 
necessarily an individual pre-disposition, but can be a form of collective behaviour. 
Tajfel sought to identify specific intergroup dynamics that might foster or suppress 
intergroup hostilities, and thus the first seeds of Social Identity Theory were sewn.
In his examination of intergroup behaviour, Tajfel (1978) places an individual’s 
behaviour on a continuum ranging from interpersonal to intergroup. The more the 
individual identifies with his or her social group, the more likely they will act as a 
member of that group. Social situations may vary, and the degree of social 
identification in any given situation is a function of the degree of (a) group 
membership awareness, (b) the positive evaluation of that group and (c) the
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emotional investment in that group. Purely interpersonal or purely intergroup 
behaviour is, according to Tajfel, the exception, not the rule, and the individual’s 
placement on the interpersonal-intergroup continuum is also ‘crucially affected by 
the individuals’ perception (or rather interpretation) of the situation’ (p. 43).
Tajfel (1974) suggests that individuals desire positive distinctiveness for their group. 
Should, for example, a lower-status group be dissatisfied with its relative position, 
SIT proposes a series of strategies that ingroup members might employ to change the 
status quo (e.g., social mobility at an individual level, social creativity or social 
competition at the group level). Social mobility is not always possible or desired. 
Social creativity might be a strategy choice of a low-status group, whereby, for 
example, it seeks a new comparison dimension where it does compare favourably to 
the high-status outgroup. Social competition is demonstrated when the group shows 
ingroup bias. Ingroup bias, then, is one identity management strategy and it can take 
several forms, ranging from ingroup favouritism to outgroup derogation.
Some have criticised SIT in that studies have failed to produce consistent evidence of 
ingroup bias (see Brown, 2000 for a review). However, from the outset Tajfel (1978) 
postulated that there are a series of factors that may induce or suppress ingroup bias. 
Firstly, irrespective of group status, the degree to which an individual will 
demonstrate ingroup bias (or not) depends upon the emotional significance attached 
to that group (Tajfel, 1978). Furthermore, there is evidence to suggest that ingroup 
bias occurs as a response to perceived threat (Branscombe, Ellemers, Spears, & 
Doosje, 1999). Although threat is not measured in this thesis, qualitative findings
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from Study 1 did suggest that threat played a role in subgroup-superordinate group 
relations. This line of evidence will be drawn upon later in brief.
Secondly and alongside status, perceived (il)legitimacy and (in)stability of relations 
and interactions between these are likely to influence the forms of ingroup behaviour 
(Tajfel, 1978). An ingroup can perceive itself to be relatively high or low in any 
combination on all three of these dimensions (e.g., high in status and stability, low in 
legitimacy). In an experimental study involving natural groups, Turner and Brown 
(1978) showed how these dimensions might affect ingroup bias levels (see Figure 1).
Figure 1: Interactions between status, legitimacy, stability and their effects on 
ingroup bias (Turner & Brown, 1978)
Group
status
Ingroup
bias
Legitimacy Ingroup
bias
Stability Ingroup
bias
High-status higher Legitimate <=!> no increase <=> Stable i=> increase
Illegitimate increase Unstable no increase
Low-status ■=> lower Legitimate no increase O Stable no increase
l=> Illegitimate increase Unstable increase
High-status groups demonstrate higher ingroup bias than low-status groups. 
Perceived illegitimacy increases ingroup bias in both high- and low-status groups. 
Additionally, perceived stability renders higher ingroup bias in legitimate/high-status 
groups, perceived instability renders higher ingroup bias in illegitimate/low-status 
groups. This demonstrates that, given the opportunity, a group will show ingroup 
bias; a higher-status group in illegitimate conditions to defend its position or in a 
stable condition when it may fear no reprisals from the lower-status group.
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Conversely a lower-status group will demonstrate higher ingroup bias in illegitimate 
conditions to rectify the status quo, and in instable relationships when chances of 
changing that status quo are more likely.
Thirdly and finally, ingroup bias comes in several forms, and a whole array of 
contextual contingencies may affect strategy choice. Jetten, Spears, and Postmes 
(2004) make two broad distinctions; judgmental strategies (e.g. trait ratings) and 
behavioural strategies (e.g. reward allocation). Furthermore, evaluative or allocation- 
based ingroup bias are behavioural responses (Reactive Distinctiveness Hypothesis: 
Spears, Jetten, & Scheepers, 2002), and are more likely to occur when ingroup 
distinctiveness is low, or when the ingroup feels threatened (Jetten, Spears, & 
Manstead, 1996, 1998). The two forms of ingroup bias measured in this thesis are 
allocation-based and evaluative.
Finally and crucially, the social reality of the group will affect its strategy choice. 
One need search no further than the original SIT literature or a military dictatorship 
to find support for this. As Turner (1999) points out, when striving to attain or 
maintain positive social identity, groups will be aware of their perceived social 
realities. The strategies that groups adopt is ‘a function of an interaction between 
their status position (high or low), their beliefs about the nature of the group 
boundaries, the intensity of ingroup identification and their collective ideologies and 
shared beliefs about the nature of the social system and intergroup differences of 
status, power and wealth’ (p. 9). In other words, collective psychological variables 
interact with social reality variables. Note that perceived social reality is not
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‘necessarily valid or accurate’ (Spears, Jetten, & Doosje, 2001, p. 341), and some 
socially imposed) realities are ‘difficult to deny’ or ‘difficult to escape’ (p. 342).
In summary, it is widely recognised within the realm of social psychology that SIT 
has provided a major contribution to understanding intergroup processes. However, it 
should be remembered that Tajfel’s leitmotif was to understand why extreme 
intergroup hostilities (e.g. the Holocaust) occur, and he emphasised that SIT might be 
a starting point in understanding intergroup dynamics. Indeed, Tajfel (1981) cautions 
that the range of vision must accommodate ‘the nature of the relations between the 
groups involved’, in order to gain an understanding of specific intergroup relations
(p. 166).
2.1.2 Self-Categorization Theory (SCT)
Turner’s Self-Categorization Theory (1981; Turner et al., 1987) grew out of and is 
related to SIT, but the two theories are not interchangeable. As Turner and Reynolds 
(2001) discuss, SIT places the shift from personal to social relations on a continuum 
(Tajfel, 1974, 1978); SCT distinguishes between personal and social identity (Turner, 
1978). SIT investigates status differences and offers explanations as to how ingroup 
members might act and react in response to these differences; SCT is concerned with 
the processes underlying becoming and being a group member. Once a self­
categorized group member, the individual becomes ‘depersonalized’ and collective 
processes are enhanced. SCT, then, offers cogent evidence for social stereotyping, 
the self-concept, social influence and so forth. To use Turner and Reynolds’ words,
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‘just as SIT provides a new way of approaching intergroup relations, so SCT 
provides a new way of thinking about social groups’ (2001, p. 136).
Seeking to explain how individuals may behave in terms of a shared identity, SCT 
maintains that the process of categorising oneself as a member of a particular group 
is the crux of all group processes (Turner, 1991). Self-categorization is context- and 
situation-specific, and, once the individual has self-categorized -  even under 
conditions where some members are actually unknown other group members -  then 
the behaviour and attitudes proposed by SIT may come into operation. Cognitive- 
perceptual factors fuel categorization processes to a large extent.
There are a series of assumptions and hypotheses (Turner et al., 1987, pp. 44-66) 
upon which SCT is based, and these will not be discussed here at any length. 
Summarizing relevant assumptions, the representations of the self can be made at 
different levels (i.e. human, social and personal) and these take the form of self­
categorization. At the social level, we can be distinct only if there is an other to 
compare ourselves against; comparisons with them are necessary if we are to exist. 
These comparison processes often draw upon the next higher level of abstraction, the 
next higher relevant category of shared membership. This brings us to the essence of 
this thesis; subgroup-superordinate group relations. The superordinate category 
serves as a frame of reference to distinguish between us and them, between in- and 
outgroup. When individuals draw on the higher level category, they may rate their 
group as more relatively prototypical of the superordinate category than they rate the 
outgroup. From this, Turner et al. hypothesise that the more highly the superordinate 
category is evaluated and the more relatively prototypical ingroup members perceive
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themselves to be, the more likely it is that ethnocentrism might come into operation 
at subgroup level.
2.1.3 Implications and Questions
Bringing this sub-section into the framework of this thesis, the first question arises. 
Because the form of ingroup bias should reflect the realistic choices that an ingroup 
has in its identity maintenance, can we match specific forms of ingroup bias to 
specific national groups? If so, can we account for these choices based on their social 
realities?
Secondly, it seems apparent that social identification is multi-faceted. Prior to the 
development of SCT, Tajfel (1978) already hypothesised that as well as emotional 
investment in and evaluation of the ingroup, group membership awareness -  that is 
in SCT terms the degree o f self-categorization -  serves to predict the degree of 
ingroup identification. Therefore, how reliably can the degree of ingroup 
identification be measured? Over the years, researchers have attempted to measure 
these dimensions (e.g., Brown, Condor, Mathews, Wade, & Williams, 1986; Hinkle, 
Taylor, Fox-Cardamone, & Cook, 1989; Luhtanen & Crocker, 1992), and most 
recent studies support Tajfel’s hypothesis (Cameron, 2004; Cameron, Duck, Terry, & 
Lalonde, 2005; Ellemers, Kortekaas, & Ouwerkerk, 1999; Jackson, 2002). The 
degree of ingroup identification (measured across the studies with Cameron’s three- 
factor model of social identity) reflects how willing an individual is to self-categorize 
into the relevant social group, and it can therefore reliably be used to predict an array 
of outcomes (Turner, 1999).
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Finally, SCT brings subgroup-superordinate group relations into play. Are there 
differences in intersubgroup relations when different superordinate categories are 
primed? Might the British sample be more favourable towards Germans under 
NATO than under The EU? Similarly, might the German sample be more favourable 
towards the British under The EU than under NATO?
2.2 Models of subgroup-superordinate group relations
Having discussed the two parent theories, this section examines the four models that 
draw on these theories to develop their explanations of subgroup-superordinate group 
relations. Relations between in- and outgroups are context-specific. If we turn to any 
large social group, this will almost by default comprise subgroups; for example a 
national group can be divided into subgroups based on gender, occupation, ethnic 
background etc. (Hornsey & Hogg, 2000a). In this context, relationships are three- 
way lateral (ingroup-outgroup) and hierarchical (ingroup and outgroup under a 
shared superordinate category) (see Figure 2). The superordinate category provides a 
common ingroup, from which ingroup members construct group norms (Hogg & 
Turner, 1987). Therefore, we may legitimately draw conclusions about intergroup 
relations only when the groups are examined under the umbrella of a shared higher 
order group. The thesis seeks to do this.
The reader is reminded that the degree of identification at the ingroup level may vary 
from individual to individual, and therefore the degree of identification at the higher 
level may also vary from individual to individual. These two identification levels 
may interact, and the effects of these interactions may help determine the forms that
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ingroup enhancement (e.g. ingroup bias) might take. Finally, perceived power and 
legitimacy (discussed later) may play pivotal roles in both high- and low-status 
groups’ social realities (discussed previously).
Figure 2: Three-way lateral and hierarchical relationships
Superordinate category
OutgroupIngroup
Four models of subgroup-superordinate group relations are examined throughout. 
Firstly, Gaertner and Dovidio’s (Gaertner, et al., 1993; Gaertner & Dovidio, 2000) 
Common Ingroup Identity Model (CIIM) draws on SCT and proposes that if ingroup 
members recategorize at the superordinate category level, this can improve 
intersubgroup relations. Secondly, Hewstone and Brown’s (1986) Mutual Intergroup 
Differentiation Model (MIDM) originally contested CIIM, and argued that SIT’s 
propositions form the cornerstone in intersubgroup relations. If ingroup members 
maintain ingroup distinctiveness and appreciate outgroup differences, intersubgroup 
relations can be favourable. MIDM has since been revised, and the new model -  the 
Intergroup Contact Model (ICM: Brown & Hewstone, 2005) -  is integrated into the 
discussion below.
Thirdly, in their comparison of CUM and MIDM, Homsey and Hogg (2000a) offer in 
conclusion an Integrative Model of Subgroup Relations (IMSR). In doing so they
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suggest that, by and large, MIDM is the stronger model in improving intersubgroup 
relations, but CIIM and its predictions may hold under some circumstances. Finally, 
as with CIIM, the Ingroup Projection Model (IPM: Mummendey & Wenzel, 1999) 
draws on SCT. Its predictions, however, are contrary to CIIM. IPM posits that the 
positive evaluation of the higher order group can lead to derogation of the 
outgroup(s).
2.2.1 The Common Ingroup Identity Model (CIIM)
CIIM, originally presented in 1993 (Gaertner et al., 1993), has been tested in an 
expansive variety of real-life and experimental settings (e.g., inter- and intranational 
relations: Costarelli, 2006; Eller & Abrams, 2003; students: Gonzalez & Brown, 
2003; Hornsey & Hogg, 2000b; organisations: Gaertner, Dovidio, & Bachman, 1996; 
Huo, Smith, Tyler, & Lind, 1996; Lipponen, Helkama, & Juslin, 2003; Lipponen & 
Leskinen, 2006; racial attitudes: Dovidio et al., 2004; Houlette, Gaertner, Johnson, 
Banker, Riek, & Dovidio, 2004; Nier, Gaertner, Dovidio, Banker, Ward, & Rust,
2001). In 2000, Gaertner and Dovidio re-presented an extended model, illustrated in 
Figure 3.
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Figure 3: The Common Ingroup Identity Model
Causes ■=> RepresentationalMediators <=> Consequences
Intergroup interdependence:
• Cooperation (e.g. common 
problem or fate)
• Competition (e.g. zero-sum)
(1)
One Group
Re-categorisation
'we’
Cognitive Effects:
• Association in memory
• Category/individual based 
recall
• Perceived group 
homogeneity
Group differentiation:
• Similarity (e.g. status, 
resources)
• Perceptual entitativity (e.g. 
proximity)
(2)
Two Subgroups 
in one Group
Re-categorisation 
‘us + them = we ’
Affective Consequences:
• Evaluations (spontaneous 
or deliberate)
• Empathic concern
• Positive affect
Environmental context:
• Egalitarian norms
• Social influence (e.g. in- and 
outgroup representations)
(3)
Two Groups
Categorisation 
‘we -  they ’
Behavioural Effects:
• Cooperation/Competition
Pre-contact experience: (4)
• Affective priming Separate
• Cognitive priming Individuals
De-categorisation
‘me-you ’
Note: Modified from Gaertner et al., (2000). The Common Ingroup Identity Model. In D. Capozza & 
R. Brown (Eds.), Social Identity Processes (p. 135). London: Sage.
In its original form, CIIM maintained that merging subgroups into one ‘big family’ 
would improve intersubgroup relations (see Figure 3, centre column, 1. One Group). 
This requires the process of recategorization and assimilation. Consistent with SCT, 
categorizing oneself into a group brings that group closer to the self. In this sense, 
intergroup boundaries become blurred or disappear during the recategorization 
process. Therefore according to CUM, if group boundaries are extended to a higher 
level of inclusiveness, former outgroups are thus included in the higher shared 
category and benefit from ingroup favouritism.
Page 25
Furthermore, a perceiver will gauge and categorize the other based on, for example, 
shared goals and/or common fate (Oakes, 1987; Oakes & Turner, 1990). If a 
common goal can be identified, then the perceiver is more likely to identify the other 
as a co-member of the superordinate category which shares that goal. This line of 
argumentation has its roots in Sherif s (1969, 1979) Summer Camp Studies.
The idea that shared goals can result in a reduction of intergroup conflict has met 
with criticism (e.g., Billig, 1976; Hewstone & Brown, 1986; Tajfel, 1978): 
unwelcome shared goals can exacerbate relations between subgroups. Nonetheless, 
Gaertner and Dovidio (2000) have pursued this concept further. Drawing also on 
Realistic Conflict Theory (Campbell, 1965; LeVine & Campbell, 1972; see also 
Sherif & Sherif, 1979), they argue that if resources are scarce and groups compete 
for these, intergroup conflict will arise; a win-lose situation. However, if a spirit of 
intergroup cooperation can be nurtured, the resulting win-win situation potential will 
see a reduction in competition, that is, in intergroup conflict.
In its original form, CIIM was cognition-based. The revised model (Gaertner & 
Dovidio, 2000) acknowledges additionally affect and behavioural components, 
where individual needs and beliefs are primary when personal identity is salient, and 
collective needs and goals when social identity is salient. Figure 3, left column -  
Causes -  shows possible predictive factors that may affect intersubgroup relations 
(e.g., intergroup interdependence, group differentiation). These factors may function 
independently or interdependently and may colour a person’s perception of the 
superordinate category and its subgroups. The right column -  Consequences -  shows 
possible outcomes (cognitive, behavioural and affective). The direction of causality
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may be left to right as depicted in Figure 3, but also bidirectional. For example, the 
impact of the consequences may lead to increased cooperation or competition. 
Representational mediators that may intervene between the two are depicted in the 
centre column. Of the four representational mediators, the first two are relevant to 
this thesis1.
As well as now acknowledging behaviour and affect, Gaertner and Dovidio (2000, 
pp. 48-49) now maintain that the CIIM strategy ‘does not necessarily’ exact of group 
members that they relinquish their lower level ingroup identity, because ‘it would be 
undesirable or impossible for people to relinquish these’. This new slant integrates 
MIDM/ICM (see Figure 3, centre column, 2. Two Subgroups in one Group), which is 
discussed in the next section. There is no one-size-fits-all strategy to reduce 
intergroup conflict, but they propose that the representational mediators reflect 
‘complimentary approaches and ... that it is more productive to consider when each 
strategy is most effective’ rather than which is the better contender (p. 33, emphasis 
in original). Furthermore, they add, the CIIM strategy can reduce bias over time.
2.2.2 The Intergroup Contact Model (ICM: formerly MIDM)
Many agree today that CIIM may be one of several approaches to reduce intergroup
antagonism. However, in its original form (Gaertner et al., 1993) it did not
accommodate affect and suggested somewhat that the ‘one big family’ approach is
the most effective strategy in promoting intergroup harmony. Also, many argued that
1 The other two are: 3 -  Two Groups): When perceptions of the aggregate are two distinct groups the 
current author suggests that attitudes to the outgroup may range from positive through indifferent to 
negative. 4 -  Separate Individuals: De-categorisation, on the other hand, reflects Optimal 
Distinctiveness Theory (Brewer, 1991; Brewer & Miller, 1984) and may serve to satisfy an 
individual’s need for both inclusiveness and distinctiveness
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the SCT-driven CIIM did not profit from the motivational insights into intergroup 
behaviour offered by SIT, nor take the social realities of the groups involved into 
account. Hewstone and Brown’s (1986) MIDM offered an alternative model of 
subgroup-superordinate group relations. To begin, MIDM is presented here in its 
original form as an untested model. Based on their own research (Hewstone, 1996; 
Vivian, Hewstone, & Brown, 1997) and the research of others, the model was later 
renamed the Intergroup Contact Model (Brown & Hewstone, 2005), and the 
refinements are presented later in this section. For the sake of clarity, the model is 
referred to as MIDM or as ICM where appropriate.
If we are to gain a fuller understanding of naturally occurring intergroup processes, 
we must turn to the social sciences and integrate their contributions (Hewstone & 
Brown, 1986). MIDM accommodates Tajfel’s (1978) notion of the desire to attain 
positive ingroup identity and Turner’s (1981; Turner et al., 1987) distinction between 
interpersonal and intergroup processes. Its rationale is as follows. Groups will differ 
on some dimensions, though not necessarily on others. Different groups will place 
varying degrees of importance on these perceived differences. The degree of 
importance placed by a specific group on these differences is an unknown quantity. 
Thus, what might be an acceptable degree of intergroup differences for one group, 
might for the other be not enough. In other words, if the outgroup is perceived to be 
too similar to the ingroup, the ingroup might feel that its unique identity is under 
threat, and ingroup bias or outgroup derogation is a likely response. Therefore, it 
might be more circumspect to focus on ‘establishing mutual intergroup 
differentiation’ (Hewstone & Brown, 1986, p. 35). If, they argue, groups could 
mutually appreciate both similarities and differences and recognise weaknesses and
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strengths in each other, each group would be able to maintain positive ingroup 
evaluation and nurture positive outgroup evaluation.
Whereas CIIM advocates a policy of recategorization and assimilation, the original 
MIDM advocates a policy of pluralism as a means to improving intersubgroup 
relations. In the former, minority group members adopt the values of the mainstream 
group; in the latter, minority groups maintain their own distinct identity. Drawing on 
Berry (1984) and Triandis (1976), Hewstone and Brown (1986) are quite explicit in 
advocating pluralism. They caution that it would be ‘both naive and wrong to teach 
people that others are similar in all respects and to gloss over fundamental 
differences’ (p. 10). Based on its own ingroup history and values, a real-life group 
simply may not want to amalgamate with a specific outgroup or outgroups, and this 
stance might be legitimate.
MIDM does not conflict with the CIIM proposition that working together towards a 
common goal can reduce intergroup conflict. However, Hewstone and Brown (1986) 
argue that improved relations cannot be attributed exclusively to recategorization. 
Rather, subgroups working together share an environment where they can 
acknowledge each other’s strengths and weaknesses. In line with Gaertner and 
Dovidio, they too raise concerns regarding shared goals. Firstly, short-term 
cooperation (as in Sherif s (1969, 1979) Summer Camp Studies) will not necessary 
extend to long-term intergroup harmony. Secondly, if the ingroup does not feel that 
its contribution is adequately honoured, and/or if the ingroup does not perceive its 
role to be unique, identity threat might result. Finally, although a vast body of 
research (e.g. Aronson, Blaney, Stephan, Sikes, & Snapp, 1978; Johnson, Johnson, &
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Maruyama, 1984; Worchel, 1979) supports the notion that working in co-operation 
can improve intergroup relations, failed co-operation can increase intergroup 
conflict.
Similarly, caution is called for when implementing a mutual intergroup 
differentiation approach (Hewstone & Brown, 1986). Policies promoting ingroup 
esteem might also promote ethnocentrism (Berry, 1984, 1997). Blatant outgroup 
discrimination might be replaced with a more subtle form (Mummendey & 
Schreiber, 1983, 1984; van Knippenberg & van Oers, 1984). Thirdly, in line with 
Stephan and Stephan’s (1984) concerns, highlighting intergroup differences might 
bring with it perceived outgroup inferiority to the forefront.
What insights led to the revised ICM? The two main arguments underlining the 
original MIDM are (a) mutual intergroup differentiation must be maintained and (b) 
ingroup-outgroup encounters must be perceived to be at the intergroup level and not 
at an interpersonal level. In the revised model, the importance of mutual intergroup 
differentiation remains. The importance of intergroup level contact has been revised. 
As Brown and Hewstone (2005) acknowledge, the initial MIDM failed to recognise 
the power that outgroup friendships -  that is, interpersonal contact -  and intergroup 
emotions might have on reducing ingroup bias .
There are, then, essential differences between CIIM and MIDM/ICM, although the 
two seem to be converging. The revised CIIM acknowledges and integrates MIDM
2 Additionally they have identified that group salience moderates the effects of contact on reducing 
ingroup bias, that is, group salience explains when bias reduction might occur. Intergroup anxiety (as 
well as other affective components) can mediate strongly between intergroup contact and attitudes 
towards the outgroup, that is, intergroup anxiety might explain how or why attitudes improve.
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(see Figure 3, 2. Two Subgroups in one Group). Similarly, ICM now lends support to 
some aspects of CIIM. Furthermore, both Dovidio et al. (2000) and Brown and 
Hewstone (2005) agree that the four acculturation strategies suggested by Berry 
(1984, 1997) can be linked to their strategies. Berry’s integration strategy reflects 
dual identification (and IMSR, presented next), assimilation reflects CIIM, 
separation (i.e. pluralism) reflects ICM3. Additionally, further findings from 
acculturation research suggest that minority group members may favour a policy of 
integration (Berry, 1997; Zagefka & Brown, 2002), majority group members may 
favour a policy of assimilation (Pfafferott & Brown, 2004; Zagefka, Brown, 
Broquard, & Leventoglu, 2002). These two policies may therefore represent 
conflicting goals of minority and majority groups. What may be the better policy for 
one group and its interests may not necessarily be the better policy for the other 
group and its interests.
2.2.3 The Integrative Model of Subgroup Relations (IMSR)
It would seem, then, that neither CIIM with its strong recategorization emphasis nor 
ICT/MIDM with its strong ingroup distinctiveness emphasis can account wholly for 
ingroup bias causation or reduction. This leads to the third model of subgroup- 
superordinate group relations -  Hornsey and Hogg’s (2000a) IMSR. The model 
integrates CIIM and MIDM (not the later published ICM) in three-way lateral and 
hierarchical relationships (see Figure 2), with particular emphasis on the impact of 
the role of the superordinate category. The model considers both social psychological 
and political approaches, and, most importantly, brings CIIM and ICT/MIDM into
3 The forth, marginalization, reflects Brewer’s (1984) Optimal Distinctiveness Theory.
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the non-contact situation, which, as Homsey and Hogg point out, is how relations 
often are in natural group settings.
Whereas there is a wealth of experimental and correlational evidence to support 
CIIM, MIDM appears to have received relatively little attention (Homsey & Hogg, 
2000a). Against this backdrop, CIIM and MIDM were compared directly in a two- 
study series involving a student sample in a decision-making task (Homsey & Hogg, 
2000b). In short, support was found for MIDM. Ingroup identification and ingroup 
bias were higher when the superordinate category alone was made salient (Figure 4, 
left, CIIM). Ingroup bias was lower when both levels of identity were salient (Figure 
4, right, MEDM), however not significantly so. It also emerged that members nested 
within the superordinate category (CIIM) were more aware of being equally 
represented or not, and perceived inequality led to intersubgroup competition. A 
similar study with intergroup similarity-dissimilarity as independent variable brought 
forth a similar pattern of scores (Homsey & Hogg, 2000c).
Figure 4: Structural relations between superordinate category and subgroups
^ S C + a \
Subgroupo]
S S C + b^ > <  
Subgroup b]
Superordinate category*
CIIM
Nested subgroups (assimilation)
Subgroup a Subgroup b\
MIDM
Cross-cutting subgroups (pluralism)
Superordinate category (SC)
Note: Modified from Homsey, M.J. & Hogg, M.A. (2000a). Assimilation and diversity: An 
integrative model of subgroup relations. Personality and Social Psychology Review, 4/2, 143-156.
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From the above evidence, Homsey and Hogg (2000a) offer an integrative model of 
subgroup relations, where both subgroup and superordinate group identities are 
acknowledged and fostered simultaneously; a process of dual categorisation leading 
to dual identification. Interestingly, Homsey and Hogg place policies of assimilation 
and pluralism on a continuum, where extreme assimilation involves the primacy of 
superordinate category identification and the absence of subgroup identity, and 
extreme pluralism the preservation of subgroup identification enhanced with 
superordinate category identification. In the integrative model, positive evaluation of 
the ingroup can extend to all groups belonging to the aggregate (CIIM), and ingroup 
distinctiveness can remain intact (ICM).
Supporting IMSR, Haslam (2001) argues that the original CIIM ‘was partly dictated 
by the fact that it involved upgrading the erstwhile outgroup rather than downgrading 
the erstwhile ingroup’ (p. 188), which might explain some cases where assimilation 
(and not dual identification) improved intersubgroup relations. Haslam maintains that 
subgroup-level differentiation is required for a superordinate category to emerge, 
and, indeed, to be maintained. That is, subgroup relations are more likely to be 
successful when subgroups are given a voice during the emergence of the 
superordinate category; thus dual identification has been made possible and the 
superordinate category mediates subgroup relations (Eggins, Haslam, & Reynolds, 
2002: Exp. 2). Further experimental evidence to support the IMSR proposition has 
already emerged (e.g., Gaertner, Rust, Dovidio, Bachman, & Anastasio, 1996; 
Gonzalez & Brown, 2003; Huo, Smith, Tyler, & Lind, 1996).
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Concurring with Brown and Hewstone (2005), however, Homsey and Hogg (2000a) 
do note that groups place themselves in the three-way lateral and hierarchical 
relationship model based more on their perceptions of relationships and less on 
structural reality. In some situations, full assimilation might be goal-worthy, in others 
the pluralistic approach. Each approach, of course, comes with potential hazards. If 
the subgroup is subsumed within the superordinate category, it is ‘land-locked’ 
should relationships become strained (as shown in Figure 4, left). If the subgroup is 
not subsumed within the superordinate category (as shown in Figure 4, right) and 
perceives that, for example, the other subgroup is seeking to exert too much 
influence, again relationships can become strained.
In summary and consistent with MIDM/ICM, IMSR proposes that distinctiveness 
threat plays the key role in intersubgroup relations. As well as social reality 
considerations, other key factors such as power differentials may affect 
intersubgroup relations in natural groups. Consistent with CIIM, the superordinate 
category can provide subgroup members with a positive higher order identity, can 
under some circumstances subsume the subgroup but generally not, and a subgroup 
can be ‘nested in a coherent superordinate category’ (p. 143). The superordinate 
category should not, however, conflict with subgroup norms, values and beliefs nor 
threaten its distinctiveness (Homsey & Hogg, 2000a). Recent findings support this. 
When comparing the subgroups contract workers and permanent workers, the degree 
of common ingroup identity mediated between perceived support given by the 
superordinate category (here the employer) and ingroup bias (Lipponen & Leskinen, 
2006). Recategorization processes appears to function more successfully when the
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superordinate category undertakes measures to promote good intersubgroup 
relations.
2.2.4 The Ingroup Projection Model (IPM)
The evidence thus far suggests that recategorization and assimilation can improve 
intersubgroup relations, though mutual intergroup differentiation and pluralism is 
more likely to do so. However, one model of intersubgroup relations that draws upon 
SCT predicts that recategorization can harm intersubgroup relations -  the Ingroup 
Projection Model (IPM: Mummendey & Wenzel, 1999). According to IPM, if the 
ingroup evaluates the superordinate category positively, it will project its own 
attributes onto the superordinate category, and may claim higher relative ingroup 
prototypicality4. This, in turn, may lead to ingroup bias or outgroup derogation. If the 
superordinate category is evaluated negatively, this might lead to the rejection of the 
superordinate category and a positive evaluation of the outgroup(s).
Mummendey and Wenzel (1999) illustrate ingroup projection with the following 
example: Pre-reunification in Germany, it was not likely that West Germans would 
rate East Germans on typical West German attributes such as efficiency and 
diligence, because two different political systems were in place and a common 
identity less salient. In a later study (Waldzus, Mummendey, Wenzel, & Boettcher, 
2004), it emerged that both East and West Germans believe the dominant, higher-
4 They liken IPM to the false consensus effect (Ross, Greene & House, 1977), whereby individuals 
overestimate the degree to which others share their views and beliefs. More recent evidence suggests 
that the overestimation of consensus on shared opinions operates within the ingroup, but does not 
extend to the outgroup (Spears & Manstead, 1990). In other words, the false consensus effect may 
shed light on projection processes from the individual onto the ingroup, whereas IPM offers an 
explanation for projection emanating from the ingroup onto the superordinate category.
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status group West Germans to be more prototypical of the superordinate category 
Germans than the lower-status group East Germans. The same paper measured 
intergroup evaluation and perceived relative prototypicality in an informal group 
(motorcyclists) and a structured group (teachers). All three studies yielded evidence 
of ingroup projection, and from this Waldzus et al. (2004) conclude that IPM is a 
robust construct.
SCT provides the main theoretical thrust of IPM. Specifically, Wenzel, 
Mummendey, Weber and Waldzus (2003) turn to Turner’s claims that 
‘ethnocentrism ... depends upon the perceived prototypicality of the ingroup in 
comparison with relevant outgroups (relative prototypicality) in terms of the valued 
superordinate self-category that provides the basis for the intergroup comparison’ 
(Turner et al., 1987, p. 61). The ingroup’s perception of the superordinate category 
mediates the relationship to the outgroup(s), whereby the superordinate category 
provides the norms against which the outgroup is judged (Mummendey & Wenzel, 
1999). When the ingroup claims greater relative prototypicality, it does so with 
‘validity’ and ‘superiority’ (p. 165). Due to its mediating role, we must turn to the 
superordinate category and its representation -  and not to the initial subgroups -  if 
we are to understand and counteract intergroup conflict.
In three respects, EPM supports MIDM/ICM. Firstly, it accommodates the 
mechanisms of natural groups, each with its own history and reality constraints. 
Indeed, a viable model must accommodate ‘social facts and socially shared truths’ 
which IPM does, because ‘[i]n-group projection can bend, but it cannot diverge from 
social truths’ (Waldzus et al., 2004, p. 387). Secondly, IPM acknowledges that the
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groups’ past may not be enough to overcome current intergroup. rivalry (e.g., 
Worchel, Coutant-Sassic, & Grossman, 1992; Worchel, 1996). Finally, IPM suggests 
that the continuum of perceived intergroup similarities-differences may be causal in 
negative intergroup relationships for one of two reasons; (a) perceived intergroup 
differences or (b) lack o f perceived intergroup differences (Mummendey & Wenzel, 
1999).
IPM does, however, bring into question the CIIM paradigm that a shared common 
identity at the superordinate level will increase outgroup evaluation due to 
generalization effects (Gaertner et al., 1993; Gaertner & Dovidio, 2000), because the 
success of generalization effects is not predictable. Rather, any improvements in 
intergroup relations may be accounted for by depersonalized liking (Waldzus, 
Mummendey, Wenzel, & Weber, 2003).
Furthermore and contrary to the predictions of IMSR, IPM maintains that high dual 
identifiers (i.e. high identification with ingroup and with the superordinate category) 
show highest ingroup bias. Because this is a central question in this thesis, supporting 
evidence is examined here in some detail (Wenzel et al., 2003). Relationships were 
examined between students from different disciplines (Exp. 1) and between Germans 
and Poles (Exp. 2 and 3). From Exp. 1 and 2, it became apparent that those who 
identified highest with both the ingroup and the superordinate category (dual 
identity) perceived the higher relative ingroup prototypicality, and there was an 
association between relative prototypicality and negative attitudes towards the 
outgroup. Exp. 3 revealed that a positively primed superordinate category generated
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more negative attitudes towards the outgroup, and a negatively primed superordinate 
category more positive attitudes towards the outgroup5.
This notion has, in turn, received criticism from others (see Gonzales & Brown, 
2003). As a rejoinder, Waldzus et al. (2003) maintain that dual identity will not in 
every case lead to intergroup conflict. Mere superordinate category presence is not 
enough; rather, it is the representation of the superordinate category that mediates 
possible effects. The superordinate category is, in this sense, the prototype. Although 
the quality of the superordinate categories’ representations were not of primary 
interest in this thesis, they are relevant in Study 1 and Study 2.
Mummendey and Wenzel (1999) suggest there are at least four representational 
qualities of the prototype. A prototype might (a) be clear or unclear, (b) have a large 
or small scope, (c) be narrow or broad, and (d) be simple or complex. These qualities 
were tested in a later study (Waldzus et al., 2003), and, in line with their predictions, 
undefinable and complex representations of the superordinate category decreased 
perceived relative prototypicality. Relative prototypicality was highest for dual 
identifiers when the representation was simple. Finally, if the representation was 
complex, there was no prototypicality effect even with high dual identifiers. It was 
concluded that the representation of the superordinate category must be both clearly 
definable and unitary, if the phenomenon of ingroup projection is to occur.
It appears, therefore, that the conditions necessary for ingroup projection are still 
somewhat blurred. For example, what of those groups who mutually agree on the
5 These findings were ‘of modest size’ and effects ‘small’, but these nonetheless offered support for 
the ‘basic theoretical predictions’ (p. 470).
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levels of perceived relative ingroup prototypicality? Here, Waldzus et al. (2004) 
argue that although there may be no contestation and thus no ‘prototypicality 
rivalry’, this does not rule out intergroup conflict. Secondly, what of those groups 
who reject superordinate category membership? Here, prototypicality is meaningless 
(Weber, Mummendey, & Waldzus, 2002). Where shared norms do not exist, 
between-group differences cannot constitute norm violation. In cases such as these, 
IPM predicts ‘plurality or tolerance[,] ... low comparability, disconnection, or 
exclusion’ (Mummendey & Wenzel, 1999, p. 169).
Summarised, an esteemed superordinate category can be likened to the container of 
positive values and attributes projected upon it by the ingroup. Members will regard 
both ingroup and the superordinate category positively (SCT). The higher the regard 
for the superordinate category, the more relatively prototypical ingroup members will 
feel. This perception may lead to ingroup favouritism and/or outgroup derogation.
Although IPM has examined perceived legitimacy and status differences (Weber et 
al., 2002), and Homsey and Hogg (2000a) suspect that those groups who ‘project 
their identities on to the shared superordinate category ... may be particularly strong 
[in] very high status, power, or both’ (p. 152), the role of perceived relative power 
and its relations to relative prototypicality has not yet been examined. The thesis 
seeks to investigate any relationships between the two, and to establish which is the 
more reliable predictor of ingroup bias.
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2.2.5 Implications and questions
It is apparent that the superordinate category plays a substantial role in intersubgroup 
relations. Of the four models, three converge to some degree; CUM, MIDM/ICM and 
IMSR. CIIM explains the positive effect on intersubgroup relations that 
recategorization can have. MIDM/ICM emphasises the need for ingroup 
differentiation. Both models acknowledge their mutual strengths. IMSR proposes 
that both approaches can help improve intersubgroup relations depending on 
circumstances, whereby dual identification is the key. Perhaps a major contribution 
of IMSR is its definition of dual identification. By placing assimilation and pluralism 
on a continuum, one policy does not necessarily exclude the other. Not inconsistent 
with MIDM/ICM, but contrary to CIIM and IMSR is IPM. If a subgroup perceives 
itself to be prototypical of a shared superordinate category, it may demonstrate 
ingroup bias and/or outgroup derogation.
These models can lead to a multitude of questions in the examination of British- 
German relations under a shared superordinate category. For example, in Study 1 and 
Study 2 in this thesis, the superordinate categories NATO and/or The EU provide 
common ties between the subgroups Great Britain and Germany. Will differences in 
intersubgroup relations emerge depending on the saliency of the respective 
superordinate categories? Will the representation of the prototype affect 
intersubgroup relations? Will the group claiming higher relative prototypicality also 
demonstrate higher ingroup bias (IPM)? Will the group higher in superordinate 
category identification demonstrate lower ingroup bias (CIIM)? Finally, will high 
dual identifiers show higher ingroup bias (IPM) or lower ingroup bias (IMSR)?
Page 40
2.3 The Roles of Power and Legitimacy
As well as the perceived social realities of the groups, the legitimacy and status (and 
thus power) of intersubgroup relations may affect ingroup bias (Bettencourt, Door, 
Charlton, & Hume, 2001; Jetten et al., 2004; Mullen, Brown, & Smith, 1992; Mullen, 
Migdal, & Hewstone, 2001). Additionally, although social identity theorists 
acknowledge that, generally, the ingroup will favour itself over the outgroup, there 
can be exceptions. Namely, outgroup favouritism has also been identified (e.g., 
Guimond, Dif, Aupy, 2002; Jost, Banaji, & Nosek, 2004, Tajfel & Turner, 1979). 
Finally, perceived relative prototypicality could serve to predict ingroup bias 
(Mummendey & Wenzel, 1999). However, there is little evidence to date to suggest 
that the interaction between relative prototypicality and relative power has been 
examined (although, as presented later, Weber et al., (2002), have investigated status 
differences and relative prototypicality). In this thesis, both relative prototypicality 
and relative power are measured throughout, and additionally, Study 3 explores the 
impact of perceived legitimacy on ingroup bias.
2.3.1 Power
It is circumspect at this point to differentiate between power and status. These are 
similar but distinct constructs. In an intergroup setting, power is typically defined as 
‘the degree of control one group has over its own fate and that of outgroups’ (Jones, 
1972, p. 416). Based on Sherif s (1966) Summer Camp Studies, it is generally 
acknowledged that demonstrations of power may likely become apparent in 
intergroup conflict. Status, on the other hand, reflects the standing a group has within
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an intergroup setting, and it may be exhibited in terms of prestige, power, privileges 
and so forth (Homsey et al., 2003). Status differences can promote or decrease 
ingroup bias, depending on the opportunities a group sees to change or maintain the 
social order (Turner & Brown, 1978). Power can result from status, although both 
can function independently of each other (Homsey et al, 2003). Both power and 
status are relative and often reflect perceptions rather than actual reality, whereby 
power is also a reflection of ‘a material fact of social relations’ (p. 216). However 
and as indicated above, the degree of the legitimacy of the relative status and power 
brings with it perceptions of relations spanning from being right and fair to wrong 
and unfair.
It is interesting at this point to reflect upon a recent proposal regarding the nature of 
power. Turner (2005) questions the standard theory of power and its suggested 
direction of causality between ingroup identification, power and ingroup bias 
(control over resources). The view to date is that control over resources leads to 
perceptions of power, which in turn leads to influence (a reflection of social identity) 
and finally to group formation. As one point in question, this theory suggests that 
influence flows unidirectionally, from the ‘“haves” to the “have-nots’” (p. 4), and 
this does not align well with the reality of historical and social change, and 
associated strength of minority influence. Indeed, the approach suggests that the 
‘psychological group is a precondition o f influence, not simply an outcome’ (p. 4, 
emphasis in original). In response, Turner differentiates between, for example, 
persuasion, authority and coercion, and proposes in his three-process theory that 
control over resources is a result of power, and not vice versa. Furthermore, the 
degree of power evolves from the antecedents of group formation and the emergent
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degree of ingroup identification. This proposal will not be examined in depth, but 
will be addressed briefly in the Results and Discussion sections of Study 2.
Returning to the standard paradigm of power, it appears that a more powerful group 
may abuse its power -  one need look no further than a daily newspaper to see where 
this is the case in natural group settings. Indeed, it has been argued that a more 
powerful group has not only the ability but also the means to do so. The more 
powerful group will not necessarily fear penalties for its behaviour (Ng, 1980; 1982). 
Power differentials may also depend upon ‘whatever other party may be significantly 
involved’ (1982, p. 180) -  within the framework of this thesis the superordinate 
category. Ng successfully demonstrated that the superordinate category (here a Select 
Committee in a university setting) can mediate between in- and outgroup. In his 
study, the in- and outgroup were represented ostensibly on the Committee, where the 
ingroup enjoyed majority power, equal power to the outgroup, or minority power. 
Discrimination was highest in the majority condition, there were no differences in 
discrimination levels in the equal and minority conditions.
In a later study (Sachdev & Bourhis, 1985), participants allocated resources to in- 
and outgroup. Here, the ingroup held one of five levels of power (e.g., no power, 
high power, absolute power). Generally, the lower the power, the lower the ingroup 
bias. However, the high-power ingroup demonstrated higher discriminatory 
behaviour that the ingroup with absolute power. From this they suggest that an 
absolute power group can demonstrate benevolent paternalism or ‘noblesse oblige’ -  
possibly because it can afford to. In contrast, a high-power group does not have 
absolute control, its position is insecure, its response is ingroup bias. Furthermore, it
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has been proposed that the noblesse oblige effect might occur when a high-status 
group is able to show generosity to a low-status group on a dimension that does not 
challenge its status position (Spears et al., 2001; see also Hewstone, Rubin, & Willis, 
2002: Leach, Snider, & Iyer, 2002).
However, Vanbeslaere, Boen, van Avermaet, and Buelens (2006) argue that the 
higher power position may bring with it a degree of social responsibility (see also 
Chen, Lee-Chai, & Bargh, 2001; Overbeck & Park, 2001; Rusbult & Van Lange, 
1996). In their study ingroup bias was lowest when control over the ingroup or 
control over the outgroup was 0%. Ingroup bias increased significantly when control 
over either group was 50%. Ingroup bias decreased with absolute control over the 
ingroup, but not with absolute control over the outgroup. This leads to the interesting 
conclusion that it is not power over the outgroup that may lead to the noblesse oblige 
effect, but power over the ingroup. This effect may be due to ‘individuals’ feeling of 
security about the in-group’s outcomes -  rather than due to an advantageous position 
in an intergroup power structure’ (Vanbeslaere et al., 2006, p. 696).
2.3.2 The Interaction between Power and Legitimacy
The legitimacy of intergroup relations and status differentials interact to produce 
differing levels of ingroup bias (Turner & Brown, 1978). Three primary theoretical 
approaches have been applied or developed to account for the role of legitimacy in 
power relations. All three differ in their essence, yet all three concur that ideas and
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beliefs fuel notions of perceived (il)legitimacy. Two are addressed here, the third is 
outside of the remit of this thesis6.
Firstly, System Justification Theory (Jost et al., 2004; Jost & Major, 2001) 
distinguishes between ego-, group- and system justification and the role of 
legitimacy in intergroup relations. In broad terms, group justification comprises those 
arguments laid down by SIT. At the system justification level -  a level that Jost and 
colleagues claim has been neglected by SIT -  both the dominant group and the 
subordinate group will seek to maintain the status quo if the system is justified. Here, 
then, members of the subordinate group internalise their inferior status, and this, 
according to System Justification Theory, explains outgroup favouritism.
This brings us to the second approach; SIT, which offers a different account for 
ingroup favouritism. A less powerful group will employ identity management 
strategies to attain positive distinctiveness, but research suggests that these are not 
necessarily at the cost of the more powerful group (Homsey et al., 2003). Indeed, a 
low-power group may not be in a position to challenge realistically the high-power 
group or the status quo, thus direct social competition is not always a viable option in 
a natural setting. It is possible that a low-power group will therefore use more 
‘benign forms’ to enhance the group’s status, and these will ‘reflect[...] the 
ideological content of group norms’ (Spears et al., 2001, p. 337), for example by 
showing social creativity. At face value, this lack of social competition can be
6 The third, Social Dominance Theory (Sidanius, 1993; Sidanius & Pratto, 1999) speaks o f ‘hierarchy- 
legitimizing myths’ (1999, p. 77), and these myths empower dominant group members to deem 
ingroup superiority as right. The means by which the group expresses this is by ‘the threat or actual 
exercise of naked force and the contents of “legitimate” social discourse’ (p. 103). This theory argues 
that an individual will score along the social dominance orientation scale, and group membership will 
promote high scorers’ beliefs in the rightness of the status quo.
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interpreted as outgroup favouritism. However, a lack of social competition does not 
equate to the internalization of the low-status group’s inferiority. Rather, the group 
may employ other ways that bend to reality constraints when managing its identity. 
This explanation accounts well for the lack of social competition -  that is, this 
accounts well for ‘outgroup favouritism’ -  and thus brings the explanation offered by 
System Justification Theory into question.
In their examination of the role of legitimacy of power differentials in intergroup 
relations, Homsey et al. (2003) see power as a ‘material fact’ (p. 216), and this can 
have real outcomes such as the distribution of wealth and resources. They suggest, 
however, that perceived legitimacy is perhaps the psychological interpretation of 
power, and this perception may be of more import in intergroup relations than the 
‘factual’ power itself. Perceived legitimacy may modify behaviour and relations, and 
past findings in minimal group settings (see also Doosje, Spears, & Koomen, 1995; 
Jetten, Spears, Hogg, & Manstead, 2000; Ng, 1982) indicate that high-power groups 
show higher ingroup bias, and low-power groups more fairness or outgroup bias. 
Furthermore, illegitimate power might be more commonplace than one would 
assume. For example, those affected by tokenism (Kanter 1977; Moreland, 1965; 
Wright & Taylor, 1999) or ambivalent sexism (Glick & Fiske, 1996, 2001) may find 
it difficult to produce hard evidence of being the target of discriminatory behaviour. 
The power relationship is, in these instances, illegitimate.
>
Homsey et al. (2003) tested the interactions between legitimacy and power. When 
relations were perceived as legitimate, power relations were seen to be fair. When 
relationships were perceived as illegitimate, power relations were seen to be more
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unfair. Additionally, the levels of ingroup bias demonstrated were higher in 
illegitimate conditions irrespective of high or low-power, which supports fully the 
findings of Turner and Brown (1979).
Finally, relationships have been found between relative prototypicality, status and 
legitimacy (Weber et al., 2002). There was a positive relationship between relative 
prototypicality and perceived legitimacy, whereby the sample was drawn from a 
high-status group (i.e. university students compared with polytechnic students as the 
outgroup). There was, in turn, a negative relationship between legitimacy and 
ingroup bias (measured on the dimension of attitudes), but no relationship between 
relative prototypicality and ingroup bias (Study l)7. Later studies revealed that the 
relationship between relative prototypicality and legitimacy was dependent on two 
moderators: the valence of the superordinate category and perceived status.
2.3.3 Implications and Questions
It is commonly acknowledged that power differentials are very likely to affect 
ingroup bias. And there the generalisation ends. A more powerful group may show 
higher or lower ingroup bias than a less powerful group, and vice versa. The 
perceived (il)legitimacy of the intergroup situation may well be the key to explain 
ingroup bias levels, and it seems that perceived illegitimacy brings forth higher 
ingroup bias in both high- and low-power groups (Homsey et al., 2003; Turner & 
Brown, 1979).
7 Interestingly, this negative relationship between legitimacy and attitudes to the outgroup is not 
consistent with the findings of others, (e.g. Turner & Brown, 1978). However, using pathway analysis, 
Weber et al. (2002) found that legitimacy was a significant predictor of attitudes, guilt and threat.
They argue that this negative relationship is consistent with past research (e.g., Montada & Schneider, 
1989; Schmitt, 1998).
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Bringing these factors into the framework of this thesis, what impact does relative 
power have on ingroup bias levels? For example, if the German sample claim higher 
relative power against the backdrop of The EU, will it show higher or lower ingroup 
bias that the British sample? Will there be discemable patterns between relative 
power and the form of ingroup bias a group might demonstrate? What are the 
associations between relative prototypicality and relative power, and which of the 
two is the more reliable predictor of ingroup bias? Finally, Study 3 also looks at the 
perceived legitimacy of relations -  here between England and Wales. Do relative 
power, relative prototypicality and perceived legitimacy interact?
2.4 National Identity
For the vast majority of individuals, nationality is bestowed at birth and is 
acknowledged as a truism. It provides us with the reference points to enact the rituals 
associated with that nationality, it specifies social norms and rules of conduct, and 
enriches its members, who perceive their group as unique, with a sense of belonging. 
Against this imposing backdrop, it is not surprising that national identity can, under 
some circumstances, become highly salient for some group members.
Social identity theorists have examined a whole array of group categories including 
national groups, and it seems that it can account well for inter-national group 
processes. However, given the unique attributes associated with national identity 
(e.g., group size, high group impermeability, permanency and so forth), it is 
circumspect at this point to reflect on the mechanisms of nationhood. Section 2.4.1 
examines nationhood beyond the realm of social psychology, and draws on
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contributions from sociology and social and political theory in doing so. Section
2.4.2 highlights in brief some qualitative social psychology research. The aim are 
firstly to illustrate how members make sense of their national identity, and secondly 
to demonstrate how well qualitative and quantitative research may together enhance 
our understanding of national identity.
2.4.1 National Identity and Contributions from other Disciplines
National identity, nationalistic sentiment and feelings of nation-ness are based on a 
customised past (Doob, 1964; Giddens, 1985; Smith, 1971, 1995) of an imagined 
(Anderson, 1983) or invented (Gellner, 1983) community. Group membership can be
o
so strong that members are ‘willing to die for such limited imaginings’ (Anderson,
1983, p.16). Why?
Consistent with Tajfel (1978), Anderson (1983) identifies a strong emotive element 
in national group membership. However, it is a series of ‘cultural artefacts of a 
particular kind ... [that] command a profound emotional legitimacy’ (pp. 13-14), and 
furthermore, these artefacts are subsumed in an ‘imagined political community’ 
(p. 15). In other words, we are placing the entity nation into the world and thus 
bestowing it with a more tangible form9. Nations are imagined, in the sense that the 
individual will possess an image of being a group member and will envisage other 
members, and this reflects the anonymity in self-categorization identified by, for
8 (although, as Anderson (1983) points out, it is not necessarily the willingness to die, but the 
willingness to kill.)
9 This leads us to Moscovici’s Social Representation Theory (Farr & Moscovici, 1984; Moscovici,
1984, 1988) -  which unfortunately also takes us outside of the remit of this thesis. In brief, this 
proposes that the category nation is an invention, whereby abstract concepts are made concrete, 
anchored to become familiar and then naturalized to become true. The resulting we-identity organises 
the present and creates a collective -  and selective -  past.
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example, Turner (1981). Furthermore, the national group is imagined as a community 
despite any inequalities within the group, because membership is ‘always conceived 
as a deep, horizontal comradeship’ (Anderson, 1983, p. 16).
However, any large-scale social group can more often than not be divided into 
subgroups (Hornsey & Hogg, 2000a), so what needs to happen to unite subgroups 
and bring forth those feelings of Anderson’s ‘deep, horizontal comradeship’? In the 
face of common threat (to ingroup values, resources, identity) the nation is capable of 
acting as an aggregate (e.g., CIIM: Gaertner & Dovidio, 2000). Exceptional 
circumstances call for exceptional group cohesion.
Giddens (1985) offers two possible factors that could account for such strong and 
defensive ingroup emotions. Firstly, high ingroup identification brings forth 
nationalism. It provides the foundation for group identity, because it offers members 
the security of being able to draw upon a common past. Secondly this may be 
coupled with a need for a certain degree of homogeneity. This, he argues, is essential 
within a nation-state to ensure its healthy economy -  and homogeneity can be 
maintained in the present, for example by maintaining a common past.
However, since nationalist sentiment is neither a constant in a given society nor 
representative of all group members (Gellner, 1994), Giddens (1985) attempts to 
pinpoint nationalism in the European nation-state more precisely. Nationalism does 
not form an intrinsic part of everyday social life, but becomes salient when the 
‘communality [provided by nationalism] ... supplies one means of support for 
ontological security, particularly where there is a perceived threat from outside the
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state’ (p. 218). This tallies with Anderson’s (1983) willingness-to-die proposition, 
with Gellner’s (1983) suggestion that territory is perceived as a non-shareable 
commodity, and with an array of social identity research linking threat with outgroup 
derogation (e.g. Branscombe et al., 1999; Spears, Doosje, & Ellemers, 1997).
Threat can, of course, come from within or outside of the state; from within the 
ingroup or from outgroups. What mechanisms have nations developed to deal with 
threat? Gellner (1964, 1983, 1994) describes these. Firstly, he differentiates between 
state and nation. The State is ‘that agency in society which possesses the monopoly 
of legitimate violence’ (1983, pp. 3-4). Its bodies, such as the police and the military, 
are ‘separated out from the rest of social life’ and these bodies only may legitimately 
demonstrate violence. The nation is more difficult to define:
Having a nation is not an inherent attribute of humanity, but it has now come to appear 
as such. ... What then is this contingent, but in our age seemingly universal and 
normative, idea of the nation? (pp. 6-7).
Gellner (1983) acknowledges that nationality serves a normative function and that 
viewing one’s own nation extremely more positively than the other nation(s) can 
bring forth nationalism. The State provides the legal framework for the nation, and it 
may be likened to a ‘container of power’ that may legitimately perform harmful acts 
to protect the group. In simple terms, the nation is our home; the state protects us.
In turn, the ingroup creates subgroups such as the military (to deal with external 
threat) and the police (to deal with internal threat), and these have the ability and the 
means to perform damaging acts upon outgroups (and deviant subgroups). If the 
threat is external, where ‘standardized, homogeneous, centrally sustained high
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cultures, [which pervade] entire populations and not just elite minorities’ may be 
found, ‘men [sz'c] will be politically united with all those, and only those, who share 
their culture’ (p. 55). The nation stands as one. If the threat is internal, other 
countermeasures may be undertaken. Coupled with the desire to maintain a high ratio 
of ingroup members (i.e. fellow nationals) and a low ratio of outgroup members (i.e. 
non-nationals and deviant fellow nationals) within a given state,
a territorial political unit can only become ethnically homogeneous ... if it either kills, 
or expels, or assimilates all non-nationals. Their unwillingness to suffer such fates may 
make the peaceful implementation of the nationalist principle difficult (Giddens, 1985,
p. 2).
This dramatic statement does sadly reflect ingroup bias in its most extreme form -  
outgroup hatred.
2.4.2 National Identity and qualitative Research
Turning to the qualitative domain of social psychology, it is fair to state that, in the 
eyes of some, experimental social psychology and social identity research have come 
under some criticism for their treatment of national identity. The major criticism is 
that the national group is often treated as any other large-scale social group, and its 
uniqueness is somehow ignored (Billig, 1995; Reicher & Hopkins, 2001). Indeed, 
Cinnirella (1996) takes this one step further and suggests that group beliefs can be so 
varied in large-scale groups per se, that this makes the definition of ingroup norms 
extremely difficult. As well as variability within groups (Condor, 1996), another area 
that SIT and SCT do not adequately address is variability across time (Billig, 1976, 
1995). Additionally, SIT and SCT, which examine the dynamics of intergroup 
processes, do not explain individuals’ social constructions or social actions. These
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latter criticisms are justified -  if the aim is to look at social change over time or to 
turn from intergroup processes to individuals’ belief systems.
However, one should never dismiss any evidence that may deepen understanding of 
the research area. To draw on two comments from Reicher and Hopkins (2001), if 
we are to understand what national identity means, firstly ‘[w]e need to elaborate
j
psychological constructs that act as a pivot between structure, culture and ideology 
on the one hand and understanding and action on the other’ (p. 6), and secondly we 
need to understand ‘how distant past can shape present actions’ (p. 6). Although the 
thesis examines the dynamic intergroup processes between subgroups and 
superordinate categories and not how individuals construct meaning and content to 
their (national) social worlds, some interesting and relevant qualitative findings are 
detailed below.
Should the research aim be to deconstruct identity, then tapping into social 
representations and/or analysing discourse are eminently sensible ways of doing so. 
These findings can, in turn, feed back into the parent theories SIT/SCT and the 
subgroup-superordinate group models that draw upon these. As a case in point, Lui 
and Hilton (2005) argue that social representations are central to our understanding 
of intergroup relations in the inter-national environment. For example, based on a 
study by Dresler-Hawke (2000) and social representational data, they examine what 
happens when an ingroup member is placed into an unwelcome social category (here 
Germans visiting Holocaust memorials accompanied either by fellow Germans or by 
Jewish individuals). Two identity management strategies became apparent when an 
unwelcome social category was imposed upon individuals; self-(re)categorization at
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the European or regional level, or by ‘denying culpability’ and distancing oneself 
temporally from the atrocities (p. 545). Here, then, recategorization at the European 
level can serve the individual as an identity management strategy for individuals in a 
situation-specific low-status group. Indeed, it has been found in experimental 
research that this is sometimes the case (Hornsey & Hogg, 2002).
As well as drawing on social representations, it is generally accepted that discourse 
analysis or analysis of interview data can bring out those finer points that written 
responses would fail to capture. Indeed, Potter and Wetherell (1995; Wetherell & 
Potter, 1992) argue that this method is essential to further our understanding of belief 
systems. Additionally, if it is combined with an eye to linking to social 
representations, very rich findings can result (Potter & Wetherell, 1998).
In particular, discourse analysis can reveal individuals’ degree of identification with 
a particular social group in a very subtle way, for example the differences between 
referring to ‘we British’ as opposed to ‘the British’. A major contributor in the field 
of English-ness is Condor (1996, 2000, 2006). Some key findings (1996) are that 
English people display a reluctance to vocalise national pride, and tend to draw on 
the category ‘English’ at home and to be uncomfortable with the category ‘British’, 
but will draw on the category ‘British’ when abroad. This could be interpreted as the 
respondents’ need to maintain ingroup distinctiveness when in the UK (i.e. self­
labelling as being English), and to present as a member of a common ingroup when 
abroad (i.e. self-labelling as British).
Page 54
To add to the complexity of her findings, the consensus of respondents when asked 
to define a ‘typical English’ person brought forth two very different prototypes; 
either the gentleman/gentlewoman or the lager lout. This observation could have 
implications for studies on social stereotypes in national settings. For example, it is 
commonplace in this line of research to have participants to rate a ‘typical target- 
group member’ on a list of specific traits. However, taking Condor’s (1996) findings 
into consideration, common sense dictates that the two prototypes possess 
contradictory characteristics, which in turn could affect the target group’s overall 
favourableness rating. Might it not therefore be circumspect for the researcher(s) to 
adopt a more differential approach, for example by employing additionally open 
ended responses where participants may describe themselves the typical target-group 
member?
In the more recent study and in contrast to the earlier studies, respondents were not 
directed to think in terms of being British or being English (Condor, 2006). In the 
interviews, some English respondents used ‘English’, ‘England’ etc., others used 
‘British’, ‘Britain’ etc. The reason for using the latter set of terms was, as Condor 
interpreted, often a question of moral judgement. She likens this to:
a lay version of the common in-group model (Gaertner [et al.,] 1993)... [where the 
respondent] casts the use of the category English as promoting particularistic group self- 
interest ... and a potential threat to public order ... In contrast, the use of the category 
British allows for the establishment of 'common ground’ ... promoting future social 
harmony (p. 672, respondent data italicised in original).
It is findings such as these that can provide a most interesting starting point for 
further, empirical study.
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Two issues relevant to this thesis remain; the implications of social change in general 
and the emergence of The EU. Apart from the impact of EU membership discussed 
later, the groups under investigation in this thesis have experienced dramatic social 
change (Germany’s reunification in 1990) or are in the process of changing (the 
devolution processes in the UK). As well as the implications for the social groups, 
Hopkins and Reicher (1998) stress that such changes have implications for the 
individual. ‘[P]eople’s representations of who they are and their relationship with 
others, categories and identities that were once routinely used in self-definition’ (p. 
69) are challenged. This in turn presents a challenge for research. One solution is to 
integrate SIT and Social Representation Theory, the former shedding light on needs 
and motivations, the latter showing how individuals may construct their current 
social (changing) world (Breakwell, 1992; De Rosa; 1998). This combined approach 
is at first viewing promising, though it is questionable to what extent the intergroup 
focus of SIT would sit with the individualist focus of Social Representation Theory. 
Nonetheless, De Rosa has constructed an impressive design for a long-term and 
multinational study, and her findings are awaited with interest.
The emergence and the growth of The EU has, for some, brought with it the 
perceived threat of being ‘overtaken’ by a higher order. For most, it likely poses the 
question of where to place one’s national group in this growing setting, and whether 
embracing the new ‘parent’ will be in the group’s interest or not. For example, 
Chryssochoou (2000) found that group self-interest is an essential component in 
evaluating The EU. Here, participants from France (a stronger member of The EU) 
and Greece (a weaker member of The EU) provided social representations of The EU 
(Study 1), and the evaluation (on economic, political and cultural dimensions) of
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their respective status within The EU was measured (Study 2). Qualitative findings 
showed that both groups identified areas of self-interest. For the French, EU 
membership made them stronger in the world. Furthermore, The EU supports French 
values, and thus categorization at the EU level was not rejected (although not 
actively sought either). In contrast, although Greek respondents felt economically 
inadequate, feared that other members would share this perception, and felt 
dependent on The EU, EU membership was nonetheless deemed positive in that it 
strengthened national security and economic stability, that is, promoted the group’s 
interest. Empirical evidence supported qualitative findings.
Summarising this brief overview, attention has been drawn to the following. Firstly, 
many argue that there are limitations to empirical research on large-scale (national) 
groups and their social identities. By examining qualitative evidence either 
additionally or simultaneously, a more complete picture can emerge. Paying 
adequate tribute to both approaches within this thesis would exceed its scope -  and 
indeed its aims. There are, then, ‘planned limitations’ here, both theoretically and 
methodologically.
Secondly, Social Representation Theory (Farr & Moscovici, 1984; Moscovici, 1984, 
1988) is not considered in the following studies, despite substantial evidence that it 
links past to present very neatly, and that is can compliment SIT well. 
Deconstructing national identity and ideology was not our aim. Nonetheless and 
relevant to this thesis, the potential impact of social change against the backdrop of 
the emergence of The EU and German Reunification has been addressed peripherally 
(De Rosa, 1998; Hopkins & Reicher, 1998). Additionally, a study was presented that
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illustrated both the effectiveness of merging qualitative with quantitative data and 
comparing two national groups and their perceptions of EU membership 
(Chryssochoou, 2000). Based on social representations, it was found that for both 
groups self-interest was an essential component when evaluating The EU, but for 
different reasons. The follow-up study (empirical) brought forth similar findings.
Finally, and specifically because it is relevant to this thesis, we have examined some 
of the works of Condor (discourse analysis; 1996, 2000, 2006) on Englishness and 
Britishness, and of Lui and Hilton (social representations; 2005) on German identity 
management strategies. Both (see Condor, 2006) provide evidence of 
recategorization at a higher level of abstraction (CIIM), albeit for two different 
purposes. This strategy in those who identify as British rather than English was 
interpreted as a means of distancing the self from the self-interest associated with 
being English in the present, and in the German context as a means of distancing the 
self from the atrocities committed in the past by national socialists.
It is true to say that the subsection presented here only skims the surface of the 
enrichment that a qualitative approach can provide. However, it is also true to say 
that many of these contributions (both those cited above and others) served to inform 
the author in the design of the empirical studies and to enrich her understanding of 
what national identity might, in fact, be.
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Chapter 3 Study 1
A vast body of research suggests that the awareness of a shared superordinate 
category is, under certain conditions, likely to influence intersubgroup relations. Two 
major models underpinning this notion are Gaertner and Dovidio’s (Gaertner et al., 
1993; Gaertner & Dovidio, 2000) Common Ingroup Identity Model (CUM), and 
Brown and Hewstone’s (2005; Hewstone & Brown, 1986) Intergroup Contact Model 
(ICM).
CUM, which draws on Turner’s Self-Categorisation Theory (SCT; Turner et al., 
1987) and also Realistic Group Conflict Theory (Sherif, 1967), advocates a process 
of recategorization and assimilation. Here subgroup members focus simultaneously 
on intersubgroup commonalities such as shared goals and common fate under the 
superordinate category, and this is not necessarily at the price of ingroup identity 
(Gaertner & Dovidio, 2000). ICM proposes that groups will differ, and therefore the 
key to promoting intergroup relations is pluralism. Thus tribute is paid to distinctive 
subgroup identity within a shared superordinate category identity, and the 
weaknesses and strengths of subgroups are acknowledged and respected.
Comparing CIIM with the earlier version of ICM, the Mutual Intergroup 
Differentiation Model (MIDM; Hewstone & Brown, 1986), Hornsey and Hogg 
(2000a) conclude that subgroup identity should be maintained rather than weakened. 
Their Integrative Model of Subgroup Relations (IMSR) does however identify areas 
where recategorization might help reduce intergroup bias. Furthermore in the 
extended CUM, pluralism and assimilation are viewed as complimentary approaches
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to intersubgroup relations, and recategorization may reduce bias over time (Gaertner 
& Dovidio, 2000).
In opposition to CIIM and its predictions, though not contrary to the notions of ICM, 
lies the Ingroup Projection Model (IPM; Mummendey & Wenzel, 1999). IPM 
proposes that, under certain conditions, the awareness of a shared superordinate 
category may have a negative impact on intersubgroup relations. The ingroup will 
turn to the superordinate category when comparing us to them. If the ingroup 
perceives itself to be more relatively prototypical of the superordinate category than 
it perceives the outgroup to be and the outgroup is deemed as deviant, this can lead to 
higher ingroup bias.
Despite essential differences between these models, there are commonalities between 
them. For example, the superordinate category should be positively evaluated by the 
subgroup if their respective theoretical projections are to hold true. Similarly, all 
agree that the subgroup(s) involved may be of such a nature as to override either sets 
of predictions. For example, a subgroup may be high in ingroup bias per se, or the 
relationship between two subgroups may be fraught with past conflict.
Additionally, all concede that their respective prognoses on intersubgroup relations 
are dependent upon certain factors, such as power, status, similarity, the degree of 
ingroup identification and the legitimacy of relations (Ellemers, Spears, & Doosje, 
1997; Guimond et al., 2002; Hornsey & Hogg, 2000a; Hornsey et al., 2003; Jetten, 
Spears, & Manstead, 1996; Jetten, et al., 2001; Spears et al., 1997; Turner & Brown, 
1978; Verkuyten & Hagendoom, 1998; Weber et al., 2002).
Page 60
The focus of this study was on intersubgroup relations under a shared superordinate 
group. Alongside relative prototypicality, the two other key factors examined were 
relative power and the degree of ingroup identification. Ingroup bias as the possible 
outcome of these factors was measured on the dimension of attitudes. The groups 
under investigation were the two subgroups Great Britain and Germany, and the two 
superordinate categories The EU and NATO.
Relative prototypicality
The main thrust of this study was to test IPM and compare it with competing models 
of intergroup relations. Does higher relative prototypicality in relation to an esteemed 
superordinate category increase (IPM) or decrease (CIIM) ingroup bias? 
Furthermore, although Mummendey and colleagues have regularly found supporting 
evidence for ingroup projection (e.g., Waldzus et al., 2004; Wenzel et al., 2003), it is 
not yet entirely clear under which conditions this might occur. For example, the 
representation of the superordinate category may need to be well-defined (Waldzus 
et al., 2003), and qualitative analysis from this study may show that this is the case. 
There were strong reasons to believe that Germans would claim higher relative 
prototypicality against the backdrop of The EU, because European identification is 
higher than German identification (Wenzel et al., 2003). Conversely, it was thought 
possible that both national groups would deem Great Britain to be the more relatively 
prototypical of NATO, because Great Britain enjoys close ties to the USA, a 
dominating NATO member. This, however, remained to be tested.
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Relative power
Laboratory studies of power using the minimal group paradigm show that high 
power groups tend to show more ingroup bias than low power groups because they 
have ‘usable power’ to justify ingroup bias (Ng, 1982; Sachdev & Bourhis, 1985, 
1987, 1989, 1991). However in more naturalistic settings such as in this study, low 
power (and status) will be threatening to identity. Therefore more subtle forms of 
ingroup bias and identity protection strategies that acknowledge social reality 
constraints may emerge (Spears et al., 2001; Tajfel & Turner, 1979; Turner & 
Brown, 1978), and these forms are not necessarily detrimental to the more relatively 
powerful outgroup (Hornsey et al., 2003). Furthermore, ingroup bias demonstrated 
by both high and low power groups may very well be influenced by the perceived 
stability and legitimacy of the groups’ positions (Turner & Brown, 1978; Hornsey et 
al., 2000; Weber et a l, 2002).
In this study, it was assumed that relations between national groups are relatively 
stable, the effects of perceived legitimacy were also not examined here. Rather, 
perceived relative power was measured, and it was expected that the British sample 
would claim higher power in the context of NATO, and the German sample in the 
context of The EU. It was of interest to observe whether high or low power groups 
show higher ingroup bias, and whether the patterns of relative power scores mirror 
relative prototypicality scores. Indeed, Hornsey and Hogg (2000a) suspect that 
ingroup projection is more likely to occur when the ingroup is high in status and/or 
power, and Weber et al. (2002) see links between relative prototypicality and ingroup 
bias in high-status groups.
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Degrees o f Ingroup and European Identification
Many argue that the degree of ingroup identification -  in particular the affective 
component of social identity and/or perceived identity threat -  is the strongest 
predictor of ingroup bias, where high scorers show highest ingroup bias (Cameron, 
2004; Ellemers et a l, 1999; Hornsey & Hogg, 2000b, 2000c; Jackson, 2002; 
Lipponen et al, 2003). However, aspects of the British-German intergroup context 
may reveal a different picture, not least when we take into account the relation to The 
EU in particular. From studies examining national and European identity with The 
EU as salient superordinate group, the following findings have emerged. German 
citizens have a higher sense of European than of German identity (Wenzel et a l, 
2003). The EU is associated with identity threat for British citizens (Cinnirella, 1997) 
and introducing Germans as a fellow sub-group member of The EU decreases 
European identification significantly (Rutland & Cinnirella, 2000).
In summary, it is generally acknowledged that investigations of subordinate- 
superordinate group relations need to make clear the superordinate category (and 
whether it is contextually salient) as well as the relation to that category (whether it 
also valued). It is also generally acknowledged that a shared past history between in- 
and outgroup may be of such a nature as to override theoretical models of 
intersubgroup relations. For these reasons it was considered circumspect to begin the 
study series with a quasi-experimental study, in order to gauge ‘the general picture’ 
regarding British-German relations under both specific superordinate categories. To 
this end, a series of research questions were formulated.
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What is the nature o f British and German relations to The EU and to NATO?
Firstly, what mental representations and beliefs do the two national groups hold 
regarding NATO and The EU? Given the qualitative data collection at this point, one 
could only speculate here. It was thought that, overall, the British sample would hold 
NATO in higher esteem and The EU in lower esteem. This would reflect the ‘special 
relationship’ Great Britain enjoys with the USA, a dominant NATO member, and 
British Euroscepticism. Overall, an opposite picture was expected from the German 
sample.
Secondly, it was expected that The EU would pose an identity threat to British 
participants, whereas NATO would not, and that neither The EU nor NATO would 
pose an identity threat to German participants. It was likely that The EU would be 
regarded as a threat to economic prosperity in the German sample only. In Germany 
the fall in purchasing power has become apparent since the introduction of the Euro. 
In contrast, Great Britain has declined to join the European Monetary Union, and 
thus it was thought that there would be no associations between The EU and 
economic prosperity in the British sample. It was also thought that NATO, given its 
militaristic nature and US American dominance, could be construed as a threat to 
peace in the German sample, and as a source of ensuring peace in the British sample.
Thirdly and finally, it was assumed that both groups would demonstrate more 
knowledge of the workings of The EU than of NATO, because the former has more 
impact on day-to-day life than the latter. If this were the case, then it could indicate 
that the mental representations of The EU are more clearly defined, and those of
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NATO less so. In turn, these differences might lead to ingroup projection in The EU 
context, but not in the NATO context.
A priori assumptions
Further analysis was quantitative; a series of a priori assumptions were made.
Superordinate category evaluation: As a starting point and consistent with 
anticipated qualitative responses and other published research, it was expected that 
British evaluation of The EU would be significantly lower than evaluation of NATO, 
and that the opposite would hold true for the German sample.
Identification measures: In line with past research, it was assumed that ingroup 
identification would be higher in the British sample (Rutland & Cinnirella, 2000), 
and European identification higher in the German sample (Wenzel et a l, 2003). It 
was also expected that the British sample would draw significantly on sub-groups in 
their self-definition (e.g., Welsh, Scottish, English), but not on European identity. 
Conversely, the German sample10 would draw on European identity but not on its 
sub-groups (i.e., East or West German).
Relative power and relative prototypicality: A pattern of scores was anticipated 
whereby the British sample would be higher in relative prototypicality and relative 
power in the NATO context, and conversely the German sample in the EU context 
(i.e. within-subjects). It was also necessary to examine between-subjects differences 
in relative prototypicality. According to IPM, if the claim to higher relative
10 Note that the German sample drew on West German participants in the main. This point is 
addressed further in the Results section.
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prototypicality between groups is contested, ingroup projection might occur 
(although if it is not, this will not necessarily rule out intergroup conflict; Waldzus et 
a l, 2004)). It was assumed that both groups would agree that Germany was more 
relatively prototypical of The EU, no assumptions were made regarding NATO.
What are the relationships between relative prototypicality, relative power, the 
degree o f ingroup identification and the degree o f European identification (possible 
predictor variables)? How do these relate to ingroup bias (outcome variable)? Are 
there differences between the national groups and/or between contexts in these 
relationships?
Are these variables interrelated in any way? For example, do relative prototypicality 
and/or relative power correlate? More specifically, do intercorrelations differ 
between national groups, and/or between the contexts of The EU and NATO?
Do relative prototypicality, relative power, ingroup identification and/or European 
identification mediate the effect o f national group on ingroup bias?
Finally, this study set out to establish some evidence for whether (a) ingroup and/or 
European identification or (b) relative power and/or relative prototypicality might 
mediate between national groups and ingroup bias.
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3.1 Method
Design
The quasi-experimental study employed a 2 (National Group: British/German) X 4 
(Target group: Ingroup/Outgroup/NATO/The EU) mixed ANOVA design, where 
national group was between-subjects, and target group within-subjects. Dependent 
variables were ingroup and European identification, superordinate category 
evaluation, ingroup bias, two measures of relative prototypicality and one measure of 
relative power. Furthermore, two open-ended questions encouraged participants to 
express their views on NATO and The EU.
Participants
Forty-six British and Germans participated in the study, all recruited via e-mail. 
Initial contacts were largely ex-colleagues (Commerce and Industry) of the 
investigator, several of whom forwarded the questionnaire to others11. Participants 
were older than the average student sample and were post-war generation, and every 
attempt was made to ensure that the initial contacts varied demographically (e.g., 
socioeconomic background, highest level of educational achievement etc.). After 
screening, three participants were excluded from the study (two dual-nationals, one 
questionnaire format destroyed). There remained 22 British participants (m:f = 8:14, 
age range = 20-57, M =  43.14, SD = 10.18), and 21 German participants (m:f = 6:15, 
age range = 21-57, M - 43.86, SD = 8.69). None had ever lived abroad.
11 Clearly the sample size was extremely modest considering the complexity and sophistication of the 
central questions. This limitation is addressed in the Discussion section.
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Materials
The study was questionnaire based (see App. 1-3 and App. 1-6). All documents were 
originally designed in English and subsequently translated by the investigator into 
German. Cooperating with two bilingual speakers (one German, one Irish), there 
followed a translation -  back-translation phase adapted from the techniques 
suggested by Brislin (1970, 1976). This was a cyclic process, and was concluded 
only when all parties had reached agreement. Before running the study, two British 
and two German subjects filled in the questionnaire on-line, to ensure that the 
instructions and the questionnaire itself were comprehensible.
Open-ended items
Before responding to the quantitative items for each superordinate category, 
participants were given the opportunity to list anything they associated with each 
(e.g., ‘When you think of NATO, what things spring to mind?’). The purpose of 
these questions was to assess the connotations each superordinate category elicited, 
and to use these to construct quantitative measures for subsequent studies.
Framing text describing the superordinate categories
Given the different natures of the superordinate categories, constructing two 
descriptive texts positive in valence proved difficult. Both were described on the 
dimension of security and member state protection, adapting texts from the 
respective superordinate category website (EU: http://europa.eu.int/index en.htm; 
NATO: http://www.nato.int/#: both accessed 28.07.04, see Questionnaires in App. I-
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3 and App. 1-6). It was assumed that both texts would reflect how each superordinate 
category attempts to present itself in positive terms to its members. In other words, 
these texts were not neutral in nature. If a superordinate category is primed 
positively, this leads to more negative attitudes towards the outgroup (Waldzus et a l, 
2003). CIIM suggests that a positively evaluated superordinate category will lead to 
more positive attitudes towards the outgroup. Therefore, positive texts were chosen 
to facilitate an increase (IPM) or decrease (CIIM) in ingroup bias.
In each framing text, paragraph one described briefly the superordinate category’s 
history. Paragraph two drew attention to sovereignty and actual ingroup power. 
(NATO members retain full sovereignty, whilst EU member states delegate some of 
their national sovereignty to The EU. Both national groups enjoy comparably high 
statuses within the superordinate category, demonstrated for example by the number 
of votes allocated to each national group in various commissions etc.) Paragraph 
three emphasised the respective superordinate category’s role in maintaining peace 
and/or striving to find peaceful solutions to conflict situations.
Dependent variables
These are described below in the order in which they appeared in the questionnaire. 
Other measures were also included, but were not relevant to this study12. Unless 
stated otherwise, all items and sub-items employed a 7-point Likert scale 
(1 = strongly disagree to 1 = strongly agree). Because the effects of different 
superordinate categories on subgroup relations was the starting-point in the study
12 Right-Wing-Orientation, degree of interest in national and in European politics, categorization 
measures
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series, superordinate category awareness was primed first; ingroup identification was 
measured towards the end of the questionnaire.
NATO evaluation: Participants were asked to evaluate NATO {pre-framing text 
evaluation, 1 item) and then read the framing text. Next, three comprehension 
questions underlined the priming process. Finally, three sub-items tapped into 
evaluation of NATO {post-framing text evaluation', e.g., ‘Membership in NATO is a 
good thing for Great Britain’; one reverse-scored). The post-framing text evaluation 
sub-items were collapsed into one single measures {a = .89, 1 = low to 7 = high).
1 *3Direct relative prototypicality NATO'. Our own measures were devised . Three 
statements investigated the degree of perceived ingroup prototypicality (e.g., ‘Great 
Britain has a lot in common with NATO’). In the next three statements, ‘ingroup’ 
was substituted for ‘outgroup’ (e.g., ‘Germany has a lot in common with NATO), 
thus giving measures of perceived outgroup prototypicality. Internal reliability was 
acceptable on in- and outgroup measures (both as > .69), and Mjngr0up-score -  Moutgroup. 
score delivered the single measure of direct relative prototypicality NATO (-6 = low to 
+6 = high).
Relative power NATO: Relative power statements were alternated with relative 
prototypicality statements and followed the same matrix (three ingroup and three 
outgroup sub-items; e.g. ‘Great Britain is a strong member in NATO). Each set of 
sub-items was collapsed (both as > .59), and MingroUp.SCore -  Moutgroup-score delivered the 
single measure of relative power NATO (-6 = low to +6 = high).
13 The IPM-school traditionally employs stereotype-based measures that in the NATO context would 
have been implausible.
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EU evaluation, direct relative prototypicality under and relative power in The EU: In 
these measures, NATO was replaced by The EU. The compound variables EU  
evaluation (a = .93), direct relative prototypicality EU  (both as > .87) and relative 
power EU  (both as > .60) were computed as above.
Ingroup bias: Participants rated the ingroup, the outgroup and both superordinate 
categories on a Feelings Thermometer (0 = extremely unfavourable to 
100 extremely favourable). ^ la t t i tu d e - in g r o u p  ^ l a t t i t u d e - o u t g w u p  delivered the single 
measure of ingroup bias (-100 = low to +100 = high).
Similarity-based prototypicality: P M  posits that the group claiming higher relative 
prototypicality will project its beliefs, values etc. onto the superordinate category, 
and prototypicality is akin to similarity (Weber et al, 2002). Against this backdrop, a 
second measure of relative prototypicality was administered; similarity on the 
dimension of shared goals and values. Participants rated how similar they perceived 
the shared goals and values to be between (a) ingroup -  NATO, (b) ingroup -  The 
EU, (c) ingroup -  outgroup, (d) outgroup -  NATO and (e) outgroup -  The EU 
(adapted from Cinnirella, 1993, 1997; 1 =very dissimilar to 7 -v e ry  similar). For 
each context, mean outgroup -  superordinate category scores were subtracted from 
mean ingroup -  superordinate category scores, thus providing two measures of 
similarity-based prototypicality (-6 = low to +6 = high).
Identification measures
Ingroup identification: Three-factors of social identity (Cameron, 2004) were 
measured. Ingroup ties measures individual-level perceptions of a common bond
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with one’s group (e.g, T feel strong ties to other British people’). Centrality reflects 
the dimension of cognitive self-categorization (e.g, ‘The fact that I’m British rarely 
enters my mind’). Ingroup affect draws on Tajfel’s (1978) ‘emotional significance’ 
attributed to ingroup membership (e.g, ‘In general, I’m glad to be British’) 
(Cameron, 2004). Each factor comprised three sub-items (randomly ordered, four 
sub-items reverse scored). All nine sub-items {a = .69) were collapsed into one 
single measure; ingroup identification.
European identification: Participants were asked to place themselves on a bipolar 
scale from 1 (<entirely <ingroup>) to 7 {entirely European) in response to ‘how much 
do you feel <ingroup> and how much do you feel European?’
Hierarchical measure o f identity: This multiple response item required participants 
to tick from a list of boxes those groups they felt described themselves. Boxes were 
provided for all subgroups (e.g, Welsh, West German), both national groups (i.e., 
British and German) and the superordinate group European. A further box (‘other: 
please specify’) served, for example, to identify and later exclude dual-nationals 
from the study.
Procedure
Ethics Approval was granted before running the study (see App. 1-1). The mode of 
correspondence was via email. Participants were informed that the study was to 
investigate ‘how citizens feel about ... involvement with other nations ... and your 
perceptions of living in Europe’ Those who agreed to participate were requested to 
return a consent form and complete the language-specific questionnaire. All
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participants were thanked by the investigator and fully de-briefed (see App. 1-2 -  I- 
7).
3.2 Results
Qualitative analysis -  What is the nature o f British and German relations to The EU  
and to NATO?
Results from the open-ended responses are reported below, the data supporting them 
in App. 1-8. German responses were translated into English using the same 
translation -  back-translation technique described above.
The response rate was excellent; 42 out of 43 participants responded, many going 
into considerable depth. In a preliminary step, participants were coded as giving 
positive, negative, or positive and negative responses; those participants whose 
responses were not explicitly evaluative were coded as neutral. Frequencies are 
reported in Table 114.
14 The sample size was very small, and the main aim of content anlaysis was to design an empirical 
measure for further studies. Therefore in this section, no statistical tests of nominal data (e.g. f )  were 
performed.
Table 1: Frequencies of open-ended responses
British German
NATO n = 21 n = 21 Total
Positive only 8 6 14
Negative only 1 6 7-
Positive and negative 1 4 5
Neutral only 11 5 16
EU « = 21 n = 21 Total
Positive only 5 4 9
Negative only 10 3 13
Positive and negative 4 11 15
Neutral only 2 3 5
In the British sample, only two respondents made negative evaluative judgements 
regarding NATO, compared with 14 negative evaluative judgements regarding The 
EU. German evaluative judgements were more equally distributed with regards to 
NATO (6 = positive, 6 = negative, 4 = positive and negative) and more critical with 
regards to The EU (4 = positive, 3 = negative, 11= positive and negative).
Next, every negative and positive connotation was coded into one of three pre­
determined categories; positive connotations, negative connotations and threat. 
Within each category, common connotations that were later to serve as sub-items in 
quantitative analyses, were identified. An independent judge was consulted regarding 
the final coding and agreement was reached. Positive connotations are listed in Table 
2, negative connotations in Table 3 and threat connotations in Table 4.
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Table 2: Positive connotations by national group by superordinate category
British 
N =  21
German 
N =  21
Total 
N =  42
NATO n = 6 n = 5 11
shared goals and values 1
(4.77)
2
(9.52)
3
promotes diversity 0 0 0
together we are strong 5
(23.81)
3
(14.29)
8
supportive of weaker 
members
0 0 0
freedom of movement 0 0 0
EU n = 9 n = 20 29
shared goals and values 0 3
(14.29)
3
promotes diversity 2
(9.52)
2
(9.52)
4
together we are strong 3
(14.29)
6
(28.57)
9
supportive of weaker 
members
1
(4.77)
1
(4.77)
2
freedom of movement 3
(14.29)
8
(38.10)
11
Note: Percentages of each national group N  are reported in parentheses.
Positive connotations NATO: As shown in Table 2, from the. British standpoint, 
NATO served primarily to strengthen its member states (n = 5, 23.81%; together we 
are strong). The only other positive connotation was on the dimension of shared 
goals and values (n = 1, 4.77%). From the German standpoint, both of the British 
connotations elicited agreement {together we are strong'. n = 3, 14.29%; shared goals 
and values: n = 2, 9.52%).
Positive connotations EU: Here from the British standpoint, four of the five 
connotations delivered frequencies ranging from 1 {supportive o f weaker members,
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4.11%) to 3 {together we are strong and freedom o f movement, 14.29%). From the 
German standpoint, all five connotations were addressed; the main focus was on 
freedom o f movement {n = 8, 38.10%), followed by together we are strong (n = 6, 
28.57%).
Table 3: Negative connotations by national group by superordinate category
British 
N =  21
German 
N =  21
Total
vV= 42
NATO n = 1 n = 6 7
too powerful 0 2 2
(9.52)
too bureaucratic, unwieldy 1 1 2
(4.77) (4.77)
too expensive 0 0 0
too much intersubgroup rivalry 0 2 • 2
(9.52)
too little power 0 1 1
(4.77)
irrelevant goals 0 0 0
too large or enlargement bad 0 0 0
EU n = 13 n = 15 28
too powerful 0 0 0
too bureaucratic, unwieldy 5 4 9
(23.81) (19.05)
too expensive 1 1 2
(4.77) (4.77)
too much intersubgroup rivalry 3 3 6
(14.29) (14.29)
too little power 0 0 0
irrelevant goals 4 3 7
(19.05) .(14.29)
too large or enlargement bad 0 4 4
(19.05)
Note: Percentages of each national group N  are reported in parentheses.
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Negative connotations NATO: Table 3 shows that, in the British sample, NATO 
elicited only one negative response {too bureaucratic, unwieldy, 4.11%). In contrast, 
NATO was viewed by German participants as too powerful {n = 2, 9.52%), too 
bureaucratic, unwieldy {n= 1, 4.77%), hosting too much intersubgroup rivalry 
{n = 2, 9.52%), or as having too little power {n = 1, 4.77%).
Negative connotations EU: In the British sample, The EU elicited 13 negative 
responses, where it was seen primarily as being too bureaucratic {n = 5, 23.81%), as 
pursuing irrelevant goals {n = 4, 19.05%) and as hosting too much intersubgroup 
rivalry {n = 3, 14.29%). In total, The EU elicited 15 negative German responses, and 
these were by and large in line with British responses. However, four (19.05) 
suggested that The EU was too large or enlargement bad, an association missing 
from the British sample.
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Table 4: Threat connotations by national group by superordinate category
British 
N =  21
German 
N =  21
Total 
N =  42
NATO n = 1 n = 2 3
Threat to sovereignty 0 0 0
Threat to ingroup identity 0 0 0
Threat to peace 1
(4.77)
2
(9.52)
3
Threat to ingroup wealth & 
prosperity
0 0 0
EU n = 6 71 = 8 14
Threat to sovereignty 6
(28.57)
0 6
Threat to ingroup identity 0 3
(14.29)
3
Threat to peace 0 0 0
Threat to ingroup wealth & 
prosperity
0 5
(23.81)
5
Note: Percentages of each national group ./V are reported in parentheses.
Threat connotations NATO: From Table 4 it was apparent that NATO (n = 3, 7.14%) 
was far less threatening than The EU (n = 14, 33.33%) for both national groups. 
NATO was perceived to pose a threat on the dimension of peace only (which 
contradicts its own declared goal). However, NATO did not threaten ingroup identity 
(i.e. sovereignty and ingroup identity) or ingroup wealth and prosperity.
Threat connotations EU: In contrast, The EU was not a threat to peace. However, the 
largest perceived threat was to identity (n = 9; threat to sovereignty and to ingroup 
identity, 21.42% of total sample). It was made clear in the priming text that EU 
member states do, in fact, delegate some degree of sovereignty to The EU. It was 
therefore interesting to note that this was perceived as a threat by six British
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participants, but by none of the German participants, although three Germans 
perceived it to be a threat to ingroup identity.
Finally, five German participants (23.81%; British; n = 0) saw The EU as a threat to 
ingroup wealth and prosperity. Many agree that the Eastern European Enlargement 
and the effects of globalisation have impacted upon the economy. From the 
standpoint of political and economic experts, the impact of enlargement is generally 
viewed positively (Barysch, 2006; Braun, 2007; House of Lords European Union 
Select Committee, 2006) and globalisation it is seen as more of a challenge than a 
‘catastrophe’ (Deutsche Gewerkschaftsbund, 2007; Die Bundesregierung, 2007; 
Shipman, 2007; TUC, 2007). However, evidence suggests that the peoples’ view 
diverges, whereby the impact is viewed negatively in both Great Britain and in 
Germany (Jahnke, 2006; Wright, n.d.). It was therefore interesting to note that this 
popularistic view was documented in the German sample only.
In summary, the British sample overall was more favourable15 to NATO (+4) than to 
The EU (-10) as anticipated. Overall, NATO represented security {together we are 
strong), posing in only one instance a threat to peace. In contrast, The EU was seen 
to represent a form of security {together we are strong), but it was also seen as a 
bureaucratic institution with irrelevant goals, as a body where intersubgroup rivalry 
could be found, and, clearly and as anticipated, as a threat to sovereignty, that is to 
ingroup identity.
15 For each superordinate category, this was calculated as the frequency of positive connotations 
minus negative connotations minus threat connotations.
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The German sample delivered a more differential picture regarding both NATO and 
The EU than anticipated. Its evaluation of NATO was both positive (+5) and 
negative (-8), although, contrary to expectations, only two participants associated 
NATO with a threat to peace. Responses to The EU showed that opinions were 
favourable (+20) but also critical (-23), and negative connotations were very much 
consistent with those of the British sample; too bureaucratic, too much intersubgroup 
rivalry and irrelevant goals. In the German cohort only, enlargement was seen in a 
negative light, the reason often cited as a threat to economic prosperity.
Interestingly, overall NATO elicited only 21 comments, compared with 71 
comments concerning The EU. The EU, then, was more salient than NATO 
according to this indicator. Furthermore, the information supplied by participants 
was incorrect in ten instances in the NATO context (British = 7; German = 3) 
compared with none in The EU context16. This suggests that the mental 
representations of NATO are rather more fuzzy and less clearly defined, the mental 
representation of The EU less fuzzy and more clearly defined.
Quantitative analysis
The data were screened for outliers and all reverse-scored items recoded. Sub-items 
were recoded into new variables as described in the Materials section. In the analyses 
reported below, due to the gender bias across the sample (m:f ratio 14:29) analyses of 
covariance were performed in each instance in a first step, with Gender as covariate.
16 For example, NATO was seen as a trading partner, as being solely a European organisation, or was 
sometimes confused with the UN.
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No gender effects were found in any of the models. Hence the following analyses use 
analysis of variance. The a priori assumptions were examined first.
Superordinate category evaluation
It was anticipated that the British would rate NATO higher than The EU, and the 
Germans would rate The EU higher than NATO. It was also hoped that the priming 
texts would have affected all scores positively. Both assumptions were correct in the 
British sample, but not in the German sample.
As shown in Table 5, paired-sample /-tests revealed that British evaluations of the 
superordinate categories increased significantly from pre-framing to post-framing 
text (NATO: /(21) = 5.14, /?<.001; EU: /(21) = 2.96, /?<.01). In the German 
sample, an increase occurred in the NATO context only, /(20) = 3.77, p  < .01. Since 
pre- and post-framing values correlated significantly for each superordinate category 
(both rs > .80), the post-framing measure was used in the next analysis.
Consistent with the a priori assumption, British evaluation of NATO {M= 5.02, 
£0= 1.07) was significantly higher than of The EU (M =4.15, £0= 1.51), 
0(1, 41) = 6.35, partial q2 = .13, p  < .05 (simple effect). However contrary to the a 
priori assumption, German evaluation of NATO (M = 4.71, £ 0  = 1.17) was only 
marginally lower than evaluation of The EU (M = 4.94, £ 0 =  1.46). Nonetheless, 
since all scores were significantly above the mid-point (all Fs > 3.75, allps < .05), it 
was concluded that both groups held both superordinate categories in positive 
esteem. Thus the prerequisite of the four models of subgroup-superordinate group
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relations for their predictions to come into operation was met, and this variable was 
not utilized in any further analyses.
Table 5: Mean superordinate category evaluation scores
British German
Evaluation
NATO
Pre-framing text 4.18*** 4.19***
(1.10) (1.17)
Post-framing text 5.02*** 4.71***
(1.07) (1.17)
n = 22 n = 21
EU
Pre-framing text 3.75* 5.00***
(1.67) (1.48)
Post-framing text 4.15** 4.94***
(1.51) (1.46)
n = 22 n = 21
Note: Asterisks indicate that measures are significantly above the midpoint (3) using one- 
sample ?-tests. Standard deviations are reported in parentheses. *p < .05. **p < .01.
***p < .001.
Ingroup and European identification, hierarchical identification levels
Three assumptions had been made. British ingroup identification would be higher 
than German ingroup identification. European identification would be higher in the 
German sample than in the British sample. The British sample would draw more 
upon subgroups in their identification (e.g., Welsh, English), the Germans would 
draw more on the European level of identification.
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Ingroup identification: All scores were significantly above the midpoint (3), both 
/?s<.001. An independent /-test showed that British ingroup identification 
(M=4.76, £D = .88) was significantly higher than German ingroup identification 
(M= 4.03, SD = .82), /(41) = 2.83,/? < .01.
European identification (-3 = entirely ingroup to +3 = entirely European): British 
scores ( M = - 1.38, S D = \.02) were significantly below the midpoint and thus 
identification was at the ingroup and not the European level, /(20) = 6.18, p <  .001. 
German scores (M =.62, SD = . 1.60) were approaching significance above the 
midpoint, /(20) = 1.77, /? = .09. Here, then, Germans identified more with being 
European than being German (n.s.).
Hierarchical levels o f identity: To recap’ briefly, participants had ticked boxes that 
they felt described themselves. Firstly, responses were coded to reflect whether they 
had drawn upon subgroup identity levels (e.g., Welsh, West German), group level 
(i.e. British or German) and/or European level. Next, specific values (categorical) 
were given to specific combinations of identity levels. The distribution of identity 
level combinations are reported in Table 6.
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Table 6: 2 X 7 contingency table -  national group by identity level combinations
Count 
(% within nationality)
Hierarchical 
ID level 
combinations
Sub Sub
+
Group
Sub
+
Super
Group Group
+
Super
Super All
3
levels
British 7 5 0 10 0 0 0
n = 22 (31.8) (22.7) (0) (45.15) ( 0 ) ( 0 ) ( 0 )
German 5 0 0 3 3 8 0
n — 19 (26.3) ( 0 ) (0 ) (15.8) (15.8) (42.1) (0 )
Note: Sub =  subgroup, e.g. W elsh, East German. Group =  British or German. Super• =  European.
National group membership was indicative o f how individuals might draw on 
differing levels o f groups in their self-description ( /2= 19.99, df=  4, p  < .001). Over 
half o f the British sample (54.5%) identified at subgroup or at subgroup + group 
level (Gennan sample: 26.3%). Identity level combinations excluding European 
identification accounted for all British responses (German sample; 26.3%). Identity 
level combinations at group and European levels accounted for 73.7% o f German 
responses, 42.1% of which were at European level only.
It should however be noted that 12 British participants in total drew on their 
subgroups (here English and Welsh), and only five Germans drew on their subgroup 
West German. Had there been more East Germans participating in this study, it may 
be that some o f these (as a lower-status group) would have also drawn upon their 
subgroup.
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Direct and similarity-based relative prototypicality
The British claimed significantly higher relative prototypicality in the NATO context 
than in the EU context. The Germans claimed significantly higher relative 
prototypicality in the EU context than in the NATO context. Both groups agreed 
upon their mutual relative prototypicality positions (all ps < .08), that is, there was no 
contestation in either context. Mean scores and standard deviations are reported in 
Table 7.
Each measure of relative prototypicality (direct and similarity-based) was analysed 
using a 2 (National Group: Great Britain/Germany) X 2 (Context: EU/NATO) 
ANOVA, with the latter as a repeated measure factor. In each, there was a 
signification interaction between national group and context, direct relative 
prototypicality: 7 (^1, 41) = 90.54, partial rj2 = .69, p  < .001; similarity-based relative 
prototypicality: F (l, 40) = 43.75, partial i f  = .52,/? < .001.
Within-subjects, simple effects: The British sample felt significantly more relatively 
prototypical of NATO (direct relative prototypicality: M — .00, SD = .90; similarity- 
based prototypicality: M = .00, ££>=1.48) than of The EU (direct relative 
prototypicality: M =-1.84, SD= 1.25; similarity-based prototypicality: M - - 1.64, 
££>=1.65) on both measures (simple effects; direct relative prototypicality: 
F=  52.01; similarity-based prototypicality: F=  13.71; both /?s = .001). Conversely, 
the German sample felt significantly more relatively prototypical of The EU (direct 
relative prototypicality: M=  1.19, ££> = .89; similarity-based prototypicality 
M=  1.50, SD = 1.28) than of NATO (direct relative prototypicality: NATO M =  -.44,
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SD = .69; similarity-based prototypicality M=  -1.10, SD = 1.62) on both measures 
(simple effects; direct relative prototypicality: F=  39.15; similarity-based
prototypicality; F=  31.46; bothps < .001).
Table 7: Mean relative prototypicality scores
British German
Direct relative prototypicality
NATO .00 -.44"
(.90) (.69)
EU -1.84*** 1.19***
(1.25) (.89)
n - 2 2 n = 21
Similarity-based relative prototypicality
NATO .00 -1.10n
(1.48) (1.62)
n — 22 n = 20
EU -1.64m 1.50***
(1.65) (1.28)
n = 22 n = 20
Note: Asterisks indicate that measures are significantly above and daggers that measures 
are significantly below the midpoint (0) using one-sample /-tests. Standard deviations are 
reported in parentheses, f f /**p < .01. t1"|7***P < -001.
Between-subjects, simple effects: Between group differences were significant in The 
EU context (direct relative prototypicality: F = 83.49; similarity-based
prototypicality; F  = 46.79; all ps = .001), where, as predicted, German scores were 
higher than British scores. In the NATO context, British scores were consistently 
higher than German scores, and differences were significant or marginally significant 
(direct relative prototypicality: F=3.31, p  = .08; similarity-based prototypicality; 
F=  5.29, p<.05).
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Relative power
Here, each national group felt more relatively powerful under that superordinate 
category where it was higher on relative prototypicality. Relative power was 
analysed using a 2 (National Group: Great Britain/Germany) X 2 (Context: 
EU/NATO) ANOVA, with the latter as a repeated measure factor. The two-way 
interaction National Group X Context was significant, F (l, 41) = 24.73, partial 
r f  = .38, p  < .001.
As shown in Table 8, the British felt significantly more relatively powerful in NATO 
(M= .15, SD = .96) than in The EU (M=-1.14, 57)= 1.36), F=  25.14, p < .0 0 \ 
(simple effect). Conversely, the Germans felt significantly more relatively powerful 
in The EU (M= .38, SD = .67) than in NATO {M= -.16, SD = .75), F=  4.21, p  < .05 
(simple effect).
Table 8: Mean relative power scores
British German
Relative power
NATO .15 -.16
(•96) (.75)
n = 22 n = 21
EU -1.14n .38*
(1.36) (.67)
n = 22 n — 21
Note: Asterisks indicate that measures are significantly above and daggers that measures 
are significantly below the midpoint (0) using one-sample ?-tests. Standard deviations are 
reported in parentheses. *p < .05. < .01.
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Summarising the score patterns of the a priori assumptions, the British felt more 
relatively prototypical of and powerful under NATO than The EU. They also held 
NATO in higher esteem than they did The EU, but not significantly so. Germans, on 
the other hand, produced a mirror image of British perceptions of relative 
prototypicality and of relative power, where the ingroup scored higher in The EU 
context than in the NATO context. Only one a priori assumption was incorrect; 
Germans’ evaluation of NATO was only marginally lower than evaluation of The 
EU. The next step was to examine whether these scores impact upon ingroup bias.
What are the relationships between relative prototypicality, relative power, the 
degree o f ingroup identification and the degree o f European identification (possible 
predictor variables)? How do these relate to ingroup bias (outcome variable)? Are 
there differences between the national groups and/or between contexts in these 
relationships?
As the point of departure, relative prototypicality, relative power, the degree o f 
ingroup identification, and the degree o f European identification were considered 
possible predictor variables of ingroup bias, the outcome variable. The exploratory 
goal was to identify difference between relationships based on national group 
membership and/or on the context of the superordinate category.
Ingroup bias was examined in a preliminary step. British ingroup bias scores 
(M= 15.68, SD = 25.93, n = 22) were significantly above the midpoint, German 
ingroup bias scores were not (M=  4.05, SD = 14.97, n = 21); although not
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significantly so, the British cohort showed higher ingroup bias than the German 
cohort did, ^(41) = 1.80,/? = .08.
In order to decompose relationships between variables, four sets of intercorrelations 
were tested. EU scores are shown in Table 9, and NATO scores in Table 10. In each 
table, British scores are given in the non-shaded and German scores in the shaded 
areas. After reporting the figures, see Figure 5 and Figure 6 for an explanation of 
these findings. Firstly we turn to identity measures and ingroup bias, because these 
scores are irrespective of context.
Identity measures and ingroup bias (non-context specific): Consistent with past 
research, as ingroup identification increased, so did ingroup bias. Consistent with 
CUM, ICM and IMSR and contrary to IPM, as European identification increased, 
ingroup bias decreased (see Table 9 or Table 10). In both samples, higher ingroup 
identification saw higher levels of ingroup bias (both rs > .46, both ps < .05). Higher 
European identification saw lower levels of ingroup bias, but significantly so only in 
the British sample, r = -.76, N = 21, p  < .01, two-tailed.
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Table 9: EU context: Intercorrelations between relative prototypicality, relative 
power, ingroup identification, European identification and ingroup 
bias by national group
1 2 3 4 5 6
1 . Direct relative 
prototypicality
- .55** 
(n=22)
.82**
(71=22)
-.49*
(71=22)
.49*
(*=21)
-.56**
(n=22)
2. Similarity-based relative 
prototypicality
.87**
(« = 2 0 )
- .67**
( tz= 2 2 )
-.44*
(n=22)
.36
(*=21)
-.51*
(71=22)
3. Relative power .59**
(* = 2 1 )
.46*
(» = 2 0 )
- -.53*
(«=22)
.67**
(* = 2 1 )
-.70**
(71=22)
4. Ingroup identification .03
(* = 2 1 )
.08
(« = 2 0 )
-.01
(* = 2 1 )
I  ~ -.58**
(71=21)
.60**
(71=22)
5. European identification - .1 2
(* = 2 1 )
- .2 4
(71=20)
.19
(* = 2 1 )
-.58**
(71=21)
I  - -.76**
(71=21)
6. Ingroup bias .07
(* = 2 1 )
.0 4
(« = 2 0 )
.06
(71=21)
.46*
(71=21)
-.2 4
(71=21)
-
Note: The shaded area show s intercorrelations in the German sample. The non-shaded area show s 
intercorrleations in the British sample. *p < .05. **p  <  .01 (two-tailed).
Prototypicality, power and ingroup bias (EU-specific): As shown in Table 9, clear 
between group differences emerged. Both measures o f relative prototypicality and 
the measure o f relative power correlated negatively and significantly with ingroup 
bias in the British sample (all r s< - .5 1 , all ps  < .05); there were no correlations 
between the three measures and ingroup bias in the German sample (r-range: .04 -  
.07).
Identity measures, prototypicality and power (EU-specific): The next question was: 
how do the identity measures and the prototypicality/power measures interrelate? In 
both samples, there were significant positive relationships between the two relative 
prototypicality measures and relative power (all rs>  .46, all /?s< .01). These three
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measures correlated negatively and significantly with British ingroup identification 
(all r s< - .4 4 , all ps<.0 \ ) .  Direct relative prototypicality and relative power 
correlated significantly with European identification (both rs > .49, both ps < .05). In 
contrast, there were no correlations between these three measures and ingroup or 
European identification in the German sample (r-range: -.24 -  .19).
Prototypicality, power and ingroup bias (NATO-specific): As shown in Table 10 and 
in contrast to the EU context, no between group difference emerged. Relative 
prototypicality and relative power were not correlated with ingroup bias in either 
sample (British: r-range: -.25 -  -.10; German: r-range: -.09 -  .14).
Table 10: NATO context: Intercorrelations between relative prototypicality, 
relative power, ingroup identification, European identification and 
ingroup bias by national group
1 2 3 4 5 6
1. D ire c t re la tiv e  
p ro to ty p ic a li ty
- .56** 
(« = 2 2 )
.75**
(77=22)
.1 4
(77=22)
.17
(77=21)
-.23
(77=22)
2. S im ila r i ty -b a s e d  re la tiv e  
p ro to ty p ic a l i ty
.65** 
(n=21)
- .56** 
( 77= 2 2 )
-.1 5
(77=22)
.29
(77=21)
-.10
(77=22)
3. R e la t iv e  p o w e r .36
(« = 2 1 )
.38
(«=21)
- .18
(77=22)
.23
(77=21)
-.25
(77=22)
4. In g ro u p  id e n tif ic a t io n .24
(« = 2 1 )
.16
(72=21)
.39
(77=21)
- -.58**
(77=21)
.60**
(77=22)
5. E u ro p e a n  id e n t if ic a t io n -.13
(«=21)
-.09
(71=21)
-.15
(tz=21)
-.58**
(77=21)
- -.76**
(77=21)
6. In g ro u p  b ia s .13
(77=21)
-.09 
(77=21)
.14
(77=21)
.46*
(77=21)
-.24
(77=21)
: -
Note: The shaded area show s intercorrelations in the German sam ple. The non-shaded area shows 
intercorrleations in the British sam ple *p < .05. **p < .01 (two-tailed).
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Identity measures, prototypicality and power (NATO-specific): In the British sample 
and in contrast to the EU context, relative prototypicality/power did not correlate 
with British ingroup or European identification (V-range: .1 4 -  .29). In the German 
sample, none of these measures correlated (r-range: -.15 -  .39).
These results are best summarized simplistically and schematically. Figure 5 shows 
significant correlations in the British sample. Figure 6 shows significant correlations 
in the German sample. In each, the EU context is depicted on the left, and the NATO 
context on the right. Comparing these two figures, it becomes apparent that the EU 
context hosts a range of interrelations between variables in the British sample, but 
not in the NATO context. In the German sample, only the degree of ingroup 
identification is linked to ingroup bias.
Figure 5: Significant intercorrelations in the British sample in both contexts
EU Context NATO Context
Ingroup
Identification
Relative
Prototypicality
Relative
Prototypicality
Ingroup bias
Relative
Power
Relative
Power
European
Identification Sig. pos. corr. 
Sig. neg. corr.
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Examining Figure 5 first, in the British sample, as ingroup identification increased, 
so did ingroup bias, irrespective of context. Conversely, as European identification 
increased, ingroup bias decreased. In the EU context, the degree of ingroup 
identification correlated negatively with relative prototypicality/power; European 
identification correlated positively with relative prototypicality/power. In the NATO 
context, identification and ingroup bias were independent of relative 
prototypicality/power. Although we can make no causal inferences here, it would 
appear that the degree of identification at ingroup or at superordinate category level 
are central to ingroup bias (non-context specific).
Findings of the German sample produced a very different picture. Although the 
relationship between ingroup identification and ingroup bias was consistent with past 
research (see Figure 6), ingroup bias levels were unaffected by the degree of 
European identification across both contexts. Furthermore, the only correlation found 
was in the EU context, where relative prototypicality and relative power were 
positively linked.
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Figure 6: Significant intercorrelations in the German sample in both contexts
EU Context NATO Context
Relative
Prototypicality
Ingroup
Identification
Ingroup bias
European
Identification
Relative
Prototypicality
Relative Relative
Power Power
Sig. pos. corr. 
Sig. neg. corr.
There are several explanations that may account for these findings, and these are 
addressed in the Discussion. Here in brief, it may be that identification (ingroup high, 
European low) and (low) power [status] is the key to negative intersubgroup relations 
in the British sample, and given the lack of relationships in the NATO context, it 
could be that NATO does not challenge ingroup distinctiveness, whereas The EU 
does. With regards to the German sample’s scores, European identification was far 
lower than anticipated (possibly due to the bi-polar scale employed), and it is 
questionable if this lack of association between European identification and ingroup 
bias found here is reliable.
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Do relative prototypicality, relative power, ingroup identification and/or European 
identification mediate the effect o f national group on ingroup bias?
Next a series of multiple regressions sought to distinguish between those variables 
that play a significant role in predicting ingroup bias levels and those that do not. To 
start, national group membership predicts ingroup bias; the British sample show 
more ingroup bias than the German sample does. The following analyses assessed 
mediators that might be responsible for this difference. Were there any specific 
mediator variables that may indirectly affect relationships between each national 
group and its ingroup bias levels? Because it was apparent that intergroup relations 
were unaffected by relative prototypicality/power in the NATO context, this context 
was not analysed further.
Regression analysis
Regression analysis was employed to determine the impact of the predictor variables 
on ingroup bias. However, two issues were of concern. Firstly, there were five
1 7possible predictor variables and a sample size of 43 . Although the sample size was 
clearly inadequate, given that the study’s aim was to gain a general picture of British- 
German relations, it was felt that regression analysis interpreted with caution might 
nonetheless add to understanding this relationship. The second concern was that of 
multicollinearity. Despite these weaknesses, analysis showed that two variables
17 Although some regard a case:IV ratio of 40:1 as an acceptable minimum (Brace, Kemp & Snelgar, 
2003), others are more stringent. Green (1991), for example, recommends a ratio of N > 50 + 8m, 
where m -  no. of IVs.
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affected ingroup bias indirectly; (a) the degree of ingroup identification and (b) 
relative power.
In a preliminary analysis, all five predictor variables were entered in one step (see 
Table 11). The omnibus model was significant, F(5, 35) = 6.36, p < .001, adj. 
R2 = .40. Relative power and ingroup identification were significant predictors (both 
ps = .03). Both relative prototypicality measures and the degree of European 
identification were non-significant.
Table 11: Multiple regression for all possible predictors of ingroup bias
Variable Adj. R2 R2 increase Step 1 p Sig.
Direct relative prototypicality .40 .48 .28 .33
Similarity-based relative 
prototypicality
-.07 .79
Relative power -.54 .03
Ingroup identification .37 .03
European identification -.05 .80
Ingroup identification and relative power were analysed again. Ingroup identification 
was entered in block 1, and this model was significant, F (l, 41) = 21.33, p  < .001, 
adj. R2= .33. Relative power was entered in block 2, and this model was likewise 
significant, F (2 ,40) = 16.26, /?<.001 adj. R2=A2  (see Table 12). Ingroup 
identification accounted for 33% of variance, and adding relative power to the model 
increased variance to 42%. It was noted that ingroup identification yielded a positive 
value (ft = .40), thus higher ingroup identification sees an increase in ingroup bias.
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Relative power yielded a negative value (fi = -.38), thus higher relative power group 
sees a decrease in ingroup bias.
Table 12: Multiple regression for ingroup identification and relative power as 
predictors of ingroup bias
Step/V ariable Adj. R2 R2 increase Step 1 p Step 2 p Sig.
1. Ingroup identification .33 .34 .59 .00
2. Ingroup identification .42 .11 .40 .01
Relative power -.38 .01
Mediation analysis
Having reduced the number of possible indirect predictors of ingroup bias, analysis 
could now turn to examining ingroup bias as a function of national group (where the 
British sample was more biased than the German sample), but more specifically to 
identify whether a relationship between national group and ingroup bias can actually 
be explained by the indirect effects of a further variable or variables -  here ingroup 
identification and relative power. To this end, mediation analysis followed, using the 
steps recommended by Baron and Kenny (1986; Kenny, 2003). Findings showed that 
both ingroup identification and relative power indirectly mediate ingroup bias, 
although not statistically significantly so. Again taking the modest sample size into 
consideration, the directional evidence of mediation is reported here.
Ingroup identification: As shown in Figure 7, the initial pathway between national 
group and ingroup bias (path c, p  = .08, n.s.) was reduced considerably when the 
mediator ingroup identification was added to the model, path c ’: B = -.04, p  = .78,
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Sobel’s t = -2.32, p  = .05. In this case, path b was positive, indicating an increase in 
ingroup bias as ingroup identification increases. The British were higher in ingroup 
identification (p < .01) and ingroup bias (p = .08, n.s.) than the Germans irrespective 
of context, and the relationship between national group and the degree of ingroup 
bias was strong (p = .08). However, the degree of ingroup identification exacerbated 
the degree of British ingroup bias considerably.
Figure 7: Mediation effects of ingroup identification on ingroup bias
Ingroup
identification
-.40**,
Adj.R2 = .31
57*** After mediation: 
path c' = -.04, n.s. 
Sobel’s t = -2.32, p = .02
National
Group
t
-.27 
p =.08
Ingroup bias
Note: National group context coded, where 1 = British, 2 = German
Relative power: Figure 8 shows findings unique to the EU context. The British were 
lower in relative power (p < .001) and higher in ingroup bias (p = .08) than the 
Germans, and relative power mediated ingroup bias even more so than the degree of 
ingroup identification. The initial pathway (path c, p  = .08; n.s.) between national 
group and ingroup bias was reduced to non-significance when the mediator relative 
power was added to the model, path c ’\ B = -.10,/? = .53, Sobel’s t = -3.02,/? < .001. 
Path b was negative; thus lower perceived relative power induced higher ingroup 
bias in the British sample.
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Figure 8: Mediation effects of relative power in the EU context on ingroup bias
Relative
power
.58’ r.63
National
Group
Ingroup bias
-.27
p  =.08
After mediation: 
path c'= -.10, n.s. 
Sobel’s t = -3.02, p < .001
Note: National group context coded, where 1 = British, 2 = German
It was interesting to note that, on the one hand, both higher ingroup identification 
(non-context specific) and lower relative power (EU context) see an increase in 
ingroup bias in the British sample. It is not possible to say with any clarity whether 
the mediators carry such weight in affecting ingroup bias scores, or whether the 
findings are a reflection of the nature of British-German relations. It is, however, 
possible to conclude that higher or lower relative prototypicality did not significantly 
affect higher or lower ingroup bias in either sample in either context.
3.3 Discussion
The aims of this study were threefold. The first was to investigate how British and 
Germans view NATO and The EU overall. The second aim was to investigate the 
nature of British-German relations, specifically to test IPM against other models of 
subgroup and superordinate group relations and to examine the role of perceived 
power in ingroup bias. The third aim was to determine whether specific variables 
might mediate ingroup bias in either of the national groups in either context. As
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pointed out previously, the sample size was extremely modest, and these limitations 
are discussed throughout this section where relevant.
Qualitative findings
Based on open-ended responses, it was expected that the British would favour NATO 
over The EU, and that, in particular, The EU would pose an identity threat, whereas 
NATO would not. It was expected that the German sample would favour The EU 
over NATO, possibly because of the multicultural ethics behind The EU and the 
militaristic nature of NATO. Additionally, it was anticipated that both groups would 
show more knowledge of The EU than of NATO.
With regards to the British sample, all speculations were correct. The overall 
evaluation of NATO was relatively positive (+4), of The EU relatively negative 
(-10). NATO was seen primarily to provide security and posed no threat to 
sovereignty or ingroup identity. In comparison, The EU did provide security to some 
degree, but perceived identity threat in the form of threat to sovereignty was 
apparent.
In the German sample, NATO evaluation was not relatively lower than EU 
evaluation (-3 for each category), nor was NATO a threat to peace. However and as 
anticipated, The EU posed a threat to ingroup wealth and prosperity.
A tentative conclusion is that, relatively speaking, NATO poses no threat to either 
group to any degree on any dimension. In contrast, The EU threatens British 
sovereignty and identity, (but not ingroup wealth and prosperity) and German
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ingroup wealth and prosperity (but not ingroup identity). It is sensible here to 
distinguish between these two forms of threat and to relate these back to social 
reality. Several Germans reported that The EU was a threat to ingroup wealth and 
prosperity, and criticisms were often well-informed. These ranged from the fall in 
purchasing power since the introduction of the Euro, to the influx of citizens from 
new member states since the EU enlargement and their willingness to offer low-cost 
labour. This threat can be measured by one’s bank balance at the end of the month.
Several British reported that The EU is a threat to sovereignty -  before reading in the 
priming text that member states do, in fact, delegate some of their sovereignty to The 
EU. So how ‘real’ is this threat? Firstly, respondents’ language was sometimes 
evaluative and emotive on negative connotations18, and emotion is a common 
response to threat (Gonz&lez & Brown, 2006). Secondly, a change in the social order 
(such as EU membership has brought about) can lead the individual to question his 
or her self-definition and the definition of their social group (Reicher & Hopkins, 
1998). Therefore, adding the situation (social change) to the response (affect), this 
can explain why EU membership is perceived as so threatening.
Based on connotation frequencies, the total number of evaluative judgements was 
higher in the EU (71) than in the NATO (21) context; The EU was therefore higher 
in contextual saliency. Additionally, incorrect information was given in the NATO 
context only, suggesting that its prototype is unclear (vague evaluative standards), 
broad (member states are intercontinental), and has a small scope (affecting few
18 For example: ‘Great Britain has become subservient to Europe and has forsaken her allies in the 
commonwealth’ (participant 006e); ‘We really don’t understand it [The EU]’ (participant 014e);
‘When I go on holiday the Euro is the currency, but it is always nice to come back to the £1 and 
pence.’ (participant 023e).
areas of day-to-day living). In contrast, The EU prototype is clear (e.g. The EU 
receives regular media coverage), narrow (member states are European only), and 
has a large scope (affecting more areas of day-to-day living). Drawing on Waldzus et 
al.’s (2003) proposal that the superordinate category needs to be well-defined for 
ingroup projection to occur, these differences in the prototypes might account for 
differences between the two contexts in the respective correlations between relative 
prototypicality and ingroup bias. The reader is reminded that, in the British sample 
only, these correlated negatively and significantly in the EU context only. This 
notion is discussed further later below.
Quantitative findings
Analyses sought to examine the direct or indirect impact of (a) ingroup and European 
identification, (b) relative power, and (c) relative prototypicality on ingroup bias. For 
all of these, it was of particular interest to uncover differences between the two 
national groups and their levels of ingroup bias, as well as to compare scores 
between the two contexts.
The primary findings are that (a) the British sample is higher on ingroup 
identification and ingroup bias than the German sample, and ingroup bias is a strong 
but not significant function of national group (i.e. the relationship is exacerbated by 
the degree of ingroup identification). Ingroup bias is not a function of national group 
mediated by the degree of European identification, (b) The lower power group (the 
British) show higher ingroup bias. Here, ingroup bias is a strong but non-significant 
function of national group, where the relationship is fully mediated by relative power
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-  but in the EU context only, (c) Higher relative prototypicality does not predict 
ingroup bias in either sample in either context. However in the EU context, lower 
relative prototypicality is associated with higher ingroup bias (in the British sample).
Ingroup identification and ingroup bias (non-context specific): The British sample 
scored higher than the German sample on both measures. Note, however, that 
relationships between all four target groups (ingroup, outgroup, The EU and NATO) 
were measured before ingroup identification. It is therefore possible that the 
comparison groups (as well as an awareness of power and prototypicality 
differentials) did influence participants’ ingroup identification scores.
European identification and ingroup bias (non-context specific): Intercorrelations 
showed that, in the British sample, as European identification increased, ingroup bias 
decreased significantly. In the German sample, the decrease in ingroup bias was non­
significant. However, regression analysis yielded no evidence that the degree of 
European identification affects ingroup bias. In hindsight, this lack of evidence may 
be due to the way in which the degree of European identification was measured. A 
bipolar scale was employed, thus placing participants in the position where any pro- 
European choice was at the cost of national identity. This is clearly a weakness in the 
design, and was rectified in the next studies.
Relative power and ingroup bias: Both groups felt more relatively powerful in one 
context than in the other (the British in NATO, the Germans in The EU). However, 
there was no correlation between relative power and ingroup bias in the NATO 
context, yet a correlation of -.70 in the EU context. Here the less powerful group (the
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British) demonstrated higher, and the more powerful group (the Germans) lower 
ingroup bias. Mediation analysis showed that ingroup bias was mediated fully by 
perceived relative power. However, and as discussed later, ingroup bias here was 
limited to evaluative ratings. The more socially competitive form of allocation-based 
ingroup bias was not measured here.
Furthermore, the lack of association between ingroup bias and relative power in the 
context of NATO suggests that the two superordinate categories do have different 
meanings for members, and these differences can affect intersubgroup evaluation, as 
proposed by all four models of subgroup-superordinate group relations (CUM, ICM, 
IMSR and IPM). It can only be speculated why this might be. A tentative explanation 
lies in the lack of perceived threat that NATO elicited in the qualitative responses, 
compared with threat to ingroup identity/sovereignty or wealth and prosperity that 
The EU elicited. Where there is no perceived threat, there is no need to employ 
identity management strategies such as social competition. If perceived threat is 
indeed the key, then the more powerful group is in a stronger position to combat it. 
The less powerful group is less able to do so, and as well seeing the superordinate 
category as the instigator of this threat, the less powerful group may also perceive the 
more powerful outgroup as being ‘guilty by association’, hence ingroup bias as a 
response.
What we cannot conclude, however, is that the high British ingroup bias scores and 
the low German ingroup bias scores can be accounted for solely by ingroup 
identification and/or relative power (nor by perceived threat to the British ingroup). It 
may be that the British sample holds unfavourable attitudes towards Germans based
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on past intergroup rivalries. Qualitative research lends support to this conclusion. For 
example, as Reicher and Hopkins (2001, p. 207) note, when evaluating the 
implications of German reunification for Europe, one British government minister 
concluded in 1993 that, whereas Germany had failed in military terms in the past, it 
was now seeking to dominate Europe economically. Past German national socialist 
atrocities remain in the British consciousness.
Similarly, it may be that the more relatively powerful German group can afford to 
hold a favourable opinion of the British because of its stronger position. This 
noblesse oblige effect ties in with findings by Sachdev & Bourhis (1985). In 
demonstrating favourable attitudes to the outgroup, the German sample is not sharing 
any of its resources, and the power differential remains unchanged (Spears et al., 
2001). Note also that only one form of ingroup bias was measured here (evaluative), 
and it may be that the German sample would have demonstrated higher ingroup bias 
on a more socially competitive level (e.g. allocation-based ingroup bias), had it been 
given the opportunity to do so.
Relative prototypicality and ingroup bias: The pattern of scores for direct and for 
similarity-based relative prototypicality measures mirrored relative power scores, 
that is higher British/NATO scores, higher German/EU scores. Also consistent with 
the relative power scores, there was no association between relative prototypicality 
and ingroup bias in the NATO context, but there were significant negative 
correlations in the EU context in the British sample only -  and IPM offers no 
predictions regarding ingroup bias levels based on lower relative prototypicality. 
Drawing too on regression analysis, there was no significant evidence that higher
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relative prototypicality sees an increase in ingroup bias, as proposed by IPM 
(Mummendey & Wenzel, 1999). Simultaneously, no evidence was found in support 
of CIIM (Gaertner & Dovidio, 2000), IMSR (Hornsey & Hogg, 2000c) and, in some 
respects, ICM19 (Brown. & Hewstone, 2005). Had this been the case, increasing 
European identification and/or relative prototypicality would have seen a significant 
decrease in ingroup bias.
It would be rash to criticize IPM at this point. As mentioned in the Method section, 
ingroup projection has been measured to date on the dimension of traits. In this 
study, however, different measures were employed and it could be that these did not 
tap into those processes in the same way that trait-rating would.
Finally, why was there no association between ingroup bias and relative 
prototypicality in the NATO context, but clear evidence in the EU context? Here the 
IPM literature may provide an insight. The prototype of the superordinate category 
may determine whether ingroup projection might occur or not. It is more likely to 
occur when the prototype is clear and narrow (as was the case with The EU), and less 
likely to occur when the prototype is unclear or broad (as was the case with NATO) 
(Waldzus et al., 2003). This could account for the lack of association between 
relative prototypicality and ingroup bias in the NATO context. However, it does not 
account for lower relative prototypicality seeing an increase in ingroup bias in the 
EU/British context.
19 As noted earlier, all three models (CIIM, ICM and IMSR) converge on several points.
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Another explanation (though wholly speculative due to the absence of empirical 
evidence) may lie in the differences between The EU and NATO, between Great 
Britain and Germany. It appears that NATO is less threatening to the British and the 
German sample, whereas The EU challenges British identity and German economic 
prosperity. If we add identity threat to a lack of power in the EU context, then The 
EU challenges the British in a way that NATO does not, and this could account for 
the higher British ingroup bias. Turning to the German sample, the threat to ingroup 
wealth and prosperity in The EU emanates from the Eastern European countries (as 
well as the effects of globalization and the introduction of the Euro). Therefore Great 
Britain herself is not the source of the threat and therefore not the target of ingroup 
bias.
As well as the weaknesses discussed above, there were other limitations in this study. 
Firstly, this first study in this series sought to gauge the general picture of British- 
German relations in the context of two superordinate categories. The correlational, 
quasi-experimental design was therefore a good choice, but there were no clear 
demarcations between contexts effects and there was no control sample (i.e. there 
were no separate conditions).
Secondly, the sample size (drawn on ex-colleagues) was inadequate given the 
sophistication of the research questions. Had the investigator extended the range of 
participants to include friends, this could have tipped the balance by introducing a 
like-minded sub-group to the sample. There was, then, a trade-off where diversity 
was prioritised over sample size. In a similar vein, a series of findings were non­
significant (p = .08). One plausible explanation for the lack of significance could be
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related to the small sample size. Therefore these findings have been reported, but 
should be interpreted with caution.
Thirdly, though again for sound reasons, the superordinate categories were primed at 
the start of the study, the two were not counterbalanced, and the degree of ingroup 
identification was measured at the end of the study. Not counterbalancing the two 
superordinate categories ensured that all participants focussed on NATO (thought to 
be the more neutral superordinate group) and then on The EU (thought to be possibly 
a threat inducing superordinate group). Whether this was the best decision is 
debatable. Additionally, measuring the degree of ingroup identification last ruled out 
any possibility of examining its role as a possible moderator of ingroup bias.
The next study rectified these weaknesses. The experimental design looked at 
separate conditions (EU, NATO, control); ingroup identification was measured 
before superordinate category priming; a more appropriate measure of European 
identification was implemented. It was also extended to include a second dimension 
of ingroup bias -  allocation-based ingroup bias -  in order to compare two forms of 
social competition.
In summary, findings showed that the degree of ingroup identification mediates 
British ingroup bias in that context where it feels under identity and status threat; The 
EU. The effect of relative prototypicality did not affect ingroup bias scores; however 
correlations suggested that, contrary to IPM, lower perceived relative prototypicality 
(in the British sample) increases ingroup bias, again in the EU context. No evidence
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was found to suggest that the degree of European identification mediates ingroup 
bias in either national group.
This was an exploratory study. Turning to the next study, when examined by 
condition, will The EU still elicit British ingroup bias more than NATO will? Will 
the noblesse oblige effect remain in the German sample, or might ingroup bias 
express itself in the form of allocation-based ingroup bias? Finally two questions not 
answered satisfactorily in this study: Does higher relative prototypicality increase or 
decrease ingroup bias? Does dual identification improve or harm intersubgroup 
relations?
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Chapter 4 Study 2
Study 1 had served to provide a general understanding of British-German relations 
under The EU and NATO, and to examine the roles of relative prototypicality, 
relative power and the degrees of ingroup and European identification in predicting 
(evaluative) ingroup bias. Five main conclusions emerged, and these were 
investigated further in this study. Firstly, there was no evidence that the 
superordinate category of NATO promoted or decreased ingroup bias. Secondly, the 
British sample demonstrated higher ingroup bias and identified more with the 
ingroup than the German sample did, and mediation analysis showed that the bias 
was enhanced by the degree of ingroup identification. Thirdly and against the 
backdrop of The EU but not against the backdrop of NATO, relative power also 
enhanced ingroup bias. Here the national group higher in relative power (the 
Germans) demonstrated lower ingroup bias. Fourthly, again in the EU context only, 
the less relatively prototypical group (the British) showed higher ingroup bias. There 
were no associations between relative prototypicality and ingroup bias in the German 
sample. Fifth and finally, there were no significant associations between the degree 
of European identity and ingroup bias.
Study 2 sought to rectify weaknesses identified in Study 1. As well as reducing the 
possibility of context effects by examining three separate conditions (The EU, 
NATO, control), the degree of national and of European identification were 
measured on two separate scales. The degree of ingroup identification was measured 
before the respective superordinate category was primed.
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Study 2 was also extended beyond the scope of Study 1. A second dimension of 
ingroup bias was included, and a measure of the degree of identification with the 
superordinate category was designed.
Ingroup bias: Due to its exploratory nature, Study 1 measured ingroup bias on the 
dimension of attitudes only (evaluative ingroup bias). As Spears et al. (2001) point 
out, the ingroup will show bias in a form that is realistically possible. In Study 1, one 
could postulate that the British sample showed higher evaluative ingroup bias 
because it was able to. Similarly, the German sample showed lower (and arguably 
withheld) ingroup bias because it could afford to. Therefore in Study 2, ingroup bias 
was measured additionally on a resource allocation task (allocation-based ingroup 
bias). Here the groups would have the opportunity to enter more directly into social 
competition.
Superordinate category identification: Additionally in Study 2, the degree of 
superordinate category identification (i.e. identification with The EU or with NATO) 
was measured, based on the evaluative component of identity. Consequently, a 
further notion could be tested, where IPM predictions are contrary to CIIM, ICM and 
IMSR. Namely, high dual identification -  that is, identification with the ingroup and 
with the superordinate category -  may increase the likelihood of ingroup bias 
(Wenzel et al., 2003).
The a priori assumptions made in Study 1 were tested here in a first step. In brief, the 
British would be more relatively prototypical/powerful under NATO than under The 
EU, would hold NATO in higher esteem than the EU, would identify more at the
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ingroup than at the European level and would draw more on sub-groups (e.g., Welsh, 
English) in their self-definition. The German sample would perceive itself to be more 
relatively prototypical/powerful under The EU than under NATO, would hold The 
EU in higher esteem than NATO20, would identify more at the European than at the 
ingroup level and would not draw on sub-groups (i.e. East German, West German) in 
self-definition.
Do we see higher evaluative ingroup bias in the British sample? Does either group 
show higher allocation-based ingroup bias? To what degree does the superordinate 
group affect ingroup bias scores?
Study 1 saw higher evaluative ingroup bias in the British sample. It was likely that 
this would hold constant in this study for two reasons. Firstly, was expected that the 
degree of ingroup identification, a strong but non-significant (p = .08) predictor of 
evaluative ingroup bias in Study 1, would remain higher in the British sample than in 
the German sample. Secondly, British attitudes to Germans may well be generally 
unfavourable. Should this be the case, then British evaluative ingroup bias should be 
constant across all three conditions.
Additionally, both forms of ingroup bias show social competition and both are
behavioural (Jetten et al., 2004), whereby allocation-based ingroup bias is perhaps
the more competitive form. It was speculated that the German sample -  at least in
The EU condition -  would show higher allocation-based ingroup bias, because as a
20 This was not the case in Study 1, where NATO evaluation was only slightly lower than EU 
evaluation. This was possibly due to the age group of the sample. Given the student sample in Study 2 
and the more left-wing stance generally associated with this group, it might be that NATO does equate 
with the USA (and indirectly with its foreign policy), and therefore the sample hold it in lower esteem 
that The EU.
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powerful EU member, it feels entitled to more resources that the outgroup and/or 
because the outgroup is less deserving of EU resources. The second speculation was 
that the British sample could even demonstrate outgroup favouritism in the EU 
condition, not necessarily because it finds itself less entitled to resources, but as a 
means of distancing itself from The EU. No speculations were made regarding 
allocation-based ingroup bias in the NATO condition.
What are the relationships between the possible predictor variables o f ingroup bias 
and the two forms o f ingroup bias?
Of the five possible predictor variables, three were identification-based; ingroup, 
European, and superordinate category identification. The other two variables were 
relative prototypicality and relative power. How did these intercorrelate? 
Furthermore, how might these intercorrelate with evaluative and with allocation- 
based ingroup bias? Would any specific patterns emerge for specific national groups 
and/or specific conditions? It was expected that ingroup identification would remain 
a strong predictor of evaluative ingroup bias. If the premises of CIIM were to hold 
true, high European identification (but not NATO identification) should see a 
decrease in both forms of ingroup bias. Based on research on power differentials and 
social reality constraints, it was expected that the more powerful group (Germans) 
would show higher allocation-based ingroup bias, and the less powerful group 
(British) higher evaluative ingroup bias. Given the sparse evidence found to support 
EPM in Study 1 (which may or may not be due to the small sample size), no 
predictions were made here.
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Is either form o f ingroup bias a function o f national group and (directly or 
indirectly) relative prototypicality or relative power? Are relative prototypicality and 
relative power distinct constructs? I f  so, are there any structural links we can 
identify?
Two research questions arise. Firstly, if either form of ingroup bias is a function of 
nationality (or not), is it mediated by relative prototypicality or relative power? In 
Study 1, there was evidence to suggest that lower relative prototypicality and lower 
relative power see higher evaluative ingroup bias (in the British/EU context). 
Secondly, there were interesting positive correlations between relative prototypicality 
and relative power in Study 1 (British/EU, British/NATO, German/EU). Therefore, 
are relative prototypicality and relative power two distinct psychological constructs? 
If yes, then is relative power the driving force behind relative prototypicality or vice 
versa, that is, which is the better predictor of relative proto typicality?
Do high dual identifiers demonstrate higher or lower ingroup bias?
The final research question brings us to the degree of ingroup and superordinate 
category identification. Do high dual identifiers demonstrate higher (IPM) or lower 
(CIIM, ICM and IMSR) ingroup bias in either form? To what degree does ingroup 
identification interact with superordinate category identification and moderate 
ingroup bias in either form?
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4.1 Method
Design
The experimental study employed a 2 (National Group: British/German) X 3 
(Condition: EU/NATO/no superordinate category) X 2 (Target Group: 
ingroup/outgroup measures) mixed ANOVA design. The two between-subjects 
factors were national group and condition, and target group data constituted within- 
subjects repeated measures. From the repeated measures, a relative ingroup rating 
was sometimes calculated that then served as a between-subjects measure. 
Participants were randomly assigned to the conditions within each national group. 
Cell sizes were between 27 and 35.
Participants
One hundred and ninety-four students across a variety of Faculties and Schools from 
the University of Wales Swansea and the Universitat zu Koln participated in the 
study. Of these, 13 were excluded entirely; eleven did not fulfil participant criteria 
(e.g. dual nationality), and a further two due to flippant comments written on the 
returned questionnaire. There remained a net sample size of 181 participants 
(British: N  = 95, m :f= 39:56, age range =18-50, M — 21.15, £D = 5.37; 
German: N=  86, m :f= 46:40, age range = 19-42, M =  24.48, SD = 4.54).
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Materials
The study was questionnaire-based and was largely a replication of Study 1. All 
printed matter was originally designed in English and there followed the same 
translation-back-translation cycle. Before running the study, three British and three 
German subjects filled in the questionnaire to ensure its clarity.
Manipulation
The manipulation took the form of priming superordinate category membership 
using the framing texts employed in Study 1.
Dependent variables
Unless stated otherwise, all items and sub-items employed a 7-point Likert scale 
(1 = strongly disagree to 7 = strongly agree). There were seven dependent variables, 
five of which served as possible predictor- and two as outcome variables. These are 
described below in the order in which they appeared in the questionnaire. Measures 
included in the control condition are asterisked. Other measures were also included , 
but were not relevant to this study.
*Ingroup identification (replicatedfrom Study 1): Sub-items (a > .62) were collapsed 
into the single measure of ingroup identification (1 = low to 7 = high).
21 These were; Right-Wing-Orientation (Altemeyer, 1981, 1998), nationalism and patriotism (Blank & 
Schmidt, 2003), interest in national and European politics, crossed categorisation, intergroup anxiety 
(Stephan & Stephan, 1985), and social stereotypes. The similarity-based prototypicality measure from 
Study 1 was also administered. However, given the strong correlations between direct and similarity- 
based prototypicality in Study 1, the latter measure was used to examine ingroup distinctiveness in a 
separate study. These findings, not relevant to the thesis, are therefore not reported here.
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Superordinate category evaluation (replicated from Study 1): After the framing text, 
and three comprehension questions, the three evaluation sub-items followed. These 
(a > .76) were collapsed into the single variable superordinate category evaluation 
(1 = low to 7 = high).
Relative prototypicality and relative power (replicated from Study 1): In contrast to 
Study 1, two of the prototypicality and two of the power statements were reverse 
scored. As in Study 1, two single measures of relative prototypicality (both a > .11) 
and relative power (both a > .55) were computed (-6 = low to +6 = high).
*Allocation-based ingroup bias (outcome variable)
Since it was not realistic to introduce the somewhat complicated Tajfel matrices 
outside of the laboratory, our own measures were devised to tap into allocation-based 
ingroup bias. Participants allocated a grand total £10 million [€10 million] between 
the ingroup and outgroup for three ostensible projects that had been organised by the 
respective superordinate category22. One project, for example, was ‘to fund six- 
monthly conferences [to be held locally] to discuss future policies’. M ingroup.score -  
Moutgroup-score delivered the measure of allocation-based ingroup bias (-10 = low to 
+10 = high). There was a risk that the results might reflect perceptions of equality 
and fairness that might override ingroup bias, and this remained to be seen.
22 In the control condition, participants were told that the scheme was devised by The EU. Also, one 
project was later rejected (see Results section).
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*Evaluative ingroup bias (outcome variable): This was replicated from Study 1.
Superordinate category identification (based on the evaluative component o f  
identity)
Ideally, superordinate category identification would have been measured on 
Cameron’s (2004) scale. However, some sub-items would have been implausible in 
the NATO condition (e.g. ‘In my everyday life, I often think about what it means to 
be a member of NATO’). Therefore, based on the rationale that the ingroup (here the 
superordinate category) will strive for positive global self-esteem, and that high 
identifiers will very likely evaluate the ingroup positively, measures were devised to 
tap into the evaluative component of identity.
Drawing on the connotations the superordinate categories had elicited in Study 1, 
four positive (e.g. ‘peace’ and ‘helps protect Western values’) and four negative 
statements (e.g. ‘threat to our identity’ and ‘too much rivalry amongst member 
states’) were randomly ordered. Participants rated how much each of these elicited 
their agreement (1 = not at all to 7 = very much so). Negative and positive sets of 
sub-items were collapsed into two new variables (both as > .54) and Mpositive -  
Mnegative delivered the measure of superordinate category identification (-6 = low to 
+6 = high).
Other identity measures
*National and European identification: In contrast to Study 1, participants rated the 
degree to which they felt British [German] and the degree to which they felt
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European (1 = not at all to 7 = very much so) on two separate scales. Thus national 
identification and European identification were measured. *Hierarchical levels o f 
identity were a replication of in Study 1.
Procedure
The study was run after Ethics Approval had been gained (see App. II-1). The data 
were collected based on convenience sampling. Participants were approached 
individually by the investigator at eating outlets in both universities between January 
and February, 2005. They were informed in the respective language that the study 
was to investigate ‘European perceptions; how people feel about their country and 
their European neighbours’. None were aware that the study would run parallel in the 
other country. Those who agreed to participate signed the Form of Consent and 
completed one of the six questionnaires (language- and condition-specific). In nearly 
all instances, questionnaires were filled in and returned on the spot. All participants 
were thanked by the investigator and fully de-briefed, either immediately or later via 
e-mail (see App. II-2 -  II-7). As an incentive, each participant received a raffle ticket 
with a prize of €20 and £15 for the respective national group winner.
4.2 Results
The data were screened for outliers and all reverse-scored items recoded. Sub-items 
were recoded into new variables as described in the Materials section. In the 
demographics section, participants had reported whether they had ever resided
23 This item was placed at the very end of the questionnaire, ensuring that European priming had not 
occurred in the NATO or control conditions.
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abroad or not for a period of at least six months. Significantly more German 
participants (n = 28, 32.6%) than British participants (n = 12, 12.6%) had, t(\19) = 
3.31, p  < .05. Also the British sample was significantly younger than the German 
sample (GB: M=  21.15, SD = 5.37; Germany: M = 24.48, SD = 4.54), t{179) = 4.48, 
/?<.001. Therefore in the analyses reported below, analyses of co-variance were 
performed in each instance in a first step, with Residency Abroad and Age as co- 
variates. No effects of these were found in any of the models. Hence the following 
analyses use analysis of variance. Unless stated otherwise, all analyses of variance 
employed a 2 X 2 [3] design, where the factors national group (British/German) and 
condition (EU/NATO/[Control]) served as independent variables. The a priori 
assumptions were examined first.
Relative prototypicality
A priori assumptions were correct and findings consistent with Study 1 (see Table 
13). The British felt more relatively prototypical of NATO than The EU, and the 
Germans of The EU than NATO. The German claim was not contested by the 
outgroup, the British claim was contested by the outgroup. A 2 X 2 ANOVA with 
relative prototypicality as dependent variable yielded a significant 2-way interaction 
National Group X Condition, F(1, 111) = 36.50, partial rj2 = .25,/? < .001 24.
24 The main effect of national group was also significant, F(l, 111) = 15.52, partial rj2 = .12, p  < .001.
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Table 13: Mean relative prototypicality and relative power scores
British German
Relative prototypicality
EU -.99n t .88"
(1.14) (1.32)
n = 30 H = 27
NATO .33* -.06
(.74) (.75)
n = 30 n = 28
Relative power
EU -.40 .41
(1.40) (1.14)
n — 30 n = 27
NATO .47" -,61n
(.68) (.93)
n = 30 n =27
Note: Asterisks indicate that measures are significantly above and daggers that measures 
are significantly below the midpoint (0) using one-sample Mests. Standard deviations are 
reported in parentheses. *p < .05. < -01. tttp  < -001.
Within-subjects, simple effects: The British cohort felt significantly more 
prototypical of NATO (M= .33, SD = .74) than of The EU (M= -.99, SD = 1.14), 
F = 26.16, p  < .001. Conversely, Germans felt significantly more prototypical of The 
EU (M= .88, SD = 1.32) than of NATO (M= -.06, SD = .75), F= 12.02,p  < .001.
Between-subjects, simple effects: Whereas both groups concurred with Germany’s 
significantly higher relative prototypicality in The EU (F = 49.33, p  < .001), groups 
did not concur with Great Britain’s significantly higher relative prototypicality in 
NATO {p = .13). As IPM posits, if the groups do not contest each other’s claim to 
higher relative prototypicality, ingroup projection may not occur. If this is the case,
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this increases the likelihood of ingroup bias in the NATO condition, and decreases its 
likelihood in the EU condition.
Relative power
Relative power scores were examined in the same fashion as relative prototypicality, 
and a similar pattern of scores emerged (see Table 13), confirming the a priori 
assumptions. British scores were higher than German scores in the NATO condition, 
German scores higher than British scores in the EU condition. The 2 X 2  ANOVA, 
where Relative Power served as dependent variable, showed that only the 2-way 
interaction National Group X Relative Power was significant, F( 1, 111) = 22.04, 
partial r\2 = .17, p  < .001. Simple effects showed that the British felt significantly 
more powerful under NATO (M=.47, SD = .68) than under The EU condition 
(M=-.40, 57)= 1.40), F=9.19, p  = .002. Conversely, the German sample felt 
significantly more powerful under The EU (M= .41, SD =1.14) than under NATO 
(M= -.61, SD = .93), F=  12.29,/? = .001.
Superordinate category evaluation
Because CIIM, ICM, IMSR and IPM all maintain that the superordinate category 
must be held in high esteem for their respective predictions to hold true, this measure 
sought only to confirm whether this was the case across both national groups and 
both experimental conditions. This was, indeed, the case. Mean scores (see Table 14) 
showed that all scores were significantly above the midpoint (all ps < .001),
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confirming a priori assumptions. This measure was therefore not utilized further in 
the study25.
Table 14: Mean superordinate category evaluation scores
British German
Superordinate category evaluation
EU 4.89"* 5.70***
(1.28) (.76)
n = 30 n = 21
NATO 5.09*** 5.93***
(.87) (.64)
n = 30 n =28
Note: Asterisks indicate that measures are significantly above the midpoint (3) using one-
sample Mests. Standard deviations are reported in parentheses. ***p < .001.
Ingroup, national group, European, hierarchical and superordinate group 
identification
It was rightly assumed that the British sample would score higher on ingroup 
identification and national identification than the German sample, although 
differences were non-significant. It was further rightly assumed that the German 
sample would score higher on European identification than the British sample. It was 
also rightly assumed that the British sample would draw significantly more on sub­
groups in their self-definition, and the German sample on the European level of 
identity {hierarchical levels o f identification). Finally, it was incorrectly assumed 
that German sample would identify more with The EU than with NATO, and the
British sample more with NATO than The EU {superordinate category
25 A 2 (National Group: British/German) X 2 (Condition: EU/NATO) ANOVA showed that only 
national group produced a significant main effect, F (l, 111) = 23.08, partial r\2 = .17,/? < .001.
German scores overall (both Ms > 5.70) were higher than British scores overall (both Ms < 5.09).
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identification). Here, the German sample identified more with both superordinate 
categories than the British sample did. Despite all between-group differences, all 
mean scores were significantly above the mid-point (see Table 15).
Table 15: Mean ingroup, national, European and superordinate category 
identification scores
British German
Ingroup identification 4.53*** 4.34***
(.83) (.78)
n -  95 n = 86
National and European identification
British/German 5.03*** 4.72***
(1.52) (1.62)
European 3.32* 5.26***
(1.49) (1.12)
n -  95 n — 86
Superordinate category identification
EU 1.09*** 2.17***
(1.48) (1.71)
h = 30 7!  = 27
NATO 1.53*** 2.31***
(1.52) (1.35)
n = 30 71 = 28
Note: Asterisks indicate that measures are significantly above the midpoint (superordinate 
category identification = 0, all other measures 3) using one-sample t-tests. Standard 
deviations are reported in parentheses. *p < .05. ***p < .001.
Ingroup identification: As shown in Table 15 and contrary to predictions, between 
group differences (M diff=.19) were marginal (British: M =  4.53, SD = .83; 
German: M =4.34, SD = .78). National identification: British scores were higher 
than German scores (British: M =  5.03, SD = 1.52; German: M =  4.72, SD=  1.62), 
but not significantly so. European identification: European identification was 
significantly higher in the German sample (.M= 5.26, SD=  1.12) than in the British
Page 124
sample (M =3.32, 50=1.49), £(176) = 9.71, p  < .001. Additionally, the German 
sample felt significantly more European than German (paired sample £-test: 
£(84) = 323 ,p  < .01).
Superordinate category identification: Differences between groups and conditions 
were examined in a 2 X 2 ANOVA. Only the main effect of national group was 
significant, F (l, 111) = 10.69, partial r f = .09, p  = .001. Simple effects revealed that 
the German sample identified more with each superordinate category than the British 
sample did (EU: F{\, 111) = 7.16, partial r f = .06,pi < .01; NATO: F (l, 111) = 3.78, 
partial tj = .03,/? = .054). This was contrary to a priori assumptions.
Hierarchical levels o f identification: The data received the same treatment as in 
Study 1. As shown in Table 16, national group membership was indicative of how a 
person might draw on differing levels of group membership in self-description 
( f l = 110.16, d f = 6 , p <  .001). Nearly half of the British sample (41.5%) identified at 
the subgroup level only (German sample: 2.5%). Identity profile combinations 
excluding the European level as a frame of reference account for 87.3% of British 
responses (German sample: 17.6%). Identity profile combinations at group and 
European levels accounted for 56.3% of German responses (British sample: 21.3%). 
These findings were consistent with those from Study 1.
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Table 16: 2 X 7 contingency table -  national group by identity level profile
Count 
(% within nationality)
ID level 
combinations
Sub Sub
+
Group
Sub
+
Super
Group Group
+
Super
Super All
3
levels
British 
n = 94
39
(41.5)
27
(28.7)
0
(0)
17
(18.1)
2
(2.1)
1
(1.1)
8
(8.5)
German 
n = 80
2
(2.5)
0
(0)
5
(6.3)
7
(8.8)
22
(27.5)
16
(20.0)
28
(35.0)
Note: Sub = subgroup, e.g. W elsh, East German. Group = British or German. Super = European.
Summarising a priori assumptions, all were correct with the exception o f 
superordinate category identification. Here Germans identified significantly more 
with both superordinate categories than the British did.
Do we see higher evaluative ingroup bias in the British sample? Does either group 
show higher allocation-based ingroup bias? To what degree does the superordinate 
group affect ingroup bias scores?
British evaluative ingroup bias scores were significantly higher than German scores, 
irrespective o f condition. Similarly, German allocation-based ingroup bias scores 
were significantly higher than British scores, irrespective o f  condition. Interestingly 
in the EU condition, the British demonstrated outgroup favouritism on the allocation- 
based ingroup bias measure. Overall, then, there seemed to be tentative evidence 
pointing to each group demonstrating its own preferred (and realistic) form o f 
ingroup bias. Mean scores are reported in Table 17.
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Table 17: Mean evaluative and allocation-based ingroup bias scores
British German
Evaluative ingroup bias
EU
**
18.77 11.67
(28.22) (16.23)
n = 30 n = 21
NATO 18.67 _ _ . *** 9.54
(21.01) (11.90)
n = 30 n = 28
Control
***
16.29
♦
8.10
(22.31) (21.48)
n - 3 5 n = 31
Overall 17.82 9.96***
(23.74) (17.06)
n = 95 n = 86
Allocation-based ingroup bias
EU -.17 .10
(.50) (.32)
72 = 28 n = 21
NATO .10 .21*
(.30) (.38)
n = 29 « = 24
Control .01 .05
(.47) (.53)
a II to 00 72 = 28
Overall -.02 .12
(.44) (.42)
n = 85 72 = 79
Note: Asterisks indicate that measures are significantly above the midpoint (0) using one- 
sample 2-tests. Standard deviations are reported in parentheses. *p < .05. **p < .01. 
* * * / ? < . 001 .
Evaluative ingroup bias: A 2 X 3 ANOVA with evaluative ingroup bias as 
dependent variable sought to identify any interactions between national group and 
condition. Findings showed that national group alone produced a significant main
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effect, F (l, 175) = 4.45, partial rj2 = .03, p  < .05. Scores were consistently higher in 
the British sample (overall score: M =  17.82, SD = 23.74) than in the German sample 
(overall score: M =  9.69, SD = 17.06), irrespective of condition.
Allocation-based ingroup bias: After data collection, one of the three ‘projects’ was 
deemed unsuitable and was excluded from the analysis26. Two steps were undertaken 
to refine responses for the two remaining projects27. As shown in Table 17, here 
German scores (EU: M=  .10, SD = .32; NATO: M  = .21, SD = .38) were higher than 
British score (EU: M =-.17, SD = .50; NATO: M =.10, SD = 3 0 ) across both 
experimental conditions. A 2 X 3 ANOVA, this time with allocation-based ingroup 
bias as dependent variable, again showed a main effect of national group, 
F (l, 158) = 4.45, partial rj2 = .03, p  < .0528. Interestingly in the EU condition, we see 
the British sample demonstrating outgroup favouritism.
What are the relationships between the possible predictor variables o f ingroup bias 
and the two forms o f ingroup bias?
Four sets of intercorrelations are reported below. The EU condition is shown in 
Table 18, the NATO condition in Table 19. In each table, British scores are given in 
the non-shaded and German scores in the shaded areas. The variables examined 
were, in this order, 1. relative prototypicality, 2. relative power, 3. ingroup
26 In this project promoting cultural diversity in schools, allocating a higher sum to the outgroup could 
indicate a belief that the outgroup lacks multicultural awareness more than the ingroup does. Thus 
allocating more to the outgroup might be a method of ingroup enhancement.
27 Firstly, responses erroneously given in percentages were computed to reflect absolute values. 
Secondly, those responses which totalled >10 were re-proportioned to reflect the grand total value of 
10. Re-proportioned responses between 9.9 and 10.1 were accepted as valid. The remaining 17 invalid 
responses were excluded from the analysis.
28 The main effect of condition approached significance, F(2, 138) = 2.73, partial rj2 = .03, p  = .07.
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• 7Qidentification , 4. European identification, 5. superordinate category identification, 
6. evaluative ingroup bias and 7. allocation-based ingroup bias. Variables 1-5 were 
considered possible predictor variables, variables 6-7 outcome variables.
In the British sample (EU condition, see Table 18), all three identity measures 
correlated with evaluative ingroup bias. Correlations were positive on the ingroup 
identity measure (r = .60, p  < .01), and negative on the two superordinate category 
measures (both rs < -.34, both ps < .08). Relative prototypicality correlated with 
allocation-based ingroup bias (r = .39, p  < .05). Neither relative prototypicality nor 
relative power correlated with evaluative ingroup bias
29 The degree of national identification was not included in this analysis. It correlated positively with 
the ingroup identification measure across both groups and conditions (all rs > .44, all ps < .05). This 
measure (based on one item) was therefore excluded and ingroup identification (based on Cameron’s 
(2004) three factor model of social identity) was included.
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Table 18: EU condition: Intercorrelations between predictor and outcome 
variables by national group
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
1. R e l. p ro to . - .34
07= 30)
-.12
(77=30)
-.0 3
(77=30)
.19
(77=30)
- .0 8
(n = 3 0 )
.39*
(77=28)
2 . R e l. p o w e r .2 4
(« = 2 7 )
- .08
(77=30)
-.10
(77=30)
.17
(77=30)
-.10
(77=30)
.27
(77=28)
3. In g ro u p  id . .38* 
(/i==2 7 )
.24
(77=27)
- .05
(77=30)
-.15
(77=30)
.6 0 ”
(77=30)
.08
(77=28)
4 . E u ro . id . .20
in-21)
.03
(77=27)
.21
(77=27)
- .17
(77=30)
-.38*
(77=30)
- .1 9
(77=28)
5. S u p e r, c a t. id . fT'
oo 
II
r~1  w .37a
(77=27)
.37a
(77=27)
.18
(77=27)
- - .3 4 a
(77=30)
.01
(77=28)
6. E v a l. b ia s .07
(«=27)
.21
(77=27)
.32
(77=27)
-.02
(77=27)
-.32
(77=27)
- .07
(77=28)
7. A llo c , b ia s .27
(tz=27)
.40*
(77=27)
.21
(77=27)
.46’
(77=27)
.02
(77=27)
.37a
(77=27)
-
Note: The shaded area show s intercorrelations in the German sample. The non-shaded area show s 
intercorrelations in the British sa m p le .ap <  -08. *p < .05. **p < .01 (two-tailed).
In the German sample (EU condition, see Table 18), none o f the predictor variables 
correlated with evaluative ingroup bias. Superordinate category identification 
correlated with allocation-based ingroup bias (r = .46, p  < .05) and with evaluative 
ingroup bias (r = .38, p  = .08), suggesting that higher dual identification sees an 
increase in ingroup bias. Relative power correlated positively with allocation-based 
ingroup bias (r -  .40, p < .05). Relative prototypicality did not correlate with either 
form o f ingroup bias.
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Table 19: NATO condition: Intercorrelations between predictor and outcome 
variables by national group
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
1. Rel. proto. - .58**
0=30)
.03
0=30)
.05
0=28)
.16
0=30)
.20
(n=30)
.19
0=29)
2. Rel. power .34a 
0=28)
- .27
0=30)
.28
0=28)
.03
0=30)
.16
0=30)
.23
0=29)
3. Ingroup id. -.05
0=28)
.04
0=28)
- .24
0=28)
-.04
0=30)
.40*
0=30)
.19
0=29)
5. Euro. id. -.23
(«=28)
-.03
0=28)
.52**
0=28)
- .26
0=28)
-.08
0=28)
-.10
0=27)
6. Super, cat. 
id.
.40*
0=28)
.23
0=28)
.03
0=28)
-.09
0=28)
- -.44*
0=30)
-.27
0=29)
7. Eval. bias .12
0=28)
.21
0=28)
.23
0=28)
.42*
0=28)
-.02
0=28)
- .23
0=29)
8. Alloc, bias -.08
0=24)
.05
0=24)
.15
0=24)
-.09
0=24)
-.12 
(n=24)
.07
0=24)
-
Note: The shaded area show s intercorrelations in the German sample. The non-shaded area shows 
intercorrelations in the British sam ple . ap  <  .08. *p <  .05. **p  <  .01 (two-tailed).
In the British sample (NATO condition, see Table 19), relative prototypicality and 
relative power were associated (/*=.58, /?< .0 1 ), but neither was linked to either 
form o f ingroup bias. Only two predictor variables were linked to evaluative ingroup 
bias; ingroup identification (r = .40, p < .05) and superordinate category 
identification (r = -.44, p < .05). As in the EU condition, higher ingroup 
identification sees higher evaluative ingroup bias, higher superordinate category 
identification lower ingroup bias. There were no relationships between predictor 
variables and allocation-based ingroup bias.
In the German sample (NATO condition, see Table 19), as the degree o f European 
identification increased, so did evaluative ingroup bias (r = .42, p  < .05). No
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correlations with allocation-based ingroup bias emerged. Finally, relative 
proto typicality and relative power were not linked to either form of ingroup bias.
These results are summarized schematically and without correlational values below. 
Figure 9 shows significant or marginally significant correlations in the British 
sample. Figure 10 shows significant or marginally significant correlations in the 
German sample. In each figure, the EU condition is depicted on the left, and the 
NATO condition on the right.
Figure 9: Significant or marginally significant intercorrelations in the British 
sample by condition
EU Condition Sig. pos. corr. Sig. neg. corr. 
a : p  < .08
NATO Condition
Evaluative 
ingroup bias
Alloc, based 
ingroup bias
Relative
Power
Relative
Power
European
Identification
Ingroup
Identification
Ingroup
Identification
European
Identification
Superord.Cat.
Identification
Superord.Cat.
Identification
Relative
Prototypicality
Relative
Prototypicality
As shown in Figure 9, in the British sample an increase in ingroup identification saw 
an increase in evaluative ingroup bias, irrespective of condition. Conversely, higher
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European identification (both measures) saw a decrease in evaluative ingroup bias in 
the EU condition only. Allocation-based ingroup bias was linked positively to 
relative prototypicality in the EU condition, and negatively to superordinate category 
identification in the NATO condition. There was no link between relative power and 
either form of ingroup bias in either condition.
Figure 10: Significant and marginally significant intercorrelations in the 
German sample by condition
NATO Condition
Evaluative 
ingroup bias
Alloc, based 
ingroup bias
EU Condition
Relative
Power
Relative
Power
European
Identification
European
Identification
Ingroup
Identification
Ingroup
Identification
Relative
Prototypicality
Superord.Cat.
Identification
Superord.Cat.
Identification
Relative
Prototypicality
Sig. pos. corr. 
Sig. neg. corr. 
a: p  < .08
As shown in Figure 10, in the German sample ingroup identification was not related 
to either form of ingroup bias. However, higher superordinate category identification 
saw in increase in allocation-based ingroup bias (EU condition only), and higher 
European identification saw an increase in evaluative ingroup bias (NATO condition
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only). Allocation-based ingroup bias was linked positively to relative power (EU 
condition only). There was no link between relative prototypicality and either form 
of ingroup bias in either condition. Interestingly, ingroup identification correlated 
positively with both levels of superordinate category identification in the EU 
condition.
Is either form o f ingroup bias a function o f national group and (directly or 
indirectly) relative prototypicality or relative power? Are relative prototypicality and 
relative power distinct constructs? I f  so, are there any structural links we can 
identify?
To answer the first question, a series of general linear models was employed (are 
there any interactions between relative prototypicality and relative power?), and 
mediation analysis followed where appropriate (do either mediate ingroup bias?). To 
answer the second question, principal component analysis was employed (are relative 
prototypicality and relative power separate constructs?), and mediation tests followed 
where appropriate (can we identify whether one indirectly affects the other?).
Is either form o f ingroup bias a function o f national group and (directly or 
indirectly) relative prototypicality or relative power?
Relative prototypicality was, then, positively related to allocation-based ingroup bias 
(British/EU) and relative power to allocation-based ingroup bias (German/EU). As a 
precursor to identifying possible indirect effects of relative prototypicality/power on 
either form of ingroup bias, a series of general linear models was employed. In each 
model, cases were selected by condition. One of the ingroup bias measures
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(dependent variable) was examined as a function of nationality (independent 
variable, categorical measure) and relative prototypicality (independent variable, 
continuous measure). Tests were later repeated, where relative prototypicality was 
replaced with relative power.
Relative prototypicality and ingroup bias
Evaluative ingroup bias, where the British sample scored higher than the German 
sample, was not mediated by relative prototypicality in either condition. Allocation- 
based ingroup bias, where the German sample scored higher than the British sample, 
was mediated fully by relative prototypicality in the EU condition only.
On the dimension of evaluative ingroup bias, the main effects of national group, of 
relative prototypicality and the 2-way interaction between these were non-significant 
(EU: all Fs < .54, all ps > .47; NATO: all Fs < 2.23, all ps > .14).
On the dimension of allocation-based ingroup bias, significant findings emerged in 
the EU condition only. Here, the main effect of relative prototypicality was 
significant (F(3, 51) = 6.74, partial rj1 = .12,p  < .05), where German scores (M= .10) 
were significantly higher than British scores (M=-.17). The interaction National 
Group X Relative Prototypicality was non-significant. All findings in the NATO 
condition were non-significant.
The focus, then, was on allocation-based ingroup bias in the EU condition, whereby 
the NATO condition was examined for comparison purposes only. Following the 
steps recommended by Baron and Kenny (1986; Kenny, 2003), mediation analysis
Page 135
examined the effects of relative prototypicality in more depth. National group served 
as independent variable, allocation-based ingroup bias as outcome variable, and 
relative prototypicality was tested as an indirect mediator.
As shown in Figure 11 left, relative prototypicality mediated allocation-based 
ingroup bias fully in the EU condition (but not in the NATO condition, Figure 11 
right). In the EU condition, the initial significant path between national group and 
allocation-based ingroup bias (path c: B = .31 ,p  = .02) became non-significant (path 
c B = .07, p  = .22) after adding relative prototypicality as a mediator, Sobel’s 
f = 2.29,/? = .02.
Figure 11: Mediation effects of relative prototypicality on allocation-based 
ingroup bias
Prototypicality Prototypicality
62***/ EU \  .39* -.26* /  NATO Vo6
Adj.R2 = .16 \ Adj.R2 = -.01 \
National
Group
c
Allocation bias
.31*
National
Group
c
Allocation bias
.15
After mediation: 
path c'= .07, n.s. 
Sobel’s f = 2.29, p = .02
After mediation: 
path c'= .17, n.s.
Note: National group context coded, where 1 = British, 2 = German
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Relative power and ingroup bias
Evaluative ingroup bias, where the British sample scored higher than the German 
sample, was not mediated by relative power in either condition. Allocation-based 
ingroup bias, where the German sample scored higher than the British sample, was 
partially mediated by relative power in the EU condition only.
Following the same procedure as above, relative prototypicality was substituted with 
relative power. Again no evidence was found to suggest that evaluative ingroup bias 
was a function of relative power. All main effects and 2-way interactions were not 
significant (EU: all Fs < 1.29, all ps > .26; NATO: all Fs < 1.65, all ps > .21).
On the dimension of allocation-based ingroup bias, significant findings emerged in 
the EU condition only. Here, the main effect of relative power was significant, 
F{3, 51) = 5.36, partial rj1 = .10, p  < .05. The interaction National Group X Relative 
Power was non-significant. All findings in the NATO condition were non­
significant.
Mediation analysis showed that partial mediation had occurred in the EU condition 
(see Figure 12, right). German higher allocation-based ingroup bias scores were 
indirectly mediated by relative power. The effect of national group on allocation- 
based ingroup bias was reduced from significance (path c : B = .31, p  = .02) to non­
significance (path c ’: B = .22, p  = .10) after adding relative power to the model. 
Sobel’s t approached significance, / = 1.66,p  = .10.
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Figure 12: Mediation effects of relative power on allocation-based ingroup bias
Power Power
.3 t t /  EU \ .3 1 * -.56**}/  NATO V i 5
/  Adj.R2 = .15 \ Adj.R2 = .00 \
c
National Allocation bias 
Group -31*
National
Group
c
Allocation bias
.15
After mediation: 
path c’= .22, n.s. 
Sobel’s t= 1.66, p = .10
After mediation: 
path c'= .23, n.s.
Note: National group context coded, where 1 = British, 2 = German
Are relative prototypicality and relative power distinct constructs? I f  so, are there 
any structural links we can identify?
Given the similarity of the relative prototypicality and relative power findings, the 
question arose as to whether they are, in fact, two distinct, psychological constructs. 
It was found that relative prototypicality drives relative power in the EU condition. 
Relative power drives relative prototypicality in the NATO condition.
To examine whether they were distinct, principle axis factoring with direct oblique 
rotation was employed and set to two factors (see Table 20, 1. Ingroup sub-items). 
All six ingroup sub-items (i.e. prototypicality and power) were entered and loaded as 
expected -  Component 1: prototypicality, Eigenvalue = 2.76, variance = 46.07%; 
Component 2: power, Eigenvalue = 1.03, variance = 17.19%.
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Table 20: Components and the loadings of prototypicality and power variables
Component 1 Component 2
1. Ingroup sub-items Eigenvalue = 2.76 Eigenvalue = 1.03
Variance = 46.07% Variance = 17.19%
Prototypicality 2 Power 2
Prototypicality 3 Power 3
Prototypicality 1 Power 1
2. Outgroup sub-items Eigenvalue = 2.09 Eigenvalue =1.01
Variance = 48.22% Variance = 16.90%
Prototypicality 3 Power 1
Prototypicality 1 
Prototypicality 2 
Power 2
Power 3
Next, all six outgroup sub-items were entered (see Table 20, 2. Outgroup sub-items). 
All prototypicality items loaded similarly into Component 1, however with the 
addition of one power item, Eigenvalue = 2.09, variance = 48.22%. The remaining 
two power items loaded into Component 2, Eigenvalue = 1.01, variance = 16.90%. 
The factor correlational matrix showed an acceptable value of .44 between the two 
components, and it was therefore concluded that power and prototypicality were two 
separate entities.
Mediation analysis was employed to identify any structural links between relative 
power and relative prototypicality. Cases were examined by condition.
In the EU condition, where the German sample perceives itself to be higher on 
relative prototypicality (p = .001) and relative power (p = .001) than in the NATO 
condition, relative prototypicality drives relative power. As shown in Figure 13, left,
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the significant pathway between national group and relative power (path c: B = .30, 
p  = .02) became non-significant (path c'\ B = .09, p  = .57) when adding relative 
prototypicality as mediator, Sobel’s t = 1.61, p  = . 11. In contrast, the pathway 
between national group and relative prototypicality (path c: B = .62, p  = .001) 
remained equally significant (path c ’\ B = .55, p  = .001) when adding relative power 
as a mediator (see Figure 13, right).
Figure 13: EU condition: Mediation effects of relative prototypicality on relative 
power
Prototypicality
EU
Power
62*** / \  35* .30* /  \ .24*
/  Adj.R2 = .37 \ Adj.R2 = .41
6
National Power 
Group -30*
National
Group
c
.62***
Prototypicality
After mediation: path c’= .09, n.s. 
Sobel’s f = 1.61, p = .11
After mediation: path c’ = .55***
Note: National group context coded, where 1 = British, 2 = German
In the NATO condition, where the British sample perceives itself to be higher on 
relative prototypicality ip = .001) and relative power ip = .001) than in the EU 
condition, relative prototypicality drives relative power. As shown in Figure 13, left, 
when adding relative prototypicality as mediator, the significant pathway between 
national group and relative power (path c: B = -.56, p  = .001) remained significant 
(path c B = -.46, p  = .001). In contrast and as shown in Figure 14 left, with relative
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power as mediator, the pathway between national group and relative prototypicality 
(path c: B = -.26, p  = .05) became non-significant (path c B = .03, p  = .85), Sobel’s
t = \.16,p  = .08.
Figure 14: NATO condition: Mediation effects of relative power on relative 
prototypicality
NATO
Prototypicality Power
a /
- .2 6 */ \ .38* - .6 6 * * * /  \ . 5 1 * *
/  Adj.R2 = .43 \  /  Adj.R2 = 2 2  \
Q
National
Group -.56***
c
Power National Prototypicality 
Group -26*
After mediation: path c’ = -.46*** After mediation: path c’ = .03, n.s.
Sobel’s t=  1.76, p = .08
Note: National group context coded, where 1 = British, 2 = German
These findings are discussed later below in full. Here in brief, Germans may perceive 
their group to be upholding the values and beliefs underlying The EU. Therefore 
being a highly prototypical member enables the group to be a powerful key player. 
The British may associate NATO with the USA, a powerful key player -  and the key 
player calls the shots on what are acceptable norms and values or not. Due to Great 
Britain’s ‘special relationship’ with the USA, it may enjoy this power ‘by proxy’ and 
likewise call the shots on what is prototypical or not. What is also observable is 
evidence to support the standard theory of nature of power, where in the 
British/NATO context power leads to prototypicality -  and by implication to ingroup
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identification. Simultaneously we see evidence to support Turner’s (2005) three- 
process theory of power, where in the German/EU context prototypicality -  and by 
implication ingroup identification -  leads to power.
Do high dual identifiers demonstrate higher or lower ingroup bias?
The final research question investigated the role that high ingroup and high 
superordinate category identification -  high dual identification -  may play in ingroup 
bias. More specifically, does the degree of ingroup identification interact with 
superordinate category identification and thus moderate ingroup bias, and do high 
dual identifiers demonstrate higher (as proposed by IPM) or lower (as proposed by 
other models) levels of ingroup bias? Findings showed that there were no effects of 
dual identification on allocation-based ingroup bias. Evaluative ingroup bias was 
moderated by the degree of ingroup identification interacting with the degree of 
superordinate category identification, but in the German sample only. This was 
consistent with IPM, the higher the dual identification, the higher the ingroup bias.
Ingroup identification: To recap’ (see also Table 15), the mean difference between 
groups’ scores was marginal (GB: M - 4.53, SD = .83; Germany: M  = 4.34, 
SD = .78). Superordinate category identification: German (EU: M=  2.17, 
SD = 1.17; NATO: M =  2.31, SD = 1.35) scores were higher than British scores (EU: 
M -  1.09, SD = 1.48; NATO: M =  1.53, SD = 1.52) in both experimental conditions.
A preliminary analysis using median splits determined high and low ingroup, and 
high and low superordinate category identifiers. Findings are reported in App. II-8; 
suffice it to summarise at this point that 56 of the 116 participants were not double-
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high or double-low identifiers. Also, there was a significant association between 
national groups and high ingroup identification (weighted towards the British: 
£  = 7.25, df= p <  .01) and with superordinate category identification (weighted 
towards the Germans),/2 = 8.57, df= l ,p  < .01.
Simple slope analysis was employed to identify whether ingroup identification 
interacted with superordinate category identification and, in doing so, moderated 
either form of ingroup bias. To facilitate this, two steps were necessary before slope 
analysis. Firstly, an omnibus MANOVA identified where interactions might be 
found (do the two identification measures interact with national group and/or 
condition?). Secondly, a series of ANOVAs were performed to break down any 3- 
way interactions into 2-way interactions (in which conditions and/or for which 
national groups specifically do the two identification measures interact with either 
national group or condition?).
Firstly, ingroup identification and superordinate category identification measures 
were centred based on the mean scores of the whole sample. Next, a 2 (National 
Group: Great Britain/Germany) X 2 (Condition: EU/NATO) X 2 (Identification: 
Ingroup/Superordinate Category) omnibus MANOVA identified where interactions 
might be found. The factors were national group and condition (categorical 
independent variables), and ingroup identification and superordinate category 
identification (continuous independent variables, centred values). Both measures of 
ingroup bias served as dependent variables.
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On the dimension of allocation-based ingroup bias, all 2-, 3- and 4-way interactions 
that included ingroup identification and superordinate category identification were 
non-significant (all Fs < 2.34, all ps > .13). High ingroup identification, then, did not 
interact with superordinate category identification and moderate allocation-based 
ingroup bias.
Evaluative ingroup bias measures delivered significant interactions (see Table 21). 
The main effects of ingroup identification and of superordinate category 
identification were significant (ingroup identification: F=  12.31, /? = .001; 
superordinate category identification: F =  4.90, p  < .05). Two strong 3-way 
interactions emerged. Both identity measures interacted with national group 
significantly (F=5.10, p < .01), and with condition at a level approaching 
significance {F= 3.01 ,p  = .09). The level of evaluative ingroup bias, then, appeared 
to be co-determined by nationality (and by condition to a lesser degree) and by the 
degree of identification with the ingroup and with the superordinate category.
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Table 21: 2 X 2 X 2 omnibus MANOVA: Evaluative ingroup bias as a function of 
National Group, Condition, Ingroup Identification and/or 
Superordinate Category Identification
Evaluative ingroup bias 
df=  1, error = 92
F P partial rf
Main effects
Ingroup ID 12.31 .001 .19
SC ID 4.90 .03 .05
3-way interactions
National Group X Ingroup ID X SC ID 5.10 .03 .05
Condition X Ingroup ID X SC ID 3.01 .09 .03
Note: ID = Identification. SC = Superordinate Category.
The second step before slope analysis was to decompose the 3-way interactions into 
sets of 2-way interactions. To do this, cases were selected by national group or by 
condition (i.e. a total of four univariate analyses of variance). Each 2 (either National 
Group or Condition) X 2 (Identification: Ingroup/Superordinate Category) ANOVA 
then tested for evaluative ingroup bias as dependent variable. In particular, 2-way 
interactions Ingroup Identification X Superordinate Category Identification were of 
interest, within one or both conditions or within one or both national groups.
ANOVAs by national group: When the British sample was selected, there was a 
marginally significant 2-way interaction Ingroup Identification X Superordinate 
Category, F (l, 52) = 3.14, partial rf = .06, p  = .08. When the German sample was 
selected, there was a marginally significant 2-way interaction Ingroup Identification 
X Superordinate Category, F (l, 47) = 3.09, partial rf = .06,p  = .09.
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ANOVAs by condition: All 2-way interactions Ingroup Identification X Superordinate 
Category Identification were not significant in either condition (both Fs <1.58, both 
ps > .22).
Simple slope analysis followed, employing the steps recommended by Aiken and 
West (1991). First, the centred values were recalculated to reflect the actual ingroup 
and superordinate category identification scores for each national group. These are 
reported below.
As shown in Figure 15, top, in line with IPM, in the German sample high dual 
identification saw a significant increase in ingroup bias, z high: fl=  13.18, p  < .001. 
Low superordinate category identification led to slight decrease in ingroup bias as 
ingroup identification increased, z low: /?=-1.13, n.s. Superordinate category 
identification at 0 also saw a significant increase in ingroup bias, z med: /? = 6.02, 
p  < .01. Thus high dual identification increased evaluative ingroup bias significantly.
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Figure 15: Moderation effects of ingroup identification (X) on mean evaluative 
ingroup bias scores (Y) for high and low superordinate category 
identifiers (Z)
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p = 6.02** 
P = -1.13
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Figure 15, bottom, shows that there were no significant interactions between the two 
levels of identity in the British sample overall, and whether identification with the 
superordinate category was low, medium or high, ingroup bias increased as 
identification with the ingroup increased, z low: J3 = 21.37, p< .001; z med; 
fi=  14.27,p  < .001; z high: J3= 7.17, n.s.
4.3 Discussion
In broadest terms, the purpose of the study was to examine subgroup-superordinate 
group relations; to (a) examine the relationship between relative prototypicality and
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relative power, (b) test IPM against CIIM/ICM/IMSR in predicting ingroup bias, and 
(c) identify factors that mediate or moderate ingroup bias.
Evidence was found in the EU condition only that relative prototypicality and 
relative power mediate allocation-based ingroup bias, but not evaluative ingroup 
bias. An interesting relationship between power and prototypicality was identified, 
where relative power mediated relative prototypicality in the EU condition, and 
relative prototypicality mediated relative power in the NATO condition. The degrees 
of ingroup and superordinate category identification moderated evaluative ingroup 
bias in the German sample.
Ingroup bias score patterns
The British sample was higher in evaluative ingroup bias, the German sample in 
allocation-based ingroup bias -  irrespective of condition. This choice of identity 
management strategy may be accounted for by the nature of the groups and/or by 
social reality. Allocation-based ingroup bias places Germany in the role of direct 
social competition, whereas Great Britain opts for a less direct or more constrained 
form, that is, unfavourable attitudes to the outgroup (and incidentally also less 
favourable attitudes to both superordinate categories). It seems that Germans feel it 
legitimate to claim resources, whereas a more insular way of thinking is in place in 
British individuals.
Firstly from the British standpoint, where the higher evaluative ingroup bias ratings 
were irrespective of relative prototypicality, relative power or superordinate 
category, it is possible that anything that is not ‘us’, is viewed less favourably.
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Considering the past tensions between Great Britain and Germany, it is arguable that 
higher evaluative ingroup bias in the British sample was a foregone conclusion 
irrespective of condition. However, this would not account for the outgroup 
favouritism shown on the allocation-based ingroup bias measure in the EU condition. 
This, in turn, possibly reflects British Euroscepticism; receiving monies from an 
unwanted superordinate category brings with it a sense of obligation and ties, and 
this could furthermore account for the ethnocentric evaluative ingroup bias scores.
At the same time, this finding might add to System Justification Theory research, 
where it is claimed that a low-status group may demonstrate outgroup favouritism, 
because it feels its position is justified (Jost & Banaji, 1994). Firstly in this study it is 
apparent that British outgroup favouritism is dependent on the superordinate 
category, because the effect was unique to the EU condition. Secondly, the author 
suggests that, within The EU, the British do not perceive themselves to be a 
‘traditionally’ low-status group (although low on prototypicality and on power), but 
rather as a distinct and separate entity. If this is the case, in this study outgroup 
favouritism it is permeated with system rejection, not with system justification.
Secondly from the German standpoint, allocation-based ingroup bias was more 
evident, and also more pronounced in the NATO condition, where participants 
claimed the position of lower relative prototypicality and lower relative power. The 
low evaluative ingroup bias may be accounted for by actual attitudes towards the 
British. The higher allocation-based ingroup bias in the EU condition may be 
accounted for by perceptions of the ingroup being more deserving of EU monies, 
because it is generally perceived that Great Britain does not support The EU as it
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should30. It can only be speculated why the group claimed higher resources in the 
NATO condition than in the EU condition. Was it seen as a means of compensation 
for the lack of perceived power? Conversely when comparing scores between 
conditions, could it be that the German sample recognise that there are other EU- 
members more in need of financial EU backing, and therefore would claim less EU 
money than NATO money?
However, it must be noted that it was unfortunate that one of the three project 
measures had to be discounted, and the point allocation system was clearly somewhat 
complicated for some participants. It cannot be ruled out that a cleaner set of 
measures might have produced different scores.
Relative prototypicality and ingroup bias
As predicted, both groups agreed that Germany was more relatively prototypical of 
The EU. Contrary to prediction, the groups did not agree that Great Britain was more 
relatively prototypical of NATO. Ingroup projection may occur when groups contest 
their relative positions (Waldzus et al., 2004), so therefore there might have been 
evidence of ingroup bias in the NATO condition. This was not the case.
No evidence was found that relative prototypicality might predict evaluative ingroup 
bias in either condition. Allocation-based ingroup bias was not a function of relative 
prototypicality in the NATO condition. However, it did mediate fully allocation- 
based ingroup bias in the EU condition, where the German cohort claimed higher
30 At an anecdotal level, this was addressed on their own initiative by several German participants 
during the de-briefing.
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relative prototypicality. Evidence supporting IPM, then, was found in one instance 
only.
Focusing on the IPM premise that high evaluation of the superordinate category is a 
further possible prerequisite, findings showed that Germans value both The EU and 
NATO significantly more than the British do (although both groups’ scores were 
significantly above the midpoint across both conditions). This too could account for 
ingroup projection being found in the German but not in the British sample. Also and 
in line with IPM, ingroup bias can occur when the outgroup is perceived to deviate 
from ingroup/superordinate category norms, and it is reasonable to assume that this is 
the case regarding Germans’ perceptions of Great Britain within The EU.
There is acknowledged uncertainty in the IPM research regarding which co-factors 
might increase the likelihood of ingroup bias occurring. For example, it may be that 
the prototype of NATO is too unclear (see also Study 1), and this could account for 
the lack of evidence of ingroup projection in this condition. Also and as in Study 1, 
prototypicality measures did not include trait-based relative prototypicality, the 
‘traditional’ IPM measure.
Relative power and ingroup bias
The British felt significantly more powerful in the NATO condition than in the EU 
condition; the Germans felt significantly more powerful in the EU condition than in 
the NATO condition. The findings examining relative power as a mediator of 
ingroup bias mirrored the relative prototypicality findings. That is, relative power did 
not predict evaluative ingroup bias in either condition, nor allocation-based ingroup
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bias in the NATO condition. Relative power partially mediated allocation-based 
ingroup bias in the EU condition. Again the German sample (claiming higher relative 
prototypicality) claimed higher relative power and demonstrated higher allocation- 
based ingroup bias. This raised the question: is there a difference between relative 
power and relative prototypicality based on the measures employed in this study?
The structural relationship between relative prototypicality and relative power
Findings from principal axis factoring confirmed that the two measures tapped into 
to separate constructs. However, both brought about comparable outcomes, that is, 
higher relative prototypicality and higher relative power are positively related to 
higher allocation-based ingroup bias. This prototypicality-power relationship is in 
line with Weber et al.’s (2002) proposition that high-status groups (measured here on 
the dimension of relative power) show high relative prototypicality. Mediation 
analysis revealed that, in the EU condition, relative prototypicality mediated relative 
power to some degree (Sobel’s test: p = . l ln  n.s.), and in the NATO condition, 
relative power mediated relative prototypicality to some degree (Sobel’s test: p  = .08, 
n.s.). Despite these non-significant findings, this observation is worthy of further 
investigation, and the nature of the national groups and superordinate categories 
involved may offer some explanations.
The EU: Germany (higher relative prototypicality/power than under NATO) is a 
founding member of The EU and its geographical location is land-locked within it. 
Given the recent enlargement to include Eastern European states, one could argue 
that Germans are de facto both relatively prototypical and relatively powerful, newer
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members less prototypical and less powerful. Findings, then, appear simply to reflect 
‘factual’ reality. However, mediation suggests that Germans’ perceived relative 
power rests on perceived relative prototypicality. One can speculate why this might 
be. The post-war generation is extremely sensitive to issues concerning the use and 
abuse of power. The EU advocates democracy, equality and multiculturalism, values 
that find much support in Germany. From this, if Germany upholds EU values and 
beliefs, if it is therefore prototypical, then The EU offers the social, economical and 
political climate where Germans may ‘rightfully’ demonstrate power.
NATO: Great Britain (higher relative prototypicality/power than under The EU) is a 
founding member of NATO. It is a power-based organisation, and here relative 
prototypicality was mediated by relative power. It is generally acknowledged that the 
USA is the most powerful player in NATO, and Great Britain enjoys a ‘special 
relationship’ with the USA. The key players -  USA and Great Britain by proxy -  
have the power to define the norms and values of the prototype, that is, what is 
prototypical and what is not. In other words, if the USA is a key player, and if ‘we’ 
(the British) have close ties to ‘them’, then the ‘ownership’ of the superordinate 
category extends to ‘us’.
It is circumspect here to compare the relationship between prototypicality and power, 
and to bring in Turner’s (2005) three-process approach in doing so. Turning 
specifically to the German scores in the EU condition, prototypicality drives power. 
This is in line with Turner’s proposal, where he argues that the ‘collective reality 
testing’ {viz. the reflection of social identification) of the psychological group (here 
the EU) antecedes power. The influence that the group can use to manifest power can
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take the form of persuasion, authority or coercion. In the case of Germany and The 
EU, the following explains the rationale clearly. ‘[Legitimate authority is a product 
o f influence and the formation of norms within the group. Authority is based on 
ingroup norms that a "group has the right to prescribe appropriate beliefs’ (p. 11). 
Power, then, is the resultant expression of the group’s influence on its members.
Dual identification and ingroup bias
There were only marginal differences in the degree of British and German ingroup 
identification, evidenced by both the Cameron’s (2004) and the national identity 
measures (mean difference .19 and .31 resp.). The German sample identified with 
both superordinate categories significantly more so than the British sample did. The 
categorical measures of identity (e.g., Welsh, British, West German, European) 
showed a strong leaning in the British sample to identify at subgroup and group 
level, in the German sample at group and European level.
These differences in identification levels notwithstanding, one final IPM proposition 
was tested. Would high dual identification increase ingroup bias (Wenzel et al.,
2003), or a decrease in ingroup bias, as proposed IMSR (Hornsey & Hogg, 2000a). 
Furthermore, would high superordinate category identification see a decrease in 
ingroup bias, as proposed by CIIM (Gaertner & Dovidio, 2000) and to some degree 
by ICM (Brown & Hewstone, 2005)?
Analyses revealed that allocation-based ingroup bias was independent of 
identification levels. However, in the German sample, high dual identifiers 
demonstrated higher levels of evaluative ingroup bias. As identification with both
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'ngroup and superordinate category increased, so did evaluative ingroup bias. This 
was the only example found in support of IPM (that is, it did not occur in the British 
sample or in either of the experimental conditions).
In contrast and consistent with IMSR, high dual identification saw a decrease in 
evaluative ingroup bias in the British sample. The positive impact of superordinate 
category identification supports CIIM and ICM31. An increase in ingroup 
identification saw an increase in evaluative ingroup bias irrespective of the degree of 
superordinate category identification. However, increasing superordinate category 
identification saw a reduction in evaluative ingroup bias as ingroup identification 
increased. Therefore in this sample, perhaps it is higher identification at the 
superordinate category level that sees the reduction in bias, but not necessarily dual 
identification.
It should be noted that the degree of superordinate category identification was 
measured on evaluative component of identification. This was unavoidable, due to 
differences in the two superordinate categories, where the Cameron (2004) measures 
would have been implausible. However, this did mean that the ingroup identification 
measure encompassed Cameron’s three factors of social identity (ingroup ties, 
ingroup affect and centrality), whereas the measure devised for this study 
encapsulated a measure of ingroup affect only. The superordinate category measure 
was, therefore, not as rich as the ingroup measure. These differences may have 
affected scores.
31 The same pattern of slopes was identified in the EU and in the NATO conditions. Because the 3- 
way interactions in these conditions did not suggest that further 2-way interactions might diverge from 
each other, these were not reported.
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Ingroup projection, then, was found in the German sample only. The following 
proposition is highly speculative. Might ingroup projection be a nation-specific 
phenomenon? It is the author’s understanding that IPM research has been conducted 
on German participants, both as members of their national group and as members of 
other social groups. Are there essential differences between British and German 
social groups and their respective constructions of the content and commitment of 
these, that in turn account can for ingroup projection in one group and a lack of 
ingroup projection in the other? For example, to draw on hierarchical levels of 
identity in this study, it may be that the German sample more readily thinks in terms 
of a shared, higher-order identity. The British, on the other hand, look within their 
group in self-definition. A way forward might be to test IPM on other non-German 
groups, or to remain within a British sample, where British identification is 
superordinate and European identification supraordinate.
In summary, support for all four models of intersubgroup relations was found. For 
the sake of clarity, these are summarised in brief in Table 22. Due to their converging 
nature, CIIM and ICM are summarised together.
As shown in Table 22, evidence supporting IPM was apparent but inconsistent; 
indeed, there were instances where there was an inverse relationship between relative 
prototypicality and ingroup bias. However, the study did not tap into the content or 
representation of the superordinate categories, that is, did not utilize the ‘traditional’ 
IPM trait-based measure, nor were factors such as legitimacy and intergroup 
differences addressed. Furthermore, a structural link was found between relative 
prototypicality and relative power, and interestingly one was the driving force in one
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condition (relative prototypicality in the EU condition), and the other in the other 
condition (relative power in the NATO condition), although not significantly so in 
either case (Sobel’s test: p  = .11 and .08 resp.). Examining the relationship between 
relative prototypicality and relative power in future studies may well help in refining 
IPM and in testing Turner’s (2005) three-process theory of power further.
Table 22: Summary of evidence supporting the four models of intersubgroup 
relations
High 
EU ID
High 
SC ID
High 
dual ID
Proto­
typicality1
CIIM/ICM
Evaluative 
ingroup bias
GB/EU
(corr)
GB/EU
(corr)
GB/NATO
(corr)
GB2
(mod)
Allocation-based 
ingroup bias
- GB
(mod)
- -
IMSR
Evaluative 
ingroup bias
- - GB2
(mod)
-
Allocation-based 
ingroup bias
- - - -
IPM
Evaluative 
ingroup bias
- - G
(mod)
-
Allocation-based 
ingroup bias
G/EU
(corr)
GB/EU
(corr)
G/EU
(med3)
Note: EU ID = European identification. SC ID = superordinate category identification 
(based on evaluative component of identity). Dual ID = identification with ingroup and 
superordinate category, corr = correlational, med = mediation, mod = moderation. 1 : all 
measures of prototypicality are included here with no differentiation between these. 2: high 
dual identification saw no significant increase in ingroup bias.3: p  = .08.
It seems reasonable to propose that ICM with its notion of pluralism explains well 
the low evaluative ingroup bias in the German sample, where, as a group committed
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to The EU and its values, the outgroup is viewed positively and distinctively (see 
Table 22). ICM could also account for the high evaluative ingroup bias in the British 
sample, where shared membership under an unwelcome superordinate category is 
seen as a threat to ingroup distinctiveness. The lack of evidence in the NATO 
condition could be accounted for by the lack of perceived identity threat that NATO 
elicits, if we were to extrapolate the qualitative findings from Study 1 to Study 2. If 
this is the case, this is in line with ICM. Future research would be required to test the 
roles of ingroup distinctiveness and identity threat.
Similarly, it is plausible that the CUM notion of common fate and shared goals 
would explain the lack of evaluative ingroup bias in the German sample, but would 
not explain German high allocation-based ingroup bias (see Table 22). It appears that 
higher relative power could account for this latter finding, which is consistent with 
Spear et al.’s (2001) notion of useable power. Again, future studies could help 
explain these identity management strategy choices further.
Finally, the interactions between the two levels of identity and evaluative ingroup 
bias revealed interesting patterns, summarised in Table 22. Evidence generally 
supported CUM and IMSR, although in one case the predictions of IPM held true. 
Before any definitive conclusions can be drawn here, more research is required on 
perceived legitimacy and status differentials between groups.
Page 158
Chapter 5 Study 3
Studies 1 and 2 examined the impact of relative prototypicality, relative power and 
two different superordinate categories on intersubgroup relations. The influence that 
the degree of ingroup and/or superordinate category identification might have upon 
sub-group relations was also considered. Study 3 pursued these questions further, 
however with two new national groups; England and Wales.
From both previous studies, it was apparent that the EU as superordinate category 
evidenced different British-German subgroup relations than NATO did. Within The 
EU, the British enjoy a degree of ‘notoriety’ in their sometimes anti-EU stance, and 
although both groups enjoy comparable power within The EU, self-ratings showed a 
significant discrepancy in perceived power differentials between the two national 
groups. Additionally, evidence suggested that British attitudes towards the Germans 
are less favourable irrespective of superordinate category (documented too by high 
evaluative ingroup bias towards the Germans in the control condition). Finally, it was 
apparent that the British sample drew heavily on subgroup identities, that is, being 
Welsh, English and so forth.
But to what degree do the previous findings (such as the influence of the nature of 
the superordinate category, perceived power and prototypicality differentials and the 
impact of the degree of identification at ingroup and at superordinate group level) 
generalize to other subgroup-superordinate group relations? From Studies 1 and 2, it 
appeared that subgroup identification played an important role in British identity. 
Added to this, it is reasonable to assume that, within Great Britain, England is the
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most dominant and therefore high-power group, and Wales a minority and therefore 
low-power group. Therefore the final study examined English-Welsh subgroup 
relations. The two superordinate categories were Great Britain and The EU. The 
study included a trait-based measure of relative prototypicality adapted from the 
IPM-school (e.g. Waldzus et al., 2003; Waldzus et al., 2004; Wenzel et al., 2003). 
The relative power items remained unchanged. A proxy measure of the perceived 
legitimacy of subgroup-superordinate group relations was added; relative fairness. A  
third measure of ingroup bias -  received respect -  measured perceptions of being a 
target of bias.
Before presenting these new measures in more detail, two issues are raised here. The 
first relates to the three levels of inclusiveness in this study, that is subgroup (English 
or Welsh), superordinate group (British) and supraordinate group (European). The 
second relates to two contextual factors concerning the two subgroups.
Firstly, it is reasonable to argue that, in this study, we have a tripartite hierarchy of 
social groups, from regional (subgroups belong to the regional groups England or 
Wales), through national (both belong to the nation-state of Great Britain) to 
supranational (Europe). Following the argumentation that the quality of 
intersubgroup relations can be affected by the nature of the superordinate category 
(Doosje, Haslam, Spears, Oakes, & Koomen, 1998; Turner et al., 1987), a far more 
complex picture can emerge when one hierarchical category (here the nation-state) 
sits between the subgroup (the region) and the supraordinate group (Europe).
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Specifically relevant to this thesis, Mols, Jetten and Haslam (unpublished 
manuscript) have hypothesised that conflicts between regional (Wales) identities and 
nation-state (Great Britain) identities may affect European identification, and that 
identification will change in response to perceptions of both normative and 
comparative fit of the subgroup with the two higher social groups. As they argue, 
examination of a multi-layered, bottom-up approach is of particular relevance with 
regards to peripheral regions such as Wales, that is, regions who do not identify 
necessarily with the nation state (Mols & Haslam, in press).
Taking this rationale one step further, consider Wales. If the region perceives the 
relationship between the nation-state and The EU to be negative, its attitudes towards 
Europe may be enhanced, that is, the region may enhance its own identity by 
aligning with Europe (Mols & Haslam, in press) .. Thus as well as paying tribute to 
the basic tenets of SCT (Turner et al., 1987) and the need for ingroup distinctiveness 
(Spears, Jetten, & Scheepers, 2002), Mols and Haslam draw on Heider’s (1946) 
balance theory and, from the standpoint of the Welsh, they found that “‘my enemy’s 
enemy is my friend’” (in press, 1 16).
In later sections, the research of Mols and colleagues will be discussed where 
relevant. For the sake of consistency, however, their terminology will be employed 
only where misunderstandings could otherwise arise. Thus regional groups (England 
and Wales) will be referred to as subgroups. They refer to Great Britain as the nation
32 Conversely (though not relevant to the Welsh sample and their anticipated believes that England 
does not enjoy a positive relationship to The EU), if the region perceives the relationship between the 
nation-state and The EU to be positive, its attitudes towards the nation state may be negative, and 
towards The EU positive, that is, it may ‘accuse’ the nation state of over-conforming with The EU and 
claim for itself closer ties to Europe.
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state and as the superordinate group, whereas below and generally Great Britain will 
be referred to as the superordinate group only. Similarly, the supraordinate category 
of The EU and Europe is referred to here as the second superordinate category. 
Finally, it is of course quite legitimate and correct that Mols and colleagues 
distinguish between the two levels of inclusiveness; the superordinate and the 
supraordinate groups. However, again for the sake of consistency across the study 
series in this thesis, Great Britain and Europe are treated as two separate 
superordinate groups.
Secondly we discuss the two contextual factors. These are group size and status 
differentials, and the two are interlinked. As discussed earlier, status reflects a 
group’s standing in an intergroup setting and status may be exhibited in terms of 
power (Hornsey et al., 2003). In this study, power differentials are measured, status 
differences are assumed. A smaller group is, of course, not necessarily lower in 
status/power than a larger group. Indeed, a group’s exclusivity can be indicative of 
its high status/power (e.g., ‘Old Boys’ networks’, Free Masonry, MENSA). The 
smaller group is understood in this study as the lower-power minority group Wales, 
and the higher-power majority group England.
Group size, group status and group power can be manipulated successfully in 
laboratory studies, and thus their independent effects on intersubgroup relations are 
measurable. For example, a recent study showed that when group size only was 
manipulated (and there was intergroup contact), the minority group showed higher 
allocation-based ingroup bias. However, when status and size were manipulated, the 
higher status group and the minority group showed higher allocation-based ingroup
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bias (Gonzalez & Brown, 2006; cf Otten, Mummendey & Blanz, 2001). In an 
attempt to unravel why minority group members might exhibit higher ingroup bias, 
Leonardelli and Brewer (2001; laboratory study) suggest that the degree of ingroup 
identification is the key, but motivations to discriminate are dependent on how 
comfortable members are with the size of their group.
However, intergroup relations are far more complex in real-life groups who 
commonly share a past and present (and, as a rule, a future). Added to this, as group 
size and group status are not controlled, it is impossible to pinpoint where the effect 
of one ends and the effect of the other starts. For example in one such study 
examining group size and group status in Swedish and Finnish groups, a Group Size 
X Group Status interaction was identified (Liebkind, Nystrom, Honkanummi & 
Lange, 2004). Minority groups demonstrate less favourable attitudes to majority 
groups, and higher-status groups demonstrate more favourable attitudes to lower- 
status groups.
To add further to the complexity, drawing on acculturation research to examine 
minority-majority intergroup relations seems somewhat misplaced in an English- 
Welsh-British context. From the English standpoint, does the Welsh group pose any 
identity threat to Englishness or Britishness? Probably not. From the Welsh 
standpoint however, Great Britain may be perceived as a superordinate category 
dominated by the English. We cannot draw on IPM here, because it offers no 
predictions regarding ingroup bias in a less relatively prototypical group. Turning to 
acculturation research, if Welsh perceptions of Britishness equate to perceptions of 
Englishness, then attempts to integrate Wales further into Great Britain (IMSR: dual
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identification) and particularly suggestions of Welsh people assimilating the British 
group (CIIM: assimilation and recategorization) are likely to be vehemently rejected 
by the group. Common sense dictates that the most likely strategy to enhance 
English-Welsh-British relations from the Welsh standpoint is mutual intergroup 
differentiation (ICM: separation) and strong ingroup identity maintenance. Does this 
‘common sense’ strategy hold true in terms of EU membership?
The second experimental condition with The EU as superordinate category offers this 
Welsh sub-sample an opportunity to recategorize at a higher level of inclusiveness 
without ‘paying homage’ to Great Britain -  and indirectly to England. This 
phenomenon is not new to research (e.g., Blanz, Mummendey, Mielke & Klink, 
1998; Hornsey & Hogg, 2002), where a lower-status group seeks to enhance its 
status in this way. In other words, the CIIM strategy of re-categorization in this case 
can offer lower-status groups a viable identity management strategy.
Trait-based relative prototypicality
In studies 1 and 2, it was not possible to utilize the trait-based measure of relative
• I 1!prototypicahty for reasons of implausibility in the NATO condition . Given the 
sparse evidence found to support IPM, it is therefore arguable that the measures 
employed did not tap into same processes as trait-based relative prototypicality does. 
Study 3 provided the opportunity to employ this tried-and-tested measure of relative 
prototypicality.
33 It was thought unlikely that participants would be able to rate what percentage of ‘typical’ NATO 
group members possess specific traits.
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Relative fairness (legitimacy)
The perceived (il)legitimacy of relations can affect intersubgroup relations 
profoundly, and possible effects and interactions have been discussed in the 
Literature Review. However, and of particular relevance here, there is some 
preliminary evidence to suggest that the perceived (il)legitimacy of relations is 
dependent upon perceived relative prototypicality, and that the relationship is 
moderated by group status and superordinate category valence. Namely, Weber et al. 
(2002) found that relative prototypicality was used to justify a high-status position; 
however only where the superordinate category was positively primed. Negative 
superordinate category priming coupled with high relative prototypicality led to 
perceptions of illegitimate relations. Bringing this finding into the context of Study 3, 
we may find links between relative prototypicality and relative fairness if subgroup- 
superordinate group relations are perceived as illegitimate.
Received respect
This measure was introduced to obtain an approximation of how respected by the 
relevant superordinate category each group perceives itself to be. A measure of 
relative received respect was calculated by subtracting outgroup received respect 
scores from ingroup received respect scores. Lower received respect indicates that 
the ingroup is more a target of (negative) bias, and higher received respect less a 
target of bias. Simultaneously, the findings will serve as a starting point to develop 
more differential and sophisticated measures of respect in a future study.
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Looking at some of the past evidence, it would seem that a subgroup receiving 
respect will demonstrate more favourable attitudes to the superordinate category and 
possibly to other subgroups (Huo & Molina, 2006); a top-down approach. Received 
respect between subgroups can enhance negotiation processes during the 
development of a superordinate category (Eggins et al., 2002); a bottom-up 
approach. Firstly, when examining US American ethnic subgroups and their 
perceptions of respect (feelings of being accepted, valued etc.), Huo and Molina 
found that the higher the perceived respect, the more favourable subgroups’ attitudes 
were towards America (the superordinate category) and its ethnic sub-groups -  
however only amongst those participants who themselves were ethnic minorities34. 
Secondly in an ostensible strategy choice negotiation task employing a student 
sample, higher perceived respect (perceptions of fairness and of feeling valued) 
between subgroups brought forth more satisfying negotiations, and this effect was 
partially mediated by the emerging superordinate category (Eggins et al., 2002: Exp. 
2).
Bringing these findings into the current study, it will not be possible to compare 
findings with those of Eggins et al. (2002), because received respect is measured top- 
down only. Nonetheless the mediation findings may shed light on interpreting these 
data. Conversely and drawing on Huo and Molin’s (2006) reseach, if the (minority) 
Welsh overall feel relatively well respected by either or both superordinate 
categories, then this might account in part for lower evaluative ingroup bias towards
34 As a point of interest, personal respect rather than subgroup respect predicted favourable attitudes in 
White Americans. This reflects somewhat the ideals and values associated with an individualistic 
culture.
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the English. Conversely, if the Welsh feel relatively less well respected, this might 
account in part for higher evaluative ingroup bias.
A priori assumptions
To start, it was assumed that the English (majority group) is higher-status and the 
Welsh (minority group) lower-status, and, in contrast to power differentials, this was 
not measured. It was further assumed that both subgroups would hold both 
superordinate categories in high esteem, a general prerequisite postulated by CIIM, 
IMSR and IPM. In the case of The EU, the rationale was based on findings from 
Study 2, where British participants, that is, both English and Welsh participants, 
scored significantly above the midpoint on the evaluation of The EU. In the case of 
Great Britain, 57% of English and Welsh participants had identified as being British.
As a minority and low-power group, the Welsh should demonstrate higher ingroup 
identification than the English (Simon, Kulla, & Zobel, 1995; Wilder & Simon,
2004). The English as a dominant (IPM), high-power and majority group should 
demonstrate higher British identification and score higher on relative prototypicality 
than the Welsh. The Welsh sample could enhance its lower-power position by 
reporting higher European identification than the English (CIIM), and also feel more 
relatively prototypical of The EU than of Great Britain. This trend would support 
fully the ‘my enemy’s enemy is my friend’ notion suggested by Mols and Haslam (in 
press). This remained to be tested. It was further assumed that the English would 
report higher relative power than the Welsh across both conditions. However, 
English scores would be higher in the GB condition than in the EU condition. Welsh
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scores could be higher in the EU condition than in the GB condition, and this too 
remained to be tested.
Do we see higher evaluative ingroup bias in the lower-power Welsh sample, and 
higher allocation-based ingroup bias in the higher-power English sample? Can we 
identify any patterns o f received respect? To what degree does the salient 
superordinate group affect ingroup bias scores?
Should the intersubgroup identity management strategies employed by British and 
Germans in Study 2 extrapolate to these two groups, then the English should 
demonstrate higher allocation-based ingroup bias (as did the German sample, which 
was higher in power and therefore able to claim more resources), the Welsh higher 
evaluative ingroup bias (as did the British sample, which was lower in power and 
therefore limited in its bias strategy choice). Based on its higher power position, it 
was assumed that the English would receive higher respect in the GB condition than 
in the EU condition. Based on its lower power position, it was also assumed that the 
Welsh sample would receive lower respect in the GB condition, but not necessarily 
in the EU condition.
What are the relationships between the possible predictor variables o f ingroup bias 
(ingroup and superordinate category identification, relative prototypicality and 
relative power) and the three forms o f ingroup bias? Is there any association 
between ingroup bias and relative fairness (legitimacy) ?
Because this study was examining the two new groups, we sought to establish 
whether or to what degree English-Welsh relationships reflect British-German
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relationships. SIT and SCT tell us that the nature of the groups involved will affect 
their relationships, and any differences in these two pairs would reveal that this is the 
case. Also new to Study 3 was (il)legitimacy, and whether or to what degree this 
might be linked to ingroup bias levels (Turner & Brown, 1978).
Is any form o f ingroup bias a function o f national group and (directly or indirectly) 
relative prototypicality, relative power or relative fairness, or o f the degree o f  
ingroup or superordinate category identification?
In Study 2, relative power and relative prototypicality mediated allocation-based 
ingroup bias to some degree, where German scores (higher-power group, lower 
ingroup identification) were higher than British (lower-power group, higher ingroup 
identification) scores. Should the assumption hold true that the English are higher in 
power and the Welsh lower, and should we see higher ingroup identification in the 
Welsh than in the English cohort, then a similar pattern of effects on ingroup bias 
should emerge.
Do high dual identifiers demonstrate higher (IPM) or lower (CIIM, IMSR) ingroup 
bias?
Study 2 provided no definitive answer was found to this question. On the one hand, 
high German dual identifiers demonstrated highest evaluative ingroup bias. In 
contrast, high British identifiers demonstrated lower (but not lowest) evaluative 
ingroup bias. Additionally, as identification with the superordinate category 
increased, evaluative ingroup bias decreased. Again drawing on the strong degree of
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ingroup identification associated with the English and the Welsh, it was possible that 
the degree of ingroup identification alone would moderate ingroup bias.
5.1 Method
Design
The experimental study employed a 2 (National Group: English/Welsh) X 3 
(Condition: EU/Great Britain/no superordinate category) X 2 (Target Group: 
ingroup-outgroup ratings) mixed ANOVA design, where target group data 
constituted repeated measures. Participants were randomly assigned to the conditions 
within each national group. Cell sizes were between 26 and 38.
Participants
One hundred and ninety participants were from three HE establishments; Cardiff 
University (CU), Swansea University (SU) and Swansea Institute (SI). The School of 
Psychology at CU attracts a high percentage of English students, and here the study 
was run on English participants only (n = 61). English and Welsh participants were 
recruited at SU and SI. All SI students (n = 45) were studying Psychology and/or 
Counselling, SU students (n = 78) were from a variety of Faculties and Schools. Six 
participants were excluded from the study (two identified as English and Welsh, two 
had filled in the incorrect questionnaire, two reported nationalities other than English 
or Welsh). The net sample size was 184 (English: N  =86, age range =18-57, 
M=  20.29, £D = 5.18, m :f= 17:69; Welsh: N - 98, age range =18-54, M =  23.71, 
SD = 9.12, m :f= 20:76).
Page 170
Materials
The study was questionnaire based and was largely a replication of Study 2. Here, 
British/Great Britain and German/Germany etc. were replaced with English/England 
and Welsh/Wales etc. The superordinate category EU remained, NATO was replaced 
with Great Britain. The item order of ingroup and outgroup measures was 
counterbalanced.
Manipulation
The manipulation took the form of a framing text in which superordinate category 
membership was primed. The initial text was adapted from the United Kingdom page 
of the CIA World Factbook (https://www.cia.gov/cia/publications/factbook/ 
geos/uk.html, accessed 15.12.05; see Questionnaire in App III.), in which the people, 
the economy and the political system were described in a neutral manner. The same 
text was used as an ostensible description of The EU with one minor amendment . 
This was followed by three comprehension questions to underline the priming 
process.
Dependent variables
Unless stated otherwise, all items and sub-items employed a 7-point Likert scale 
(1 = strongly disagree to 7 = strongly agree). There were measures of identification, 
superordinate category evaluation, relative power, relative fairness, three measures of 
relative prototypicality and three measures of ingroup bias. These are described
35 ‘Elections are held as laid out in the statutes’ (GB-version) was replaced with ‘Elections are held as 
laid out in the Constitution’ (EU-version).
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below in the order in which they appeared in the questionnaire. Those measures 
administered across all three conditions are indicated by an asterisk. Those measures 
not replicated or adapted from Study 1 or Study 2 are indicated by a dagger. Other 
measures were also included36, but were not relevant to this study.
*Ingroup identification followed by Superordinate category evaluation: The nine 
ingroup identification sub-items (Cameron, 2004; all as > .64) and the three 
superordinate category sub-items {a = .84) were collapsed into two single variables 
(1 = low to 7 = high).
f  Trait-based relative prototypicality: Adapted from previous IPM studies (e.g., 
Waldzus et al., 2003; Weber et al., 2003), a list of 15 traits was presented to 
participants three times. Each time, participants were asked to rate how typical they 
felt these traits to be for the respective target group on a scale from 1 {not at all) to 7 
{very much so). Ingroup and outgroup were counterbalanced, the superordinate 
category target group was rated.last. Traits fell into three categories; warmth (5; e.g., 
‘genuine’, ‘community spirited’), competency (5; e.g., ‘achieving’, ‘driven’), and 
non-nation specific (5; e.g., ‘honest’, ‘intelligent’). The non-nation specific traits 
were taken from the Katz and Braly (1933) list.
The choice of warmth and competency traits was based on evidence that stereotypes 
can be encapsulated by two dimensions; warmth and competence (Fiske, Cuddy, 
Glick & Xu, 2002)37. For example, perceived status appears to predict perceived
36 These were nationalism and patriotism (Blank & Schmidt, 2003), degree of interest in politics, 
political party affiliation and Right-Wing-Orientation (Altemeyer, 1981, 1998).
37 Thanks to Dr. Ronni Greenwood for suggesting this approach.
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competence, and socially competitive behaviour perceived lack of warmth. It was 
assumed that the English sample (higher-status) would be perceived higher in 
competence, and the Welsh sample (lower-status) higher in warmth.
The treatment of the data followed the procedure recommended by Waldzus et al. 
(2004). Euclidean distances38 were calculated, thus measuring dissimilarity between 
superordinate category and target group. The reverse of the measure indicates the 
degree of similarity between the two. Here, then, the lower the score, the higher the 
perceived relative prototypicality.
*Allocation-based ingroup bias: Three new ostensible projects were devised (e.g., 
‘to fund brownsite developments’), and participants allocated a grand total £15 
million between the ingroup and outgroup for these {-15 = low to +15 = high). In the 
control condition, participants were told that the scheme was introduced by 
Parliament. *Evaluative ingroup bias and similarity-based relative prototypicality 
were a replication of Study 2.
f  Proximity-based relative prototypicality: Four Venn-like diagrams depicting 
variations of crossed or subsumed categorisation (see e.g. App. II, p. 308.) were 
presented. Diagrams A and B reflected resp. the double-ingroup and double-outgroup 
scenario, and thus represented no disparity between subgroups in their relationship to 
the superordinate category. Scenarios C (ingroup-in outgroup-out) and D (outgroup- 
in ingroup-out) showed disparity. Participants ranked the four diagrams on how these 
best reflected the relationship between the three groups (1 = least best to 4 = best;
dsuper su b— [ Z Usuperi x sub i) + ( x SUper2 x sut,2) • • • ( x SUperi5 x sub is ) /x w ] ,  where d profile
dissimilarity, super = superordinate category, sub = subgroup, xn = trait n.
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see Vescio, Hewstone, Crisp & Rubin, 1999, p. 117). Of interest were only those 
responses given as Scenario C or D. Mdiagram-c ~ Mdiagmm-D delivered proximity-based 
relative prototypicality (-3 = low to +3 = high).
O Q
*Relative power was a replication of Study 2 (here both as > = .73).
*fRelative fairness (legitimacy): In two sub-items, participants were asked ‘how fair 
do you personally find the amount of power that the ingroup [outgroup] has in <the 
superordinate category>? . Affaimess-to-ingroup A/lpaimess-to-outgroup formed relative fairness 
(-6 = very unfair to +6 = very fair).
f  *Received respect: The next six statements (three ingroup, three outgroup, four 
reverse scored) were alternated with the power statements described above (e.g., 
‘The EU does not take Wales seriously’). Two collapsed scores were computed (both 
a s >.70) and M ingr0Up .respect -  M outgrouP-respect delivered respect-based ingroup bias 
(-6 = low to +6 = high).
f  Superordinate category identification: The Cameron (2004) scale was used to 
measure identification at the British or European level. Studies 1 and 2 had shown 
the factor centrality to play a minor role in national ingroup identification, and this 
factor was therefore omitted40. Sub-items and factors (all as > .75) were collapsed 
into superordinate category identification (1 = low to 7 = high).
39 In the control condition, the frame of reference was ‘other nations’ on rdative power, relative 
fairness and received respect.
40 Given the unanticipated and strong centrality score in the Welsh sample, the decision to exclude 
centrality was, in hindsight, unfortunate.
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*Hierarchical levels o f identity: This multiple response item was a replication of 
Study 2.
Procedure
Ethics Approval was granted before running the study (see App. III-l). At CU, the 
study was advertised on the Departmental Study Pool web-site, and students signed 
up to take part in the study in return for course credits. Administration of the 
questionnaire took place in the designated laboratory. At SI, students were 
approached by the investigator during their lectures and questionnaires returned at a 
later point. At SU, participants were approached individually by the investigator at 
eating outlets on campus, and questionnaires were filled in on the spot. SI and SU 
participants received a raffle ticket with a prize of £25 as an incentive. All 
participants were told that the aim of the study was to investigate ‘how we feel about 
our country and our neighbours’. Those who agreed to participate signed the Form of 
Consent and completed one of the twelve questionnaires (i.e. two national groups, 
three conditions, ingroup and outgroup items counterbalanced). All participants were 
thanked and fully de-briefed (see App. III-2 -  III-4).
5.2 Results
The data were screened for outliers, all reverse scored items recoded and variables 
collapsed as described in the Method section. It was noted that the male:female ratio 
(38:144) was weighted towards females (jf = 6.96, df=  2,p <  .05), a common effect 
when drawing heavily on psychology students. Therefore in the analyses reported 
below, analyses of covariance were performed in each instance in a first step, with
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Gender as covariate. No gender effects were found. Therefore unless stated 
otherwise, all analyses of variance employed a 2 X 2 [3] design, where the factors 
national group (English/Welsh) and condition (EU/GB/[Control]) served as 
independent variables. The a priori assumptions were tested first.
A priori assumptions
Superordinate category evaluation: It had been assumed that all scores would be 
significantly above the midpoint, and this was the case. England (M= 5.54, 
SD = .71) held Great Britain in higher esteem than the Welsh (M= 5.04, SD = 1.17). 
did, though only marginally so (see Table 23). The Welsh (M= 4.88, SD=  1.06) 
rated The EU only marginally higher than the English (M= 4.76, SD = 1.22) did. All 
scores were significantly above the midpoint (all ps < .001). Therefore and as 
assumed, superordinate category evaluation was higher rather than lower, and the 
measure was not utilized further41.
Table 23: Mean superordinate category evaluation scores
English Welsh
Great Britain 5.54'*' 5.04'*'
(.71) (1.17)
n = 29 n = 28
The EU 4.76'*' 4.88’*'
(1.22) (1.06)
n = 26 n = 31
Note: Asterisks indicate that measures are significantly above the midpoint (3) using one- 
sample /-tests. Standard deviations are reported in parentheses. ***/?<.001.
41 For the interested reader: The English cohort rated Great Britain more highly than The EU 
(F(l, 110) = 7.54, partial rf2 = .06, p < .01; simple effect), whereas the Welsh cohort did not (p = .58). 
All other simple effects were non-significant.
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Ingroup identification: As assumed (see Table 24), Welsh ingroup identification 
(M= 5.17, SD = .88) was significantly higher than English ingroup identification 
(M = 4.61, SD = .70), ^(180) = 4.70,/? < .001.
Table 24: Mean ingroup and superordinate category identification scores
English Welsh
Ingroup identification 4.61*" 5.17*"
(.70) (.88)
n = 86 n = 98
British identification 5.16*** 4.97"*
(.94) (1.02)
n = 29 n — 26
European identification 4.40*" 4.26*"
(1.00) (.91)
n -  26 n = 31
Note: Asterisks indicate that measures are significantly above the midpoint (3) using one- 
sample Mests. Standard deviations are reported in parentheses. ***p < .001.
Superordinate category identification: Only partly in line with a priori assumptions, 
a 2 X 2 ANOVA, where superordinate category identification served as a dependent 
variable, revealed that groups identified significantly more at the British (English: 
M =  5.16, SD = .94; Welsh: M =4.97, SD= 1.02) than at the European level 
(English: M =4.40, SD = 1.00; Welsh: M =4.26, SD = .91), both Fs>7.46, both 
ps < .01 (simple effects). There were no significant differences between the national 
groups in their degrees of British or European identification, both Fs < .45, both 
ps > .49.
Hierarchical levels o f identification: As shown in Table 25, there was a significant 
relationship between nationality and the levels of identity = 29.58, df=  6, 
/?<.001), where nearly half of the Welsh sample (46.9%; English = 15.3%)
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identified at subgroup level only. However, both groups identified at subgroup and 
British level almost in equal measure (Welsh: 34.4%; English: 35.3%).
Table 25: 2 X 7 contingency table -  national group by hierarchical identity level 
combinations
Count 
(% within nationality)
Hierarchical
combinations
Sub Sub + 
Grp
Sub + 
Super
Grp Grp + 
Super
Super All
levels
English 13 30 0 22 1 1 18
n = 85 (15.3) (35.3) (0) (25.9) (1.2) (1.2) (21.2)
Welsh 45 33 1 10 0 0 7
n — 96 (46.9) (34.4) (1.0) (10.4) (0) (0) (7.3)
Note: Sub = subgroup English or W elsh. Grp = British. Super = European.
Relative prototypicality
All English scores were higher than all Welsh scores across both conditions, that is, 
the English felt more prototypical o f both superordinate categories than the Welsh 
did (for the sake o f brevity, see Table 26 for mean scores and standard deviations). 
On all three measures, the English felt more prototypical o f Great Britain than o f The 
EU. Conversely on two o f the three measures, the Welsh felt more prototypical o f 
The EU than o f Great Britain (the exception was trait-based relative prototypicality). 
A series o f 2 X 2 ANOVAs, where one of the relative prototypicality measures 
served as a dependent variable, tested for between- and within-subjects differences.
Proximity-based and similarity-based relative prototypicality: The 2-way interaction 
National Group X Condition was significant on proximity-based relative
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prototypicality, (F(3, 105) = 6.57, partial rj2 = .06, p  < .05), and on similarity-based 
relative prototypicality, F(3, 110) = 8.04, partial rj2 = .08,/? < .01.
Between-subjects, simple effects: On the dimension of proximity-based relative 
prototypicality, the English felt more prototypical of Great Britain 
(F(l, 105) = 94.55, partial rj2 = .48, p  < .001) and of The EU (F(l, 105) = 30.01, 
partial r\ = .27, p  < .001) than the Welsh did. On the dimension of similarity-based 
relative prototypicality, the English felt more prototypical of Great Britain 
( m .  110) = 36.78, partial i/2 = .25, /X .0 0 1 ) and of The EU (F(l, 110) = 3.07, 
partial rj1 = .03, p  = .08, n.s.) than the Welsh did.
Within-subjects, simple effects On the dimension of proximity-based relative 
prototypicality, the English felt more prototypical of Great Britain than of The EU, 
F{ 1, 105) = 4.62, partial rj2 = .04, p < .01. Although the Welsh sample scored higher 
in The EU condition than in the GB condition, differences were non-significant 
(p = .14). A similar pattern of simple effects emerged on the dimension of similarity- 
based relative prototypicality, (English: F( 1, 110) = 5.90, partial rj =.05, p < .05; 
Welsh: F (l, 110) = 3.46, partial t f  = .03, p  = .07).
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Table 26: Mean proximity-based, similarity-based and trait-based relative
prototypicality scores
English Welsh
Proximity-based prototypicality
GB 1.93*** -1.92tn
(.90) (1.47)
n = 28 n = 26
EU 1.08* -1.34tn
(2.02) (1.26)
n = 26 n = 29
Similarity-based prototypicality
GB .86*** -1.25n
(.95) (1.84)
n = 29 n = 28
EU .00 -,61n
(1.13) (1-17)
n = 26 n = 31
Trait-based prototypicality
GB -.42 .17
(.43) (.91)
n = 21 n = 22
EU -.23 .02
(.45) (1.27)
« = 24 n = 27
Note: Asterisks indicate that measures are significantly above and daggers significantly 
below the midpoint (0) using one-sample /-tests. Standard deviations are reported in 
parentheses, f !*p < .05. t t /7 < .01. t t t /***p < .001.
Trait-based relative prototypicality42: As shown in Table 26, English scores were 
lower than Welsh scores in both conditions, that is, English perceived relative 
prototypicality was higher in both conditions, significantly so in the GB condition, 
F( 1, 97) = 6.02, partial rj2 = .06, p  < .05 (simple effect). The third ANOVA, where
42 Analysis of the trait dimensions warmth and competence is not part of the remit of this thesis. 
However, the reader may be interested to know that, as suspected, both groups concurred that the 
English are higher on competence and lower on warmth, and that the Welsh are higher on warmth and 
lower on competence (paired-sample /-tests, all ps < .001).
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trait-based relative prototypicality was the dependent variable, showed a significant 
main effect of national group, F(3, 97) = 6.07, partial rj2 = .06, p  < .05. The two-way 
interaction National Group X Condition was non-significant, F  = 1.06,/? = .31.
Relative power
Consistent with a priori assumptions, the English felt more relatively powerful than 
the Welsh across both conditions (see Table 27). The English felt less powerful in 
The EU (M= .88, SD = 1.20) than in Great Britain (M  = 1.68, SD =1.16). The Welsh 
felt less powerful in Great Britain (M= -2.41, SD = 1.63) than in The EU (M= -1.63, 
SD = 1.37).
Table 27: Mean relative power scores
English Welsh
Relative power
GB condition 1.68*** -2.41n t
(1.16) (1.63)
n — 29 n = 21
EU condition .88" -1.63tn
(1.20) (1.37)
« = 26 « = 31
Note: Asterisks indicate that measures are significantly above and daggers that measures 
are significantly below the midpoint (0) using one-sample t-tests. Standard deviations are 
reported in parentheses**/? < .01. ftf/***/? < -001.
The 2 X 2  ANOVA with relative power as a dependent variable showed the 2-way 
interaction National Group X Condition to be significant, F(3, 109) = 9.55, partial 
rj2 = .08, p  < .01. Simple effects revealed that the English felt more powerful under 
Great Britain (F(l, 109) = 127.41, partial rj2 = .54, p  < .001) and under The EU 
(F(l, 109) = 45.57, partial ^2 = .31, p < .001) than the Welsh did. They also felt
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more powerful under Great Britain than under The EU, F (l, 109) = 4.71, partial 
r/2 = -04, p  < .01. In contrast, the Welsh sample felt more powerful under The EU 
than under Great Britain, F (l, 109) = 4.84, partial rj2 = .04, p  < .01.
Do we see higher evaluative ingroup bias in the lower-power Welsh sample, and 
higher allocation-based ingroup bias in the higher-power English sample? Can we 
identify any patterns o f received respect? To what degree does the salient 
superordinate group affect ingroup bias scores?
The Welsh did indeed score higher on evaluative ingroup bias than the English. The 
English also scored higher on allocation-based ingroup bias than the Welsh. English 
received respect scores were higher than Welsh received respect scores, and the 
Welsh received less respect in Great Britain that they did within The EU (see Table 
28).
Evaluative ingroup bias: A 2 X 3 ANOVA with evaluative ingroup bias as 
dependent variable, only revealed a main effect reflecting greater ingroup bias for the 
Welsh (overall M =  26.64, SD = 31.77) than for the English (overall M =  8.63, 
SD = 19.12), F(5,176) = 22.12, partial >/2 = .1 1,P < .001.
Allocation-based ingroup bias: A 2 X 3 ANOVA with allocation-based ingroup bias 
as dependent variable, only revealed a main effect reflecting greater ingroup bias for 
the English (overall M = .86, 6!D=1.09) than for the Welsh (overall M =.07, 
SD = 1.09), F (l, 175) = 22.51, partial t f  = .1 Up  < 001.
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Table 28: Mean evaluative ingroup bias, allocation-based ingroup bias and
received respect scores
English Welsh
Evaluative ingroup bias
GB condition 8.38 3 _ _ „ * * *33.21
(22.74) (30.91)
n = 29 72 = 28
EU condition 2.65 21.90*
(15.50) (35.03)
n —  26 72 = 30
Control condition 13.87 25.53***
(17.12) (29.68)
72 = 31 72 = 38
Overall 8.63*** .  , , . * * *  26.64
(19.12) (31.77)
72 =  8 6 72 = 96
Allocation-based ingroup bias
Great Britain .70*** .17
(.96) (1.19)
72 = 29 72 = 27
The EU .72*** .03
(.79) (1.06)
72 = 26 72 = 31
Control 1.14*** .03
(1.39) (1.05)
72 = 30 72 = 38
Overall .86*** .07
(1.09) (1.09)
72 = 85 72 = 96
Received respect
GB condition 1.33*** -2.0 lm
(1.23) (1.58)
72 = 29 72 = 27
EU condition .58** -1.15w
(.90) (1.00)
72 = 26 72 = 31
Control condition .99** -1.35™
(1.58) (1.31)
72 = 31 72 = 38
Overall .98** -1.47™
(1.30) (1.34)
72 = 86 72 = 96
Note: Asterisks indicate that measures are significantly above the midpoint (0) using one-sample
/-tests. Standard deviations are reported in parentheses. ap -  .06. *p < .05. ***p < .001.
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Received respect: A 2 X 3 ANOVA with received respect as dependent variable,
revealed a main effect reflecting higher scores for the English (overall M =  .98,
££>=1.30) than for the Welsh (overall A /=-1.47, ££>=1.34), F (3 ,109) = 5.58,
• 2partial rj = .11, p  = .001. The National Group X Condition interaction was 
significant (F(3, 109) = 5.58, partial rj2 = .11, p  = .001), where the English reported 
higher respect in Great Britain than in The EU (M= 1.33, SD = 1.23 and M=  .58, 
£D = .90 resp.), F (l, 109) = 5.42, partial rj2 = .05, p  < .05. Conversely, the Welsh 
reported higher respect in The EU than in Great Britain (M= -1.15, SD=  1.00 and 
M =  -2.01, SD = 1.58 resp.), £(1, 109) = 5.42, partial rj2 = .05, p  < .05.
What are the relationships between the possible predictor variables o f ingroup bias 
(ingroup and superordinate category identification, relative prototypicality, relative 
power) and the three forms o f ingroup bias? Is there any association between
ingroup bias and relative fairness (legitimacy)?
To begin, relative fairness findings are reported in Table 29. A 2 X 2 ANOVA with 
relative fairness as dependent variable, only revealed a main effect reflecting higher 
perceived fairness in the English sample (GB: M —.86, SD = .83; EU: A f= .50, 
££>=1.48) than in the Welsh sample (GB: M  = -.85, ££>=1.63; EU: M =  -1.06, 
SD = 1.24), F (3 ,109) = 43.53, partial rj1 = .29, p < .001.
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Table 29: Mean relative fairness scores
English Welsh
Relative fairness
GB condition .86** -.85t
(.83) (1.63)
h  = 29 n  = 27
EU condition .50 -1.06m
(1.48) (1.24)
n = 26 71 = 31
Note: Asterisks indicate that measures are significantly above and daggers that measures 
are significantly below the midpoint (0) using one-sample 7-tests. Standard deviations are 
reported in parentheses, fp < .05. **p < .01. t t tp  < -001.
Next a series of intercorrelations were examined for national group by condition. 
There were ten variables to consider. Evaluative ingroup bias, allocation-based 
ingroup bias and received respect were outcome variables. All other variables were 
considered possible predictor variables of ingroup bias. The EU condition is shown 
in Table 30, the GB condition in Table 31. In each table, English scores are given in 
the non-shaded and Welsh scores in the shaded areas. The variables examined were, 
in this order, 1. degree of ingroup identification (IGID), 2. degree of superordinate 
category identification (SCID), 3. proximity-based relative prototypicality (Prox), 4. 
similarity-based relative prototypicality (Sim), 5. trait-based relative prototypicality 
(Trait), 6. relative power (Power), 7. relative fairness (Fair), 8. received respect 
(Resp), 9. evaluative ingroup bias (Eval) and 10. allocation-based ingroup bias 
(Alloc). Findings are reported by national group and, given the complexity, these are 
additionally depicted schematically and without correlational values in Figure 16 
(English sample) and Figure 17 (Welsh sample).
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Table 30: EU condition: Intercorrelations between all variables by national
group
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
l.IG ID - -.23 
(*=26)
.03
(*=26)
.18
(*=26)
-.03
(*=24)
-.10
(n=26)
-.12
(n=26)
-.11
(n=26)
.30
(n=26)
-.05
(n=26)
2.SCID -.48**
(i i=31)
- .24 
(*=26)
.05
(*=26)
.25
(*=24)
-.08
(*=26)
.10
(*= 26)
-.05
(*=26)
.08
(*=26)
.18
(*=26)
3.Prox .16
(*>29)
-.14
(*=29)
- .49*
(*=26)
-.42*
(*=24)
.21
(*=26)
.01
(*=26)
.19
(*=26)
.44*
(*=26)
.17
(*=26)
4 .Sim -.05
(» = 3 D
.13
(*=31)
.16
(*=29)
- -.22
(*=24)
-.20
(*=26)
-.17
(*=26)
.03
(*=26)
.09
(*=26)
.20
(*=26)
5.Trait -.06
(*=27)
-.04
(*=27)
-.36“
(*=25)
-.38*
(*=27)
- -.27
(*= 24)
.06
(*= 24)
-.16
(*=24)
-.52*
(*=24)
-.15
(*=24)
6 .Power -.21  
(«=31)
-.04
(*=31)
.09
(*=29)
.38*
(*=31)
-.22
(*=27)
- .54*
(*= 26)
.56**
(*=26)
.30
(*=26)
-.09
(*=26)
7 .Fair -.18
(*= 31)
.33a
(*=31)
-.20  
(*=29)
.29
(*=31)
-.40*
(*=27)
.19
(n=31)
- .54**
(*=26)
.07
(*=26)
-.47*
(*=26)
8. Resp -.33a
(*=31)
.15
(*=31)
.01
(*=29)
.30
(*=31)
-.04
(*=27)
.75**
(*=31)
.24
(*= 31)
- .26
(*=26)
.04
(*=26)
9.Eval .78**
(*=30)
-.67**
(*=30)
.21
(*=28)
-.12
(*=30)
-.11
(*=26)
-.09
(*=30)
-.08
(*= 30)
-.18
(*=30)
- .30
(*=26)
10. A lloc .31
(ii=31)
-.44*
(*=31)
-.16
(*=29)
.11
(*=31)
.02
(*=27)
.22
(*=31)
.11
(*= 31)
.06
(*=31)
.49**
(*=30)
-
Note: The shaded area show s intercorrelations in the W elsh sam ple. The non-shaded area shows
intercorrelations in the English sa m p le .a/? < .08. *p <  .05. **p <  .01 (two-tailed).
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Table 31: GB condition: Intercorrelations between all variables by national
group
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
l.IG ID - .23
(n=29)
-.14
(77=28)
-.09  
(/i=29)
-.06
(77=27)
-.27
(n=29)
.11
(n=29)
-.07
(n=29)
.48"
(n=29)
.47*
(n=29)
2.SCID .03
(n=26)
- -.40*
(n=28)
-.06  
(«=29)
.24
(77=27)
-.15
(77=29)
.14
(77=29)
.04
(77=29)
-.05
(77=29)
-.01
(77=29)
3.Prox -.35 
( 77=26)
.46 ’ 
(«=25)
- .46* 
(/?=28)
.06
(77=26)
.38*
(77=28)
-.06
(77=28)
.38*
(77=28)
.16
(77=28)
-.06
(77=28)
4 .Sim .02
(n=28)
.36a 
(«=26)
.49*
(h=26)
- -,37a
(77=27)
.58**
(77=29)
.20
(77=29)
.58**
(77=29)
.38*
(77=29)
-.06
(77=29)
5.Trait -.58 ’*
(n=23)
-.11
(77=22)
-.11
(n=22)
-.25
(n -2 3 )
- -.10
(77=27)
.04
(77=27)
.04
(77=27)
-.12
(77=27)
.18
(77=27)
6 .Power .06
(»=27)
.25
(n=26)
.47*
(n=26)
.14
(n=27)
-.32
(77=23)
- .46*
(77=29)
.63”
(77=29)
.09
(77=29)
-.27
(77=29)
7 .Fair .09
(77=27)
.39 ’
(77=26)
-.05 
(/!=26)
.31
(n=27)
-.24
(77=23)
-.01
(n=27)
- .28
(77=29)
-.07
(77=29)
-.15
(77=29)
8. Resp .14
(«=27)
.23 
(«=26)
.20
(77=26)
.32
(/i=27)
-.20
(77=23)
.65”
(77=27)
.30
(77=27)
- .31
(77=29)
-.11
(77=29)
9.Eval .65”  
(n=28)
-.30
(«=26)
-.45*
(«=26)
-.09
(77=28)
-.12
(77=23)
-.19
(77=27)
-.14
(77=27)
.04
(77=27)
- .25
(77=29)
10.A lloc .22
(«=27)
-.31
(n=25)
-.01
(n»25)
.14
(77=27)
.09
(77=23)
-.18
(77=26)
.04
(77=26)
-.03
(77=26)
.29
(77=27)
-
Note: The shaded area show s intercorrelations in the W elsh sam ple. The non-shaded area show s
intercorrelations in the English sample. a p  < .08. *p < .05. **p  <  .01 (two-tailed).
The English sample: As shown in Figure 16, evaluative ingroup bias increased with 
relative prototypicality (proximity-based: r = .44, trait-based: r = -.52, both ps < .05) 
in the EU condition, and with relative prototypicality (similarity-based: r  = .38, 
p < .05) and ingroup identification (r = .48, p  < 01) in the GB condition. A llocation- 
based ingroup bias increased with ingroup identification (r = .47, p < .05) in the GB 
condition. Allocation-based ingroup bias increased as relative fairness decreased (i.e. 
as perceived legitimacy decreased) in the EU condition, r = -.47, p  < .05. Received
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respect increased with relative power across both conditions, both rs < .56, both 
ps <.01. There were positive correlations between two of the three relative 
prototypicality measures and relative power (both rs > .38, both ps < .05), but in the 
GB condition only.
Figure 16: Significant intercorrelations in the English sample by condition
Evaluative 
ingroup bias
Alloc, based 
ingroup bias
Respect-based 
ingroup bias
EU Condition
Relative
Fairness
Relative
Power
Relative
Fairness
Relative
Power
GB Condition
Ingroup
Identification
Ingroup
Identification
Relative
Prototypicality
Superord.Cat.
Identification
Superord.Cat.
Identification
Relative
Prototypicality
 -----  Sig. pos. corr.
Sig. neg. corr. 
1: Prox. Prototypicality 
2: Trait. Prototypicality. 
3: Sim. Prototypicality.
The Welsh sample: As shown in Figure 17, evaluative ingroup bias increased, as 
ingroup identification increased across both conditions, both rs > .65, both ps < .01. 
Evaluative ingroup bias (r = -.67, p  < .01) and allocation-based ingroup bias 
(r = -.44, p  < .05) decreased, as European identification increased (i.e. in the EU 
condition only). In contrast to the English sample, there were no correlations
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between relative fairness and ingroup bias. Received respect increased with relative 
power across both conditions, both rs < .65, both ps < .01.
Figure 17: Significant intercorrelations in the Welsh sample by condition
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In summary in the English sample, only perceived unfairness sees a reduction in 
ingroup bias (allocation-based, EU condition only). Ingroup identification is 
positively related to evaluative and allocation-based ingroup bias (GB condition 
only). Relative prototypicality increases with evaluative ingroup bias (both 
conditions). In the Welsh sample, only superordinate category identification sees a 
decrease in ingroup bias (evaluative and allocation-based, EU condition only). 
Ingroup identification sees an increase in evaluative ingroup bias (both conditions). 
Relative prototypicality and relative fairness are not related to any form of ingroup
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bias. Bringing this into the theoretical framework of subgroup-superordinate group 
relations, ingroup identification was linked to bias, superordinate category 
identification less so (Welsh/EU), relative prototypicality only in the English sample 
(EU and GB), and, most interestingly, there were no direct relationships between 
ingroup bias and relative power.
Is any form o f ingroup bias a function o f national group and (directly or indirectly) 
relative prototypicality, relative power or relative fairness, or o f the degree o f  
ingroup or superordinate category identification?
Findings from Study 2 had shown ingroup bias to be mediated by relative 
prototypicality or relative power in some instances. The question was how 
generalizable were these findings when applied to England and Wales. Additionally 
and new to Study 3, could perceptions of (il-)legitimacy mediate ingroup bias? 
Finally and in contrast to Study 2, here we have a minority and a majority subgroup, 
and it was therefore likely that ingroup bias might be mediated by the degree of 
ingroup identification. To this end, a series of analyses of covariance were 
performed. Cases were selected by condition and in each ANCOVA with national 
group as independent variable, one specific predictor variable was entered as 
covariate, and one of the ingroup bias measures as dependent variable. Thus, if the 
effect of the covariate was significant and the effect of national group was non­
significant, this would indicate possible mediation or partial mediation. For the sake 
of brevity, Table 32 summarises only those three instances where mediation was 
possible, that is, where the covariate had a significant or marginally significant value 
and where the effect of national group was not significant. For each of these,
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mediation tests were performed following the steps recommended by Baron and 
Kenny (1986; Kenny, 2003). In each case, findings are reported by both conditions 
for comparison purposes.
Table 32: Significant or marginally significant main effects of covariates
F partial rj2 P
DV: Evaluative ingroup bias
Proximity-based relative prototypicality 
(GB condition)
3.45 .06 .07
Ingroup identification 
(EU condition)
39.33 .43 <.001
DV: Allocation-based ingroup bias
None
DV: Received respect
Relative power 37.25 .41 <.001
(GB condition)
The Welsh were significantly higher in ingroup identification and in evaluative 
ingroup bias than the English across both experimental conditions, and the degree of 
ingroup identification mediated evaluative ingroup bias in the EU condition (see 
Figure 18 left), but not in the GB condition (see Figure 18 right). In the EU 
condition, path c was originally significant (B = .33, p  < .01), and was reduced to 
non-significance (path c B = .10,/? = .37) after adding ingroup identification to the 
model, Sobel’s t = 2.62, p  < .07. In contrast in the GB condition path c ’ remained 
significant after adding ingroup identification to the model,/? = .03.
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Figure 18: Mediation effects of ingroup identification on evaluative ingroup bias
Ingroup identification Ingroup identification
3 6 * * /  EU \  .66*** 3 3 * /  GB V 5 3 " *
/  Adj.R2 = .47 \ /  Adj.R2 = .44 \
c
National Evaluative 
group ingroup bias
c
National Evaluative 
group 42 ingroup bias
After mediation:
path c ’= .10, n.s. 
Sobel’s t = 2.62,p  = .01
After mediation:
path c ’ = .24, p  -  .03
Note: National group context coded, where 1 = English, 2 = Welsh
The degree of proximity-based relative prototypicality mediated evaluative ingroup 
bias in the GB condition (see Figure 19 right), but not in the EU condition (see 
Figure 19 left). To remind the reader, the Welsh were higher on evaluative ingroup 
bias and the English on proximity-based relative prototypicality. Note that this 
prototypicality measure can also be interpreted as how much the subgroup feels 
relatively included in or excluded from the superordinate category. In the GB 
condition, the originally significant path c (B = .42, p  < .01) was reduced to non­
significance (path c B = .06, p  = .79) after adding ingroup identification to the 
model, Sobel’s t -  1.83, p  = .07. Given the negative B-value for path b in the GB 
condition, the more excluded the group (the Welsh, national group context coded as 
2), the higher the evaluative ingroup bias. The more included the group (the English, 
national group context coded as 1), the lower the evaluative ingroup bias.
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Figure 19: Mediation effects of proximity-based relative prototypicality on
evaluative ingroup bias
Prox-based relative 
prototypicality
Prox-based relative 
prototypicality
a /  'sb
-.60 " y  EU .29 (p<.08) - . 8 5 GB V .4 3  (/?<.07)
/  Adj.R2 = 13 /  Adj.R2 = .21 \
National °33*
group
Evaluative 
ingroup bias
c
National Evaluative
42** • u- group ingroup bias
After mediation:
pathc' = .51,/? = .002
After mediation:
path c ’ = .06, p  = .79, n.s. 
Sobel’s t = 1.83, p  = .07
Note: National group context coded, where 1 = English, 2 = Welsh
The English scored higher than the Welsh on relative power and on received respect 
in both conditions. Analysis showed that the degree of relative power mediated 
received respect in the GB condition (see Figure 20 right), but not in the EU 
condition (see Figure 20 left). In the GB condition, path c (originally significant; 
B = -.77, p  < .001) was reduced to non-significance (path c ’\ B = -.06, p  = .18) after 
adding ingroup identification to the model, Sobel’s t — 5.30, p  < .001. England is a 
higher power group than Wales, and this power differential brings respect and not 
vice versa.
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Figure 20: Mediation effects of relative power on received respect
Relative power Relative power
a /
-.70***/ EU \  .69*** -.83 * y  GB V 7 3 " *
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After mediation:
path c ’ = -. 16, p  = . 18, n.s. 
Sobel’s t = 5.30,p  < .001
Note: National group context coded, where 1 = English, 2 = Welsh
Do high dual identifiers demonstrate higher (IPM) or lower (CUM, IMSR) ingroup 
bias?
To recap’ the identification scores as the point of departure and as shown in Table 
24, Welsh ingroup identification (M=  5.17, SD = .88) was significantly higher than 
English ingroup identification (M -  4.61, SD = .70). The English sample identified at 
the British (M= 5.16, SD = .94) and European (M= 4.405.17, SD=  1.00) levels 
more than the Welsh sample (British: M  = 4.97, 5D=1.02; European: M =  4.26, 
SD = .91), but differences were non-significant.
As in Study 2, the final set of tests looked to identify interaction effects between 
Ingroup Identification X Superordinate Category Identification, and whether these 
moderated evaluative or allocation-based ingroup bias in line with predictions from 
IPM, or perceptions of being a target of negative bias (received respect). Firstly, a 2 
X 2 X 2 omnibus MANOVA examined where interactions might be found. Secondly,
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a series of MANOVAs examined scores by condition and by national group to see if 
these factors featured in the interactions. Thirdly, simple slope analysis tested 2-way 
interactions for significant moderation effects.
Firstly, the omnibus MANOVA was a 2 (National Group: categorical independent 
variable) X 2 (Condition: categorical independent variable) X (Ingroup
Identification, i.e. English or Welsh) X (Superordinate Category Identification, i.e. 
British or European) design. The latter two measures were continuous independent 
variables (centred). The three ingroup bias measures were dependent variables. Of 
interest were interactions that included Ingroup Identification X Superordinate 
Category Identification. There were two marginally significant 3-way interactions 
Condition X Ingroup Identification X Superordinate Category Identification; on 
received respect (F(l, 94) = 3.11, partial rj2 = .03, p  = .08) and on evaluative ingroup 
bias, F (l, 94) = 2.75, partial rj2 = .03, p  = . 10. The 2-way interactions Ingroup 
Identification X Superordinate Category Identification and the 3-way interactions 
National Group X Ingroup Identification X Superordinate Category Identification 
were non-significant, all Fs <2.19, all ps > .14.
To decompose the 3-way interactions into 2-way interactions, cases were selected by 
condition, and two 2 (National Group) X Ingroup Identification X Superordinate 
Category Identification MANOVAs, with received respect and evaluative ingroup 
bias as dependent variables, followed.
On the evaluative ingroup bias measure (that is, demonstrating ingroup bias), the 2- 
way interaction Ingroup Identification X Superordinate Category Identification was
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non-significant in the EU condition, F (l, 48) = 1.32, partial r f = .03, p  = .26. In the 
GB condition, the 2-way interaction Ingroup Identification X Superordinate Category 
Identification was non-significant, F(1, 47) = 1.34, partial rj2 = .02,p  = .25. Although 
there were no significant interactions, the slopes were nonetheless plotted, because 
the marginally significant 3-way interaction reported above did indicate that that the 
two 2-way interactions might diverge from one another.
As shown in Figure 21, in both conditions, high dual identifiers showed the lowest 
evaluative ingroup bias amongst those with high ingroup identification. Conversely, 
low dual identifiers showed the highest ingroup bias amongst those with low ingroup 
identification. For high superordinate category identifiers, as ingroup identification 
increased, so did ingroup bias (EU: z high: /?= 21.36, /?<.001; GB: z high; 
P — 21.97, p  < .001). The same relationship between the two levels of identification 
was observed for low superordinate category identifiers, that is, as ingroup 
identification increased, so did ingroup bias (EU: z low: p  = 17.60, p  < .001; GB: z 
low; p = 27.54, /?<.001). However, comparing the two z low slopes between 
conditions, ingroup bias as a function of ingroup identification was stronger in the 
GB condition than in the EU condition (J3 = 27.54 and p=  17.60 resp.).
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Figure 21: Moderation effects of ingroup identification (X) on mean evaluative 
ingroup bias scores (Y) for high and low superordinate category 
identifiers (Z)
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On the received respect measure (that is, receiving negative bias), the 2-way 
interaction Ingroup Identification X Superordinate Category Identification was 
significant in the EU condition, F(1, 48) = 4.37, partial r\2 = .08, p  < .05. In the GB 
condition, the 2-way interaction Ingroup Identification X Superordinate Category 
Identification was not significant, F (l, 47) = .70, partial rj2 = .02, p  = .41.
As shown in Figure 22, top, in the EU condition, high dual identifiers scored low 
(but not lowest) on received respect. Low dual identifiers scored highest on received 
respect. In this condition, as ingroup identification increased and European
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identification decreased, relative respect decreased significantly for low to medium 
European identifiers, z low: fi = -.75, p  < .001; z mid: fi = -.39, p  < .01. However, 
when European identification was high, as ingroup identification increased, relative 
respect decreased only marginally, z high: fi = -.03, n.s.
By comparison in the GB condition (see Figure 22, bottom), high dual identifiers 
again scored low (but not lowest) on received respect. Low dual identifiers scored 
higher (but not highest) on received respect. Here there were no interactions between 
ingroup identification and British identification. Overall, as ingroup identification 
increased, received respect decreased, irrespective of the degree of British 
identification (z low: fi = -.69; z med: fi — -.67; z high: fi — -.65; all slopes n.s.).
Figure 22: Moderation effects of ingroup identification (X) on mean received
respect scores (Y) for high and low superordinate category identifiers 
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5.3 Discussion
As with the previous study, the purpose of this study was to examine subgroup- 
superordinate group relations, and specifically (a) to examine the relationship 
between relative prototypicality, relative power and ingroup bias, (b) to test IPM 
against CIIM/ICM/IMSR in predicting ingroup bias, and (c) to identify factors that 
mediate or moderate ingroup bias. Additionally, it was thought that the relative 
fairness (a proxy measure of legitimacy) of subgroup-superordinate group relations 
might help explain ingroup bias score patterns.
Evidence was found that proximity-based relative prototypicality mediated 
evaluative ingroup bias in the GB condition only. Relative power mediated received 
respect in the GB condition only. The degree of ingroup identification mediated 
evaluative ingroup bias in the EU condition only. Slope analysis showed no 
interactions between ingroup identification and superordinate category identification 
that might affect evaluative ingroup bias. Turning to received respect, simple slope 
analysis showed that, in the EU condition, low levels of ingroup and European 
identification (i.e. low dual identification) led to higher levels of received respect, 
and high dual identification led to lower levels (but not the lowest level) of received 
respect. In contrast in the GB condition, there was no interaction between the two 
levels of identification, and as ingroup identification increased, received respect 
decreased. Finally, there was little evidence linking relative fairness to ingroup bias. 
Only one inverse relationship between relative fairness and allocation-based ingroup 
bias was found (in the English/EU scenario).
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Given the complexity of dependent variables and the inconsistent findings supporting 
the four models of intersubgroup relations, an overview is shown in Table 33.
Table 33: Summary of evidence supporting the four models of intersubgroup 
relations
High 
SC ID
High 
dual ID
Trait-
based
proto.
Sim.-based 
proto.
Prox.-
based
proto.
CIIM/ICM
Evaluative 
ingroup bias
W/EU
(corr)
GB + 
EU1 
(mod)
E/GB
(med)
Allocation-based 
ingroup bias
W/EU
(corr)
- - - -
Received respect ” GB + 
EU2 
(mod) '
IMSR
Evaluative 
ingroup bias
- - - - -
Allocation-based 
ingroup bias
- - - - -
Received respect - - - - -
IPM
Evaluative 
ingroup bias
- - E/EU
(corr)
E/GB
(corr)
E/EU
(corr)
Allocation-based 
ingroup bias
- - - - -
Received respect - - - - -
Note: SC ID = superordinate category identification (based on evaluative component of identity). 
Dual ID = identification with ingroup and superordinate category. Proto. = prototypicality, corr = 
correlational, med = mediation, mod = moderation 1: Of high ingroup identifiers, those with high 
superordinate category identification showed lowest levels of evaluative ingroup bias.2: Of high 
ingroup identifiers, those with high superordinate category identification showed highest levels of 
received respect.
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Ingroup bias score patterns
As anticipated, irrespective of condition the Welsh sample overall showed higher 
evaluative ingroup bias, the English sample overall higher allocation-based ingroup 
bias. These patterns mirror those from Study 2, where the higher-power group 
(Germans) showed higher allocation-based ingroup bias, and the lower-power group 
(British) higher evaluative ingroup bias. This reflects the notion of usable power (Ng, 
1980, 1982; Sachdev & Bourhis, 1985, 1987, 1991). It is unlikely that the Welsh 
would succeed in claiming more resources than the English given the latter’s size and 
power. Demonstrating favourable attitudes towards the outgroup costs the English 
nothing in terms of status or resources. Therefore both groups respect size- and 
power-relevant social reality constraints. Finally and as expected, relative respect and 
relative power were positively related for both national groups in both conditions.
Relative prototypicality and ingroup bias
As shown in Table 33, findings relating to the prototypicality measures were 
conflicting. On the one hand, correlational evidence supported IPM. Here, 
relationships were examined within national groups and within separate conditions. 
On the other hand, mediation analysis produced findings contradictory to IPM. Here, 
differences between national groups were tested. Below, the findings of correlational 
and mediation analyses are discussed separately.
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Relative prototypicality and correlational evidence
From the English standpoint, there was correlational evidence to support IPM. 
Against the backdrop of The EU, both higher proximity and higher prototypicality 
based on trait-ratings increased evaluative ingroup bias. Against the backdrop of 
Great Britain, similarity-based relative prototypicality saw an increase in evaluative 
ingroup bias. There were no associations between any type of prototypicality and 
allocation-based ingroup bias. Against the backdrop of The EU and fully in line with 
IPM, if the English sample regards itself as more representative of the prototype such 
as it did on the trait-ratings, and if we consider the dimensions of warmth vs. 
competence that were tested, then the English sample may react to the perceived lack 
of competence in the Welsh sample with negative attitudes. Similarly, the English 
feel less included in The EU than in Great Britain, yet more included in The EU than 
they feel the Welsh to be (proximity-based relative prototypicality). Given the less 
secure position of England in The EU, making downward comparisons with a less 
powerful and more excluded group such as the Welsh could be a viable identity 
management strategy. Finally, it seems that when the Welsh deviate from British 
goals and values (that is, feelings of exclusion or not sharing the perceived degree of 
competency), then evaluative ingroup bias results.
From the Welsh standpoint, there were no associations between any form of ingroup 
bias and any measure of relative prototypicality in either condition. However, there 
was an inverse relationship between similarity-based relative prototypicality and 
relative fairness in the EU condition, that is, as prototypicality increased, the 
perceived legitimacy of Wales’ treatment decreased. This is similar to the effect
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found by Weber et al. (2002) when the superordinate category had been primed 
negatively. It would not be circumspect to conclude that this one piece of evidence 
offers reliable support for Weber and her colleagues’ findings; nonetheless further 
investigation may tell us more.
Relative prototypicality and mediation analyses
On the surface, evidence was found that proximity-based relative prototypicality 
partially mediated evaluative ingroup bias in the GB condition (Sobel’s p  = .07), (see 
Table 33). Here the Welsh sample scored higher than the English sample on ingroup 
bias, and the English sample scored higher than the Welsh sample on prototypicality. 
National group (the independent variable) was coded such that the English national 
group had the value of 1, and the Welsh the value of 2, and it negatively predicted 
prototypicality in line with the higher prototypicality of the English. The pathway 
between prototypicality (the mediator) and evaluative ingroup bias (the dependent 
variable) was negative and marginally significant. Thus the closer relationship 
between England and Great Britain saw a reduction in ingroup bias (as proposed by 
IPM), but the more distant relation between Wales and Great Britain saw higher 
ingroup bias, mediated by the relatively lower prototypicality. This pattern is clearly 
contrary to IPM’s predictions. Indeed, as we noted earlier, the correlational data for 
the English sample do suggest evidence of an ingroup projection pattern in 
evaluative bias in the British context. Therefore this deviation from IPM when 
comparing levels of ingroup bias between national groups is best accounted for by 
the Welsh. From the Welsh standpoint, being more excluded from the British 
prototype (whether desired or undesired) fosters more negative attitudes to the
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English. This phenomenon was not found in the EU condition, where the Welsh 
sample was less distanced from the superordinate category, that is, higher in 
proximity-based relative prototypicality. It is suggested tentatively that the degree of 
inclusion or exclusion (desired or not desired) may exacerbate or mitigate evaluative 
ingroup bias for the Welsh.
The dimensions o f relative prototypicality
These dimensional differences in the measures employed warrant brief discussion. 
Firstly, correlational evidence supporting IPM showed that all three dimensions of 
relative prototypicality are linked positively to ingroup bias for the English sample 
(higher in relative prototypicality). However, in the GB condition, higher proximity- 
based relative prototypicality saw a decrease and lower proximity-based 
prototypicality an increase in evaluative ingroup bias when treated as a mediator. 
Why? Administration of the measure (the Venn-type diagrams) may have induced in 
some participants a feeling of being (undesirably) excluded from the superordinate 
category for the Welsh in particular. This could therefore have triggered aversive 
affective responses from participants (exclusion threat; Branscombe et al., 1999) -  
and ingroup projection is, in the first instance, a cognitive process. Furthermore, IPM 
does not examine the responses of groups lower in relative prototypicality. It could 
be that adding an affect component to the IPM model, or more generally considering 
the relation between (lack of) prototypicality and the threat of exclusion, might bring 
forth more consistent findings in future research.
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Relative power and ingroup bias
As assumed, the English were higher than the Welsh on relative power across both 
conditions. The English felt more powerful in Great Britain than in The EU, and 
although both scores were negative, the Welsh did feel more relatively powerful in 
The EU than in Great Britain. However, there was no correlational evidence or 
covariate effects to suggest that relative power was associated with or affected 
evaluative or allocation-based ingroup bias.
This lack of evidence regarding power differentials is a puzzle and almost flies in the 
face of past studies of subgroup-superordinate group relations and power 
differentials. One can only speculate why this might be. One explanation for the lack 
of evidence of power effects might be that the English feel so much more powerful 
than the Welsh, that, as a gesture of goodwill, they do not draw directly upon this 
(magnanimity and noblesse oblige). Similarly, the Welsh may feel so disempowered 
-  and this over time -  that the power differential may have become latent or defunct. 
However, there may well be some additional factor(s) that have not been taken into 
consideration in this study. In any event, due consideration must be given when 
designing follow-up studies.
The relationship between relative power and received respect
It is circumspect at this point to turn to the measure of received respect. As expected 
across both national groups and conditions, relative power correlated positively with 
received respect. Further tests showed that, in the GB condition, respect-based 
ingroup bias is driven by relative power, where English scores were higher than
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Welsh scores. In other words, for the English, their power position earns them 
respect, and for the Welsh, the lack of power costs them respect. This mediation 
effect was absent in the EU condition. Presumably, as The EU is a larger 
international organisation, the English perceive themselves to be one player of many. 
In Great Britain, however, England may be perceived as the key player. English- 
Welsh power differentials are therefore more clearly majority-minority based in 
Great Britain.
As already mentioned, received respect was measured to provide a simple 
approximation of the degree to which a group might feel the target of negative bias 
or discrimination, and indeed, power mediates its effects. This is a line of evidence 
that should be pursued further in future studies. For example, measuring respect on 
different dimensions (e.g., warmth, competence, culture, etc.) as well as 
differentiating between the respect-giving agents (e.g., respect from within the 
ingroup, from the outgroup, from the superordinate category) could produce some 
interesting findings. This approach has been taken in several recent studies (e.g., 
Ellemers, Doosje & Spears, 2004; Huo & Molina, 2006; Jetten, Schmitt, Branscombe 
& McKimmie, 2005; Spears, Ellemers, & Doosje, 2005).
The role o f levels o f identification in ingroup bias -  correlational evidence
Examining correlational findings first, we see ingroup identification playing a 
significant role in ingroup bias, but superordinate category identification less so. This 
is perhaps not so surprising: by definition ingroup bias is related to the level at which 
the ingroup is experienced and expressed (i.e. experienced and expressed by the
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ingroup towards an outgroup). For the English in the GB condition, higher ingroup 
identification saw increases in evaluative and allocation-based ingroup bias. Neither 
British nor European identification affected English ingroup bias levels. We see, 
therefore, the higher ingroup identifiers in the English sample, where the group is 
high in legitimate power and relative prototypicality, claim more resources than the 
outgroup and hold less favourable attitudes towards them. However, the EU 
relationship tells a different story. Here -  though independent of ingroup 
identification -  the less fair the treatment, the higher the allocation-based ingroup 
bias. It could be that the group seeks compensation for the perceived unfair treatment 
‘handed out’ by The EU, at the cost of the outgroup if needs be. It is also possible 
that the English participants attempted to be fair in their treatment of the outgroup 
and allocated monies to reflect the respective group sizes.
From the Welsh standpoint, the story seems quite simple. Evaluative ingroup bias 
increased with ingroup identification across both conditions, independent of relative 
prototypicality or power. Thus the more salient Welsh ingroup identification is, the 
less positive the attitudes are towards the English. This finding is furthermore in line 
with evidence presented earlier (Mols et al., unpublished manuscript; Mols & 
Haslam, in press), where ingroup identity salience sees the peripheral group 
expressing pro-European sentiments.
Furthermore in the EU condition, we have the only evidence where superordinate 
category identification is related to ingroup bias scores. Here, the higher the Welsh 
identified at the European level, the lower their evaluative and allocation-based 
ingroup bias, and this supports CUM (see Table 33). Given the growing trend
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towards devolution in Wales and Gaertner and Dovidio’s (2000) suggestion that the 
CIIM approach might reduce bias over time, it may be the case that European 
identification could become an increasing source of identity enhancement for the 
Welsh.
Taken at surface value, the reduction in both forms of ingroup bias speaks against the 
evidence presented by Mols and colleagues (Mols et al., unpublished manuscript; 
Mols & Haslam, in press), that is, here pro-European sentiment saw a decrease in 
ingroup bias. This is, however, not necessarily a contradiction. Firstly, one of the 
studies’ main aims was to identify the implicit and explicit meanings that participants 
place on their three social groups and to explain these; as such, much of the evidence 
collected was qualitative. Secondly, qualitative data were collected from regional 
politicians, and as the authors point out, this sample was better informed of the 
economic, social and political impact of The EU than average citizens are likely to 
be. Thirdly, empirical data on Welsh, British and European identity were collected as 
a repeated measure, that is, the study did not involve any manipulations (Mols et al., 
unpublished manuscript). As stated above, from the Welsh standpoint, the story 
seems quite simple. But in the light of the findings from Mol and his colleagues, how 
sure can we be? It may be that including open-ended measures in Study 3 would 
have served well here to gain an understand of the meanings and contents that each 
of these social groups gives its group members. These in turn might have offered a 
different explanation for the decrease in ingroup bias in the EU condition.
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The role o f levels o f identification in ingroup bias -  Mediation analyses
Only in one instance did an identification measure fully mediate ingroup bias. The 
degree of ingroup identification mediated evaluative ingroup bias in the EU 
condition only, where Welsh scores were higher than English scores. In order to offer 
a tentative explanation for this, we revisit prototypicality: As reported above, 
evaluative ingroup bias was mediated (p = .07) by the perceived lower proximity- 
based prototypicality of the Welsh in the GB condition. This was interpreted as a 
question of perceived inclusion versus perceived exclusion.
Returning to the finding where Welsh ingroup identification mediated evaluative 
ingroup bias, the effect was found in the EU condition, but not in the GB condition. 
The EU is geographically and psychologically more distant to the Welsh than Great 
Britain is. Away from the influence of Great Britain and within the influence of a 
higher order group, it could be interpreted that the Welsh felt free to express anti- 
English attitudes. Closer to home in the GB condition, negative attitudes towards the 
English were observed irrespective of the degree of ingroup identification. Again 
interpreted with caution, if Englishness and Britishness are perceived to be two sides 
of the same coin for the Welsh, this would account for no mediation effects of 
ingroup identification on evaluative ingroup bias in the GB condition.
The role o f dual identification in ingroup bias
Finally, the study tested whether high dual identifiers demonstrate higher (as per 
IPM) or lower (as per CIIM and IMSR) ingroup bias. There was no interaction 
between the levels of identification and allocation-based ingroup bias. Thus this form
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of ingroup-bias in this study was not a function of identification. However, two 
interesting findings emerged, one with regards to evaluative ingroup bias, and one 
with regards to received respect (see Table 33).
Evaluative ingroup bias: Low dual identifiers showed lower levels of ingroup bias 
than high dual identifiers across both conditions. At face value, this observation 
initially lends support to IPM and not to CUM and IMSR. However, it is the 
interaction between the two levels of identification that should be considered. Across 
both conditions, as ingroup identification increased, ingroup bias increased 
significantly irrespective of the increase in superordinate category identification. 
However, this increase was lowest when superordinate category identification was 
high. Thus we can conclude that an esteemed superordinate category can reduce 
ingroup bias, as postulated by CIIM and -  indirectly -  IMSR. Furthermore, 
comparing the z high slope between conditions, the bias shown in the GB condition 
was stronger than the bias shown in The EU condition. This is accounted for by 
differences in English-Welsh relations under each superordinate category. If the 
superordinate category is not accepted (i.e. z low), this may increase ingroup 
identification and ingroup bias, as it did more so with regards to British identification 
than to European identification (fi = 27.54 and 17.60 resp.). This may be the case in 
Great Britain, where the groups carry more meaning, are located within a very 
confined superordinate category, and where they engage in more direct competition. 
Conversely, if  the superordinate category is accepted (i.e. z high), there is virtually 
no difference in the relation between ingroup identification and ingroup bias (British: 
fi = 21.97; European: fi = and 21.36). Therefore in support of CIIM, we do see high 
superordinate category identification per se bringing forth lower ingroup bias. Thus
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if the superordinate category is held in high esteem, it can bring subgroups together. 
What we failed to find was direct evidence showing that high dual identification sees 
a reduction in ingroup bias, and thus no direct evidence in support of IMSR.
Received respect: Examining slope patterns over both conditions, received respect 
decreased as ingroup identification increased. High British identification saw higher 
received respect than high European identification did. Turning to the interactions 
between the two levels of identification, in the EU condition as ingroup identification 
increased and European identification decreased, relative respect decreased 
significantly -  but not significantly so when European identification was high. This 
again reflects the CIIM premise that a valued shared superordinate category can 
affect intersubgroup relations positively. In this instance, received respect was 
admittedly in the negative domain, but the negative effect of ingroup identification 
was counteracted to some degree by high European identification. This interaction 
was not found in the GB condition. It appears that here that the increase in ingroup 
identification and its negative impact on received respect is only marginally affected 
by the degree of British identification.
In summary, we see higher evaluative ingroup bias in the Welsh sample overall. 
Furthermore, this bias is mediated by the degree of ingroup identification within The 
EU, and by lower proximity-based relative prototypicality within Great Britain. We 
see higher allocation-based ingroup bias in the English sample overall, which they 
can justify on the basis of their greater size and higher power. We see evidence that 
evaluative ingroup bias is a function of ingroup identification, more so in the GB 
context than in the EU context. Also, it appears that, the higher ingroup
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identification, the lower the received respect. Additionally, we see that an esteemed 
superordinate category can improve intersubgroup relations (CIIM, IMSR). Finally, 
we have found evidence both supporting and conflicting with IPM.
There are many open questions remaining, of course, and four of the most pressing 
are presented here. Firstly, the three prototypicality measures were clearly 
interrelated, but can specifically the proximity-based relative prototypicality measure 
add a new, affective dimension to IPM? IPM is a cognition-driven model, but it is 
legitimate to question just how successfully can cognition alone account for 
intergroup relations without acknowledging the emotional dimension of identity. 
Secondly, there were strong associations between relative power and relative 
prototypicality in Study 2; why was this not the case in this study? Thirdly, why did 
relative power and relative fairness play no role in intersubgroup relations? Finally, 
why was there so little evidence of an association between perceived fairness and 
received respect?
Follow-up research is essential to look for answers to the above questions. 
Examining the three groups English, non-Welsh speaking Welsh and Welsh­
speaking Welsh would likely enhance our understanding of these specific 
intersubgroup relations under Great Britain and The EU, firstly on the dimensions of 
prototypicality, power and status, as well as on identity management strategies, but 
also perhaps to consider the intergroup relations in a tripartite model. Furthermore, 
the open-ended items in Study 1 provided a good general understanding of the 
content of the superordinate categories for the British and German samples, which in 
turn aided the process of bringing empirical findings into a social reality context.
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Contrasting the findings from Study 1 and 2 with the puzzling questions resulting 
from Study 3, it seems eminently sensible to include a qualitative component in a 
follow-up English-Welsh study. In this way, a better understanding of the content 
and meaning of each group’s social identities would allow for clearer interpretation 
of findings, which would then serve to inform model and theory enhancement. 
Finally, given a large enough sample size, the statistical way forward would be to 
extend tests, for example by performing pathway analysis. Thus it would be possible 
to examine the richness of data in a more ordered fashion, where a more rigorous 
model of intersubgroup relations might emerge.
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Chapter 6 General Discussion
The current studies provide evidence that specific types of group demonstrate 
specific types of ingroup bias, and specific groups draw on ingroup identification 
more than other groups. Certain types of superordinate category elicit more 
conflictual intersubgroup relations than others do. We also see relative 
prototypicality and relative power predicting ingroup bias in some cases, but not in 
others. These instances where we cannot generalize are understandable, not least 
when we consider that the social realities and the shared histories of the groups and 
their relationships to the superordinate groups have been acknowledged fully 
throughout. In short, patterns of ingroup bias seem to be determined by a diverse 
range of contextual factors and theoretical principles. We now attempt to extract 
some theoretical order from this complexity. In doing so, three summary tables are 
provided. Table 34 shows evidence supporting each of the four models of subgroup 
relations. Table 35 summarises the effects of power differentials on ingroup bias, and 
Table 36 the effects of the degree of ingroup and/or superordinate category 
identification on ingroup bias.
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Table 34: Summary of evidence supporting the four models of intersubgroup 
relations
High High High Direct Trait. Sim. Prox.
EU ID SC ID dual ID proto. proto. proto. proto.
Study 1
CIIM/ICM
Evaluative IGB S S S
IPM
Evaluative IGB - - -
Study 2
CIIM/ICM
Evaluative IGB ✓ V S ' -
A lloc.-based  IGB - S - -
IMSR
Evaluative IGB 
A lloc.-based  IGB _
- s
_
IPM 
Evaluative IGB - - s -
A lloc.-based  IGB - S - s
Study 3
CIIM/ICM
Evaluative IGB  
A lloc.-based  IGB 
R eceived respect
IMSR
Evaluative IGB  
A lloc.-based  IGB 
R eceived respect 
IPM  
Evaluative IGB  
A lloc.-based  IGB 
R eceived  respect
✓
✓ ✓ ✓
Note: EU ID =  European identification. SC ID = superordinate category identification. Dual ID 
identification with ingroup and superordinate category. Proto. =  prototypicality. : p  =  .08.
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Relative prototypicality
From a theoretical standpoint, the main focus of the thesis was to compare IPM 
(Mummendey & Wenzel, 1999) and its predictions with other models of subgroup- 
superordinate group relations, that is, with CIIM, ICM and IMSR. Some limited 
evidence was found to support IPM, but clearly not in every instance, and indeed, 
one case was identified where the reverse effect was found. It is necessary at this 
point to distinguish between correlational evidence (i.e. relative prototypicality and 
ingroup bias within national groups) and evidence of differences in ingroup bias 
between national groups as a function of relative prototypicality.
Summarizing correlations (see Table 34), in the EU context in Study 1 there were no 
associations between the more relatively prototypical group (Germans) and ingroup 
bias levels, and the less relatively prototypical group (British) showed higher ingroup 
bias -and here IPM offers no explanation. In Study 2 and consistent with IPM, 
higher relative prototypicality saw higher allocation-based ingroup bias in the 
British/EU condition43. Finally in Study 3, higher proximity- and trait-based 
prototypicality saw higher evaluative ingroup bias in the English/EU condition, and 
higher similarity-based prototypicality in the English/GB condition. These findings 
have been addressed in the relevant Discussion sections, and suffice it to summarise 
as follows. In Study 1, the lack of evidence to support IPM may be due to important 
contextual factors. In Study 2 and 3, we have correlational evidence to support IPM.
43 Here it should be noted that British scores on relative prototypicality and ingroup bias were below 
the midpoint (0), relative prototypicality significantly so. Nonetheless, the two measures did correlate 
positively at the .05 level, thus revealing the effect that higher relative prototypicality can have upon 
ingroup bias within the national group.
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Consistent with IPM, in Study 2 mediation analysis revealed that higher relative 
prototypicality in the German sample mediated allocation-based ingroup bias in the 
EU condition. Here the more relatively prototypical group (and also the more 
relatively powerful group) claim higher resources than the less relatively prototypical 
(and less relatively powerful) group. This brings into question if and how relative 
power and relative prototypicality might relate to each other (see Relative 
prototypicality and relative power below). However and contrary to IPM, in Study 3 
in the GB condition, English proximity-based relative prototypicality mediated 
evaluative ingroup bias such that higher relative prototypicality actually saw lower 
ingroup bias.
As discussed earlier, the proximity-measure may have induced feelings of inclusion 
or exclusion in participants. If a subgroup (here the Welsh) feels excluded from a 
superordinate category that is more inclusive of the other subgroup (here the 
English), then the response of increased evaluative ingroup bias is one way of 
responding to this threat to identity through social competition. Conversely, a 
subgroup (the English) that feels more included in the superordinate category may 
show more positive feelings to the less included group (the Welsh) in order to feel 
better about itself. Considering that IPM is cognition-driven and has focused to date 
on the higher relatively prototypical group, turning attention to more affective threats 
to identity deriving from lack of prototypicality may help develop the model further.
Furthermore in Study 1 and Study 2, ingroup projection was found in The EU 
context/condition, but not in the NATO context/condition. Here we turn to the nature 
of the superordinate categories and to IPM for a possible explanation. Firstly,
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German identification at the European level is higher than identification at the 
ingroup level (Wenzel et al., 2003). The EU is associated with identity threat for the 
British (Cinnirella, 1997), and added to this, introducing specifically Germany as a 
subgroup decreases European identification in British participants significantly 
(Rutland & Cinnirella, 2000). Thus asking British and German participants to think 
in terms of European identity means different things to each. The EU is likely to be 
salient for both, albeit for different reasons relating to their more negative and 
positive attitudes respectively.
On the other hand, NATO is far removed from and impinges less upon everyday life; 
the category is therefore less salient. Secondly, ingroup projection is more likely to 
occur under a clearly defined and simple prototype (such as The EU), and less likely 
when the prototype is unclear and complex (such as NATO) (Wenzel et al., 2003). 
Qualitative findings from Study 1 revealed that the NATO prototype is indeed 
unclear, whereas The EU prototype is relatively clearly defined. These differences 
between the representations of the prototypes can account for the lack of ingroup 
projection in the NATO context/condition. Moreover, qualitative analysis also
revealed that NATO poses no threat to its members, whereas The EU does. In their
\
presentation of possible types of prototype representations (i.e., clear or unclear, 
large or small scope, narrow or broad, simple or complex), Wenzel and colleagues 
noted that this list was a starting point. It is suggested here that threatening or non­
threatening might be a further possible dimension of the prototype.
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Relative power
Power differentials were acknowledged by the subgroups. In each study, the lower- 
power group demonstrated higher evaluative ingroup bias, although correlational 
evidence to support this was not found in every case (see Table 3544). In Study 2 and 
3, the higher-power group demonstrated higher allocation-based ingroup bias. (The 
higher-power group would possibly have shown allocation-based ingroup bias in 
Study 1 too, had the measure been included.) This pattern fully supports the notion of 
usable power (Ng, 1980, 1982). In other words, groups will show ingroup bias on a 
dimension that is (socially) realistically possible. Additionally, ‘outgroup 
favouritism’ was identified in the British sample in the EU condition (Study 2), 
where the group allocated more resources to Germany than to Great Britain. It was 
suggested that the outgroup favouritism encountered here cannot be accounted for by 
System Justification Theory (Jost & Banaji, 1994; Jost et al., 2004). Indeed, rather 
than accepting its relatively lower-power position in The EU (as System Justification 
Theory would claim), the British reject the superordinate category. Accepting EU 
funding may create an undesirable sense of obligation to The EU; refusing funding is 
therefore a means of psychologically distancing itself from the (unwelcome) 
superordinate category.
44 Since this is a general summary and for the sake of brevity, here the various measures of 
prototypicality are all subsumed under the single column prototypicality.
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Table 35: Summary of relationships between relative power, relative 
prototypicality and ingroup bias
Relative Power Eval. IGB Alloc. IGB Respect Fairness Prototypicality
Study 1
Germ an/EU
British/EU V  
(corr)
*
(m ed)
'jg
' ,vV ' A v  "  fcV'A,;/ /  0 C/  xU ; A< 4 1 C
*
(corr)
*
(corr)
Study 2
German/EU
British/EU
Germ an/NATO
British/NATO
(corr)
"T2
(m ed)
-
;
(med)
'T2
(m ed)
Study 3
English/EU -
(corr) (corr)
W elsh/EU * *
(corr) (corr)
English/G B *
(corr) (corr) (corr)
W elsh/G B 1s
(corr) (corr)
Note: IGB =  ingroup bias. corr. =  correlations, med = mediation. =  positive relationship/increase. 
'I' =  inverse relationship/decrease. l: p  = .0 8 .2: Sob el’s test; p  < . 1 1 . 3: SobePs test; p  = .08.
There were no correlations between relative power and ingroup bias in the NATO 
context/condition -  just as there were no correlations between relative prototypicality 
and ingroup bias. Turning to mediation analysis (see Table 35), relative power 
mediated evaluative ingroup bias in the EU context (Study 1). The higher evaluative 
ingroup bias shown by the British is explained by its lack o f  power. This is nicely 
contrasted in the EU condition in Study 2, where the higher allocation-based ingroup 
bias shown by the Germans is explained by its high power.
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Based on mean scores, we also see evidence of the more relatively powerful group 
liking the less relatively powerful group (i.e. lower evaluative ingroup bias), 
especially when the superordinate category is salient, that is, in Study 2 in the EU 
condition and in Study 3 in the GB condition. This noblesse oblige effect has been 
identified in previous studies. Sachdev and Bourhis (1985) suggest that the more 
powerful group demonstrates this ‘benevolent paternalism’ because it can afford to. 
This is a likely explanation for the noblesse oblige demonstrated by the English 
towards the Welsh, where England clearly ‘rules the Great British roost’. Spears et 
al. (2001) add that the more powerful group will show its generosity to the less 
powerful group when that generosity costs no loss of status. This could account for 
both Germans’ positive attitudes to the British and English positive attitudes to the 
Welsh. Recent research (Vanbeslaere et al., 2006) has added a further dimension to 
this line of research; the noblesse oblige effect may not so much depend on the 
degree of power that the ingroup has over the outgroup, but the degree of power the 
ingroup has over itself. The more the ingroup is in control of its power position and 
its fate, the more secure it feels. Due to its secure position, the noblesse oblige effect 
may occur out of a sense of social responsibility. England’s position in Great Britain 
is certainly very secure, Germany’s position in The EU perhaps less so. In these 
studies, we can only speculate whether lower evaluative ingroup bias scores were 
compounded by a sense of social responsibility.
Relative prototypicality and relative power
The question arose regarding the relationship between relative prototypicality and 
relative power, where both mediated allocation-based ingroup bias to some degree
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(Study 2, EU condition; see Table 35). Principal component analysis showed these to 
be two distinct constructs. It was found that relative prototypicality mediated relative 
power in the EU condition, and relative power mediated relative prototypicality in 
the NATO condition. To explain these asymmetrical scores, the nature of the two 
national groups and their relationships to the superordinate categories were 
considered.
In the EU condition, the Germans’ claim to higher relative power was founded on 
(i.e. mediated to some degree by) their claim to higher relative prototypicality. 
Openly demonstrating power is a very sensitive issue in Germany. The EU embraces 
multicultural diversity and social inclusion, and these values mirror Germans’ 
perceptions of what is ‘right and fair’. Thus by being prototypical of such an 
organisation, the group may legitimately claim higher relative power, and remain 
politically correct when doing so. If this interpretation is correct, this would lend 
support to Turner’s (2005) three-process theory of power, viz. the process of group 
formation (a social identification/self-categorization process) can lead to power, 
which informs the ability to control resources.
In contrast, the British associate the power-driven organisation of NATO with the 
USA, the dominating NATO member. The USA has the power to define NATO 
norms. Great Britain enjoys a ‘special relationship’ with the USA and, with it, 
‘power by proxy’ -  or at least proximity. It is this power that enables the British (i.e. 
mediates to some degree) to feel so relatively prototypical of NATO. If this 
interpretation is correct, this would contradict Turner’s (2005) three-process theory
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of power, viz. the ability to control resources can lead to feelings of power, which 
inform group processes and social identification.
It would require further research to test whether these interpretations of the power- 
prototypicality relationships per se can be extended to other subgroup-superordinate 
groups. Added to this, the conflicting findings in the causal relationship between 
prototypicality and power relations seem to both question and support Turner’s 
(2005) theory. As he himself states, we must look to historical facts and social 
realities to explain relationships, and it may be that these two specific groups and 
these two superordinate categories have shown the necessity of doing so, at the same 
time providing a set of natural groups where the direction of causality might be 
investigated further.
Relative fairness (legitimacy)
Study 3 additionally investigated the role of the perceived (il-)legitimacy of relations. 
Both groups agreed that the Welsh are treated less fairly than the English both within 
Great Britain and within The EU. However, these perceptions had no effects on 
ingroup bias levels. Given that research from the start of social identity research until 
the present day shows that legitimacy can have a profound effect on intersubgroup 
relations, the lack of findings here seems odd. One can only speculate why this might 
be. It could be that the measures employed were inadequate. It could also be that 
English-Welsh relations and inequalities between the two sub-groups are so long­
standing, that both groups do not question the legitimacy of the status quo. For 
example, it could be that the English sample are aware of the inequality between the
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groups, but feel secure and unchallenged in their higher-power position; ingroup bias 
is therefore not necessary.
Identification and ingroup bias
Also central to these studies were the degrees of identification at ingroup and at 
superordinate category level. This line of questioning had, of course, served to 
examine the identity-driven models of subgroup-superordinate group relations CIIM 
(Gaertner & Dovidio, 2000), IMSR (Hornsey & Hogg, 2000a) and, to a lesser 
degree, ICM (Brown & Hewstone, 20005, see also Hewstone & Brown, 1986). In a 
nutshell, the degree of ingroup identification and its effects on ingroup bias levels 
were apparent throughout. Effects of superordinate category identification on 
ingroup bias were also identified, but in a few instances only. Finally, interactions 
between the two levels of identification were considered. A general summary of 
findings are given in Table 36.
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Table 36: Summary of findings on the roles of ingroup and superordinate group
identification in ingroup bias
E v a lu a t iv e  in g r o u p  b ia s
Stu d y  1 British G erm an
Ingroup ID T T
EU ID nI' 4/
Stu d y  2 B ritish G erm an
E U N A T O E U N A TO
Ingroup ID * T - -
EU ID - -
SC ID si' - - -
Dual ID sU T
S tudy 3 E nglish W elsh
GB E U GB E U
Ingroup ID T - Is T
SC ID - - - sh
A llo c a t io n - b a s e d  in g r o u p  b ia s
B ritish G erm an
E U N A T O E U N A T O
-
4/
- -
- -
E nglish Welsh
G B E U GB E U
T - - -
- - - 4/
Note: "Ts show s increase in ingroup bias. 4 / show s decrease in ingroup bias. Shaded areas refer to 
national groups, irrespective o f  condition.
Based on correlations, generally, as ingroup identification increased, so did ingroup 
bias with few exceptions45. Generally, there were no associations between the degree 
o f superordinate category identification and ingroup bias (indeed, these would not 
generally be expected, although this varies from one theory to another). In two o f the 
three instances where there were associations (British/NATO evaluative ingroup 
bias: Wales/EU, evaluative and allocation-based ingroup bias), then as superordinate
4? N o correlations betw een the two were found in the German sample in Study 2. In Study 3 in the EU  
condition, the degree o f  ingroup identification was not associated with ingroup bias in the English  
sample.
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category identification increased, ingroup bias decreased (with one exception46). This 
is consistent with the predictions of CUM.
Mediation analyses revealed that the degree of ingroup identification indirectly 
affected ingroup bias scores47 (Study 3, see Table 36). Here the Welsh sample 
demonstrated higher evaluative ingroup bias than the English did. These 
unfavourable attitudes to the outgroup were mediated by the degree of ingroup 
identification, but in the EU condition only. In other words, further away from home 
(the EU condition), attitudes to the English are not necessarily so unfavourable as 
they are at home (the GB condition); the decisive factor is the degree of Welsh 
ingroup identification.
Simple slope analyses examined ingroup bias as a function of the interaction between 
ingroup and superordinate category identification. The purpose of these analyses was 
to test three claims. On the one hand, IPM claims that high dual identifiers show 
highest ingroup bias. On the other hand, IMSR claims that high dual identification 
can improve intersubgroup relations, and CUM claims that higher superordinate 
category identification can improve intersubgroup relations. No interactions were 
found with regards to allocation-based ingroup bias. Here it seems more likely that 
power differentials between groups and not differences in ingroup identification will 
impact upon this form of social competition.
46 In Study 2 in the NATO condition, as superordinate category identification increased in the German 
sample, so did evaluative ingroup bias.
47 Also, although the pathway between national group and ingroup bias was not significant in Study 1, 
the indirect effects of the degree of ingroup identification drove British ingroup bias considerably.
Page 226
As expected, simple slope analyses revealed that the degree of identification (at one 
or both levels) can impact upon evaluative ingroup bias (see Table 36), which 
underlines Tajfel’s (1978) proposal that the degree of ingroup identification involves 
a strong affective component. The emotional significance of the group revealed itself 
again, when it was seen that relative respect (an affective response) was also a 
function of (dual) identification.
It is necessary to distinguish between the findings from Study 2 (where superordinate 
category identification was based on the evaluative component of social identity 
only) and Study 3 (where superordinate category identification encompassed the 
factors ingroup ties and ingroup affect (Cameron, 2004)). In Study 2, support for 
IPM was found, where high German dual identifiers demonstrated the highest level 
of evaluative ingroup bias. In Study 3 however, support was found for CIIM. When 
British or European identification increased, this did help ‘limit the damage’ of 
increasing ingroup identification and its negative impact on evaluative ingroup bias.
This ‘damage limitation’ effect was also observed on relative respect. In the EU 
condition, where the subgroups share a broad and therefore less restrictive 
superordinate category, for high ingroup identifiers, high European identification saw 
only a minimal decrease in received respect. In contrast, low and medium European 
identification saw a significant decrease in received respect. In the GB condition, 
where the subgroups share a narrow and therefore more restrictive superordinate 
category, for high ingroup identifiers, the degree of British identification played no 
role in the degree of received respect.
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Received respect
In the broadest of terms, then, the degree of ingroup identification was central to 
handing out (evaluative ingroup bias) and receiving (received respect) affective bias. 
Simultaneously, it was seen that an esteemed shared superordinate category can help 
improve intersubgroup relations. But how? Respect (introduced in Study 3) might be 
a viable starting point. In contrast to the other two measures of ingroup bias, received 
respect examined the degree to which a sub-group might be the target of (negative) 
bias.
There were limitations to this measure, both planned and unplanned. No distinctions 
were made between the dimensions of respect, and the source of respect was the 
superordinate category only. Additionally and as well as the modest sample size 
within cell, it cannot be ruled out that the self-reported degree of received respect 
might be a means of enhancing self-presentation in the higher power group, and a 
reactive response in the lower power group. Given this host of limitations, caution is 
called for in the following interpretation and suggestion.
Received respect and relative power correlated positively across both national groups 
and conditions. In Study 2, relative power mediated allocation-based ingroup bias, 
but not evaluative ingroup bias. In Study 3, ingroup identification mediated 
evaluative ingroup bias, but not allocation-based ingroup bias. We see therefore a 
connection between (a) power and the behavioural form of social competition, (b) 
identification and the less tangible, attitudinal form of social competition and (c) 
between affect (respect) and behaviour (power). Might therefore respect provide a
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link between power (and the ingroup bias it produces) and ingroup identification 
(and the ingroup bias it produces)?
The way(s) forward
Based on the findings from these studies, two ways forward are suggested. The first 
remains with ingroup projection research and how this might be developed further. 
The second concerns the contributions of CIIM, ICM and IMSR and, grounded in the 
data, weighs up how these models have faired with the samples in this study series. 
The three models are considered in terms of the naturally occurring large-scale 
groups. What are the implications of the findings here and how might they be applied 
profitably in real-life terms?
IPM
In these studies, support for EPM was inconsistent. Ingroup projection did occur (if 
only in a few instances) and there was evidence to suggest that high dual identifiers 
show the highest level of ingroup bias (if only in one case). Furthermore, the 
conditions that have been suggested as necessary for ingroup projection to occur are 
still too numerous, and these clearly need to be narrowed down. Indeed, one might 
sometimes question whether the predicted increase in ingroup bias is, in fact, 
attributable solely to ingroup projection, or whether ingroup projection is a ‘by­
product’, that is, a latent variable. Nonetheless, IPM is still a relatively young model 
(Mummendey & Wenzel, 1999), and given the support that was found here, 
dismissing IPM as a viable explanation for subgroup-superordinate group relations 
would be hasty. Four points come to mind.
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Firstly, the proximity-based measure of relative prototypicality (that is, not the 
‘traditional’ trait-based measure generally employed) might very well have induced 
an affective response. This may conflict somewhat with the cognitive-perceptual 
processes normally associated with SCT upon which IPM is based, but it may also be 
that IPM would be enhanced by integrating some of the affective processes relating 
to social identity. Indeed, just how well can a cognitive model explain ingroup bias 
in social groups, where, as we know, it is those ingroup members who attach higher 
emotional significance to their group that show higher levels of ingroup bias. If a 
model needs to bend as may be the case with IPM, it must.
This leads to the second point. The links found between relative prototypicality and 
relative power warrant further investigation. As documented by the asymmetrical 
partial mediation in the NATO and EU conditions (Study 2), prototypicality and 
power appear to co-operate; the nature of the superordinate category may determine 
which of the two is the driving force. As discussed earlier, Turner (2005) has 
recently questioned the direction of cause and effect between social identification 
(and, by implication, prototypicality) and power. By administering a measure of 
relative prototypicality, the study produced evidence for both the standard theory and 
the three-process theory of power. This in itself was a very interesting finding that 
should be investigated further.
Thirdly, attempts to examine legitimacy in this thesis bore little fruit. However, the 
research into the effects of legitimacy and relative prototypicality on ingroup bias 
(Weber et al., 2002) produced promising findings, and this line of evidence is worthy 
of further investigation. Given the weakness of the legitimacy measure employed in
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Study 3, yet given Weber and colleagues’ findings, possible interactions between 
legitimacy and prototypicality are worthy of further investigation.
Fourthly and importantly, qualitative evidence from Study 1 showed that the 
representation of the prototype may play a key role in ingroup projection, as 
suggested by Waldzus et al. (2003). A prototype that emerged was that of threatening 
or not threatening -  but threatening to identity (again, an affective element). 
Similarly, the qualitative findings from Mols and colleagues (Mols et al., 
unpublished manuscript; Mols & Haslam, in press) demonstrated clearly the 
enrichment that, for example, in-depth interviews can add to our understanding of the 
beliefs and motivations underlying identity management from a multi-layered 
perspective. Against the backdrop of IPM, it is not unlikely that such techniques 
would reveal further, category-dependent prototypes. Admittedly, then 
operationalizing the representation of the superordinate category in an experimental 
setting is a difficult challenge, and this is even more so the case with real-life groups. 
However, this two-step methodological approach might serve to develop the Ingroup 
Projection Model further.
CUM, ICM and IMSR
Evidence has been presented in support of CIIM (assimilation and recategorization), 
whereby CIIM integrates ICM (pluralism) ‘en route\ Additionally, according to 
IMSR, assimilation and pluralism are on a continuum and dual identification does 
not necessarily have to come at the cost of the degree of ingroup identification 
(Hornsey & Hogg, 2000a). None of these models, then, is mutually exclusive of the
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others. Furthermore, all three acknowledge social reality constraints; natural groups 
bring with them their own perceptions of what is.
There is, therefore, no definitive model for successful intersubgroup relations. It may 
be that the ICM approach is a first step towards improving intersubgroup relations, 
and this ‘solution’ may be the most viable for some natural subgroups. In other 
settings, recategorization (CIIM) may work equally well or over time, and dual 
categorization (IMSR) is a further possibility. (It is also reasonable to assume that 
some subgroups, perhaps driven by overriding social or political agendas, would not 
want to get closer to the superordinate category or other subgroups -  but that is a 
different story.)
Turning to the evidence that has emerged from these studies, we can make 
generalisations pertaining to (a) specific superordinate categories, (b) specific 
national groups, and (c) specific forms of ingroup bias. The essential task here is 
superimposing identification levels onto these patterns, and then to relate these back 
to the three models. One contextual factor, however, needs to be considered when 
doing so; power. The reader may, at this stage, like to refer back to Table 34 - Table 
36.
(A): Underlining the notion that the nature of the superordinate group can mediate 
intersubgroup relations, relations were more favourable overall under NATO than 
under The EU or Great Britain. This is unsurprising, because NATO presence may 
go almost unnoticed by its subgroups. The following generalisations therefore 
exclude the NATO data. (B) and (C): Germans (higher in power) overall showed
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higher allocation-based ingroup bias (see Table 35). The British (lower in power) 
overall showed higher evaluative ingroup bias. Power differentials did not impact 
upon ingroup bias in the Welsh or English cohorts. From this we can conclude that 
power differentials may play a role in some subgroup-superordinate group 
constellations, but not in others.
Focusing now on the general summary presented in Table 34, we see quite consistent 
evidence of the inverse relationship between identification at a higher level of 
inclusiveness and ingroup bias. There is less evidence to support IMSR directly, but 
the general trend speaks nonetheless for higher superordinate category bringing with 
it a more favourable intersubgroup relationship.
Table 36 offers a more detailed overview, and here we can consider additionally the 
influence of the degree of ingroup identification. In line with much past research, 
finding confirmed that ingroup bias is more prominent in higher ingroup identifiers 
than in lower ingroup identifiers. We also see that higher ingroup identification leads 
to higher evaluative ingroup bias, but generally not to higher allocation-based 
ingroup bias (which, as stated earlier, may be a reflection of perceived power and 
demonstrations of ingroup bias in a way that is realistic and viable). Table 36 also 
allows us to see at a glance the influence of the degree of superordinate group 
identification. With just one exception, identification at the superordinate level saw 
either a decrease in ingroup bias, or no increase in ingroup bias. Thus we can 
conclude that it is the degree of ingroup identification that is most likely to influence 
intersubgroup relations negatively, and as proposed by CIIM, ICM and IMSR,
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identifying at a higher level of inclusiveness can improve these relations 
significantly.
Before considering these findings in real-life terms, two factors warrant discussion. 
These are legitimacy and respect. Each of these were measured in Study 3, and 
findings were disappointing. As far as the perceived (il)legitimacy of relations is 
concerned, it is inexplicable why no effect of legitimacy was found here. Given that 
a wealth of research has shown that illegitimate relations are more likely to promote 
conflict between subgroups, it can only be concluded here that the measure 
administered failed to tap into this adequately. Respect, on the other hand, has not yet 
received the amount of attention that il(legitimacy) has, and for this reason it is 
disappointing that Study 3 had nothing to contribute to this line of research. 
However, based on findings from others (e.g., Branscombe, Spears, Ellemers & 
Doosje, 2002; Eggins et al., 2002; Huo & Molina, 2006; Lipponen & Leskinen, 
2006; O’Brien, Haslam, Jetten, Humphrey, O’Sullivan, Postmes, et al., 2004; Platow, 
Brewer & Eggins, 2007; Voltmer & Lalljee, 2003) and on common sense, respect is 
included in the proposal below as a further means to promoting intersubgroup 
harmony.
Most evidence, then, points to pluralism and/or assimilation or dual identification 
(i.e. this continuum) as a means of reducing intersubgroup conflict. In social reality 
terms, there will generally be differences in perceived power between subgroups. For 
example, the Welsh lack of power in Great Britain is likely founded on fact; the 
British lack of power in The EU is not. Also there may be a shared past between 
groups that is historically one of tension and dislike, as may be the case in British
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attitudes to Germans and Germany, and Welsh attitudes to the English and England. 
Furthermore, a superordinate category may be perceived as a threat to ingroup 
distinctiveness, which is the case possibly in British-EU and Welsh-British relations. 
Grounded in the data and irrespective o f (national) subgroup, the question is, then, 
how to promote identification at a higher level? The way of doing this depends on the 
social realities of the subgroups, that is, is not irrespective o f (national) subgroup.
Especially considering that high ingroup identification per se is a great stumbling 
block to overcome ingroup bias, it seems clear that any attempts to exact of subgroup 
members that they relinquish some of their uniqueness is not viable in most cases -  
nor indeed should it be necessary. As we have also seen, the perceived nature of the 
superordinate group (its scope, its values and beliefs, its policies, the other subgroups 
it includes etc.) can mediate relations between its subgroup members, and it is 
therefore fair to place much onus on the higher level group to create and maintain an 
environment where subgroups (particularly lower-status groups) can feel valued and 
appreciated. It must be seen to show social responsibility and a sense of obligation, 
and not simply viewed as the ‘grey eminence’ exhibiting demonstrations of power. 
Nonetheless, if a superordinate category needs to intervene should a higher-status 
subgroup attempt to discriminate against a lower-status subgroup, it should and must 
be prepared do so, especially when this entails challenging a powerful subgroup. It 
should, then, lead by example.
There appear to be two scenarios, each of which brings its own set of dilemmas; 
emerging superordinate categories and established superordinate categories. The 
former case can be found regularly in an organisational setting. Here there is the
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opportunity to set the rules and norms expected of subgroups, but it is unfortunate 
that the focus during merger processes is often more on profit (and possibly down­
sizing) than on addressing the psychological needs of the workforce(s). As has been 
demonstrated (Eggins et al., 2002; O’Brien, Haslam, Jetten, Humphrey, O’Sullivan, 
Postmes, et al., 2004; Platow, Brewer & Eggins, 2007), much can be done to produce 
an environment conducive to staff welfare, which in turn can be translated into later 
financial gain. The keywords here are voice, involvement, and a consultative and 
democratic approach. Grounded in a bottom-up approach, intersubgroup contact 
should be encouraged before decision-making processes are announced; it is here 
that the strength of mutual inter(sub)group differentiation can bear fruit.
In the case where an existing superordinate category hosts subgroups in conflict, 
changing attitudes is naturally a difficult undertaking. Added to this, of course, is the 
question whether the superordinate category itself seeks to be democratic and fair (as 
is more likely the case with The EU), or whether it is dependent upon and influenced 
by a higher-status, main-stream subgroup (as is more likely the case with Great 
Britain). In line with the proposal for emerging superordinate categories presented 
above, if the institution is indeed attempting to treat subgroups fairly, then it should 
be seen to do so, but also seen to endorse inappropriate behaviour from deviant 
subgroups.
Finally we consider the nature of the subgroups involved. Despite the argumentation 
that the superordinate category carries the responsibility for promoting good 
intersubgroup relations, this is not absolute. A subgroup will and can seek to take 
ownership of the higher level group (e.g. England and Great Britain; relative
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prototypicality), and this may be regarded by other subgroups as illegitimate and 
unfair. In contrast, if we consider here The EU, its policies of democracy and fairness 
have not necessarily been internalised by the British in general -  hence the 
Euroscepticism encountered in many citizens. What we see here is a superordinate 
category not necessarily ‘doing the right thing’ (Great Britain) and a superordinate 
category attempting to ‘do the right thing’ (The EU), which in both cases lead to 
discontent amongst some subgroups. Here creativity is called for, and it is essential 
to give (lower-status) subgroups the support the support they need, and the only way 
to establish their needs is to ask them. A bottom-up approach and open 
communication channels are therefore essential. In this vein, it is interesting to note 
that, when articulating their attitudes to The EU, regional politicians (i.e. a group 
with a more informed opinion of The EU than average citizens) spoke more of the 
fact that The EU recognises Welsh regional identity and less that The EU funds 
Wales as an Objective One area (Mols et al., unpublished manuscript). Here we see 
that subgroup needs are best assessed by the subgroup itself.
In conclusion, it is hoped that these studies have contributed to social identity 
research in general, and more specifically to testing the mechanisms involved in 
intersubgroup relations. It is unfortunate that attempts to examine il(legitimacy) and 
respect were unsuccessful, but this failing is very likely due to inadequacies in the 
implementation of these measures. As well as findings on power and prototypicality, 
there seems to be clear evidence showing the negative impact that high ingroup 
identification can have on subgroup relations, and the positive impact that high 
superordinate group identification can have on (improving) intersubgroup relations. 
Translating these findings into real-life terms, we see here specifically a contribution
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that may be integrated into research on national identity, which can in turn inform 
social and public policy making, multiculturalism, citizenship and multi-level 
governance. We further believe that these findings can be considered in the realm of 
organisational psychology, especially in view of the ever-increasing popularity of 
mergers, out-sourcing and restructuring/lean management.
Nonetheless, we must return to respect. Respect may not be the Holy Grail, but it is 
suggested here that it (alongside empowerment, voice, and engagement) can be a 
powerful tool to limit the damage to group self-esteem that lower-status groups may 
encounter, and simultaneously it can ensure that higher-status groups do not devalue 
(or even seek to dehumanise) lower-status groups. It is the function of the 
superordinate category to facilitate this.
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Appendix I to Study 1 
1-1 Ethics Approval
PSYCHOLOGY
DEPARTMENT
ETHICS COMMITTEE
Memo
To: Christine Dobbs
From: Professor DavidClark, Chair of Departmental Ethics Committee 
Date: 28th September, 2004“
Re: European Perceptions (Pilot Study leading up to Study 2 in Doctorate Thesis)
Members of the departmental Ethics Committee have now reviewed the above study and 
agree that it raises no substantive ethical issues, provided the information obtained from the 
questionnaires is kept absolutely confidential and that no personally identifiable information is 
entered on computer. You may therefore proceed with your study.
A copy of this memo together with a copy of your Ethics Application Form and Risk 
Assessment Form should^be included in the final version of your thesis.
•  P a g e  2
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1-2 Form of Consent (English)
Dear Participant
I am a PhD student at the Department of Psychology at the University of Wales Swansea. 
My main area of interest looks at European perceptions; how we feel about country, our 
European neighbours, and what living in Europe means to us personally.
This is one of two documents you have received via e-mail. This document is a form of 
consent, and I would ask you to tick the box below stating that you kindly agree to take part 
in this study. It is only when I receive your consent that I may examine your responses 
within this study.
The second document is the actual questionnaire. You will read a series of questions, and I 
would ask you to answer them in the order that they appear and on-screen. You will be asked 
to write down some of your thoughts in two instances, and in most other cases you will be 
asked to place a cross in the appropriate box. Filling in the questionnaire should take no 
longer than 25 minutes.
If you agree to take part in this study, your questionnaire will remain entirely anonymous. 
Your consent form will be printed out and then deleted. In other words, there will be no link 
between yourself and your responses. All data collected are treated with confidentiality and 
used only within the framework of this thesis and any resulting publications.
Please remember:
-  Participation is entirely voluntary
-  There are no right or wrong answers
-  You are free to break off your participation at any time
If you agree to participate, please give your informed consent by placing an “X” in the box 
below, typing in the date and then <SAVE> the file. Then please open the next document 
and fill in your answers on screen. When you have completed the study, please mail both 
documents back to me in one e-mail.
Thank you very much for your participation.
Christine Dobbs
Department of Psychology, University of Wales Swansea 
Tel:++44-1792-513140
E-mail: Christine.dobbs@ntlworld.com or 182177@swan.ac.uk
By placing an “X” in this box 
Please type the date: dd.mm.yy
I agree to participate in this study.
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1-3 Instruction Sheet and Questionnaire (English)
European Perceptions
We live in a European democracy, and our government makes decisions on our behalf. Some 
decisions which are in national interest concern our degree of involvement with other nations 
-  for example trading agreements, common policies to protect the environment and issues of 
security and defence. Recently, psychologists have become very interested in how citizens 
feel about the various degrees of involvement with other nations, and we would like to 
explore this issue in this study. In the following questionnaire we will be asking you as a 
British person about your perceptions of living in Europe.
When you complete this questionnaire, it is very important that you answer the questions in 
the order they come. Also please remember there are no right or wrong answers. We are 
interested in your own feelings and personal opinions. Try to answer the questions without 
too much deliberation. Past studies suggest that our initial responses are likely the better 
responses. We would also appreciate it if you could be honest in your responses. We assure 
you again that your responses are entirely anonymous.
Instructions on how to fill out the questionnaire
The questionnaire can be filled out on your screen, i.e. printing this document is NOT 
required. Please make sure you have SAVED this document (e.g. to the desktop) and then 
fill in as required. For ease of reading, please make sure you have selected <Print Layout> 
from the <View> option, and that the formatting marks are not visible.
Please take time to read this sheet carefully.
You will be asked a series of questions. For all questions a box is provided for your answers. 
Just click on the box to type in your answer. Very often you will be given a range of 
numbers to choose from when you answer a question. To show you what we mean, below is 
an example in which the respondent has typed her answer into the box, and here she agrees 
(6) with the statement.
Strongly
disagree
Disagree Tend to 
disagree
Neither agree 
nor disagree
Tend to 
agree
Agree Strongly
agree
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
Keeping fit is important to me.
When you have completed the questionnaire, please <save> the file. Please <send> the questionnaire 
together with the form of consent to:
Christine.dobbs@ntlworld.com
or
182177@swan.ac.uk
Again, many thanks for your cooperation! It is greatly appreciated.
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W e’d like to start by asking you about your opinions concerning NATO. When you answer 
the question below, please write down b r ie f ly  and c le a r ly  what spontaneously comes to 
mind. W e’re certainly not interested in your writing style nor in the amount you write -  just try 
to write clearly and briefly what comes to mind. Remember there are no right or wrong 
responses, as these are your own personal feelings and opinions. ____
When you think of NATO, what things spring to mind? For example, you might like to write 
down some things that you associate with NATO, or things that you personally find a good 
thing or a bad thing about NATO.
Please write your response here:
Please read the following statement and write in the box the number that best reflects your 
o p i n i o n . ____________ ________________ ______________________________________
Strongly
disagree
Disagree Tend to 
disagree
Neither agree 
nor disagree
Tend to 
agree
Agree Strongly
agree
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
In general, NATO conjures up a positive image for me.
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Next we’d like you to read a short text about NATO. When you’ve read it, please continue
with the questionnaire.
In January 1948, the United Kingdom (that is, Great Britain and Northern Ireland) proposed 
a form of Western Union between five European countries, and this union -  the Brussels 
Treaty Powers -  was established later that year. At the same time, Canada and the United 
States began negotiations on the North Atlantic Treaty with the Brussels Treaty Powers. In 
1949 the treaty was signed by twelve countries, including Great Britain. The former Federal 
Republic of Germany (West Germany) became an official member in May, 1955.
At its foundation, then, NATO comprised twelve member states. Today, the North Atlantic 
Treaty Organisation is an alliance of 26 countries from North America and Europe. The 26 
member countries retain their full sovereignty. All NATO decisions are taken jointly by the 
member countries on the basis of consensus. Of these 26 members, both Great Britain and 
Germany are represented in the most important decision making bodies.
The fundamental role of NATO is to safeguard the freedom and security of its member 
countries by political and military means. It safeguards the Allies common values of 
democracy, individual liberty, the rule of law and the peaceful resolution of disputes.
Please answer the following questions by writing your response in the appropriate box. You 
may, of course, refer back to the text if you w ant_____________________________________
Do NATO member states retain their full sovereignty? Yes/No
Has Great Britain or Germany been a NATO member longer?
How many countries are members of NATO today?
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Next, please read the following statements and place the number which best reflects your 
opinion in the box next to each statement. The scale ranges from 1 (strongly disagree) to 7 
(strongly agree).
Strongly
disagree
D isagree Tend to 
disagree
Neither agree 
nor disagree
Tend to 
agree
Agree Strongly
agree
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
Membership in NATO is a good thing for Great Britain.
Taking everything into consideration, Great Britain has on balance 
benefited from being a member of NATO.
In general, NATO conjures up a negative image for me.
Great Britain has a lot in common with NATO.
Germany has a lot in common with NATO.
Great Britain is a strong member in NATO.
Germany is a strong member in NATO.
Great Britain is a very good example of a typical NATO member state. 
Germany is a very good example of a typical NATO member state. 
Great Britain has a powerful influence on NATO decisions.
Germany has a powerful influence on NATO decisions.
I regard Great Britain as a typical NATO member state.
I regard Germany as a typical NATO member state.
A strong NATO makes for a strong Great Britain.
A strong NATO makes for a strong Germany.
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Moving on, we’d like to know a little more about your opinions concerning the European 
Union. Please answer the question below, writing down briefly and clearly what 
spontaneously comes to mind. Remember there are no right or wrong responses, as these 
are your own personal feelings and opinions.
When you think of the European Union, what things spring to mind? For example, you might 
like to write down some things that you associate with the European Union, or things that 
you personally find a good thing or a bad thing about the European Union.
Please write your response here:
Please read the following statement and write in the box the number that best reflects your 
opinion.    ____________________ _______
Strongly
disagree
Disagree Tend to 
disagree
Neither agree 
nor disagree
Tend to 
agree
Agree Strongly
agree
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
In general, the European Union conjures up a positive image for me.
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Next we’d like you to read a short text about the European Union. When you’ve read it,
please continue with the questionnaire.
The European Union was bom out of the European Coal and Steel Community formed in 
1951 by six European countries including Germany. In 1957 two further Communities were 
created (EURATOM and EEC), and ten years later all three were merged. The United 
Kingdom (that is, Great Britain and Northern Ireland) joined in 1973. By 1992 there were 10 
members, new forms of co-operation between the member state governments were 
introduced and the European Union (EU) was created.
Today, the European Union comprises 25 countries from Eastern and Western Europe. 
Member States have set up common institutions to which they delegate some of their 
sovereignty so that decisions on specific matters of joint interest can be made democratically 
at a European level. Each country has a certain number of votes which roughly reflects its 
population. Holding 29 votes each, Great Britain and Germany are two of the four countries 
with the highest number of votes.
The EU deals with many subjects, including ensuring freedom and security. It is now 
increasingly involved in creating stability in neighbouring countries, and it is developing its 
common foreign and security policy, with plans for more co-operation between members on 
defence questions.
Please answer the following questions by writing your response in the appropriate box. You 
may, of course, refer back to the text if you want. ________ _______________________
Do EU member states retain their full sovereignty? Yes/No
Has Great Britain or Germany been a member of the EU longer?
How many countries are members of the EU today?
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Next, please read the following statements and place the number which best reflects your 
opinion in the box next to each statement. The scale ranges from 1 (strongly disagree) to 7 
(strongly agree).
Strongly
disagree
D isagree Tend to 
disagree
Neither agree 
nor disagree
Tend to 
agree
Agree Strongly
agree
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
Membership in the EU is a good thing for Great Britain.
Taking everything into consideration, Great Britain has on balance 
benefited from being a member of the EU.
In general, the EU conjures up a negative image for me.
Great Britain has a lot in common with the EU.
Germany has a lot in common with the EU.
Great Britain is a strong member in the EU.
Germany is a strong member in the EU.
Great Britain is a very good example of a typical EU member state. 
Germany is a very good example of a typical EU member state. 
Great Britain has a powerful influence on EU decisions.
Germany has a powerful influence on EU decisions.
I regard Great Britain as a typical EU member state.
I regard Germany as a typical EU member state.
A strong EU makes for a strong Great Britain.
A strong EU makes for a strong Germany.
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Now we’re interested in learning more about your attitudes towards four groups. We’d like 
you to use the thermometer ratings listed on the right in order to indicate your attitudes 
towards these groups. For example, a rating of 50° C would indicate that your feelings 
towards that particular group are neither favourable nor unfavourable. You may give any 
number between 0 and 100. Please be honest. Remember that your answers are strictly 
confidential.
My attitude towards Great Britain is °C.
My attitude towards NATO is °C.
My attitude towards the European Union is °C.
My attitude towards Germany is °C.
ro Favourable 100c90c
80c
70c
60c
50c
40c
30c
20c
10c
Unfavourable 0°
Extremely favourable
Very favourable
Quite favourable
Fairly favourable
Slightly favourable
Neither favourable nor unfavourable
Slightly unfavourable
Fairly unfavourable
Quite unfavourable
Very unfavourable
Extremely unfavourable
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Please look at the following pairs. For example, we’d like you to think about which goals and 
values you think are important for Great Britain and about the goals and values you think are 
important for NATO. If you compare these, how similar do you think they are? To answer, 
please place an “X” in one of the seven boxes ranging from very dissimilar to very similar. To 
show you what we mean, we’ve provided two examples below. _________________________
I think the goals and values of the following pairs are:
shop steward - managing director very dissimilar
Green Party member -  organic farmer very dissim ilar
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
X
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
X
very similar
very similar
Please now provide your ratings for the pairs listed below:
I think the goals and values of the following pairs are:
Great Britain - NATO very dissim ilar
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
very similar
Great Britain -  the European Union very dissim ilar
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
very similar
Great Britain -  Germany very dissim ilar
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
very similar
Germany -  NATO very dissim ilar
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
very similar
Germany -  the European Union very dissim ilar
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
very similar
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Please indicate in the box below which of these four pictures (A, B, C or D) in your opinion
best reflects how Great Britain and Germany are linked to NATO.
NATO
G reat
B ritain
NATO
Great
Britain
NATO
NATO
G reat
Britain
Box. |~ | best reflects how Great Britain and Germany are linked to NATO.
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Please indicate in the box below which of these four pictures (A, B, C or D) in your opinion
best reflects how Great Britain and Germany are linked to the EU._____________________
EU
G reat
Britain
EU
Great 
Britain .
c
EU
Germany
EU
best reflects how Great Britain and Germany are linked to the EU.
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You have almost completed the questionnaire. W e’d like you to give your answers to one 
final set of statements. Please read them and place the number which best reflects your 
opinion in the box next to each statement. The scale ranges from 1 (strongly disagree) to 7 
(strongly agree). ___  ____  ________
Strongly
disagree
D isagree Tend to 
disagree
N either agree 
nor disagree
Tend to 
agree
Agree Strongly
agree
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
In a group of British people, I really feel that I belong.
The fact that I’m British rarely enters my mind.
Just thinking about the fact that I’m British sometimes gives me bad 
feelings.
I feel strong ties to other British people.
Being British is an important reflection of who I am.
In general, I’m glad to be British.
I don’t have a lot in common with other British people.
In my everyday life, I often think about what it means to be British.
I often regret that I’m British.
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Finally, we’d like to know a little about yourself.
1. Are you... male
2. How old are you?
female
3. How would you describe yourself? Please place an “X” next to the box or boxes you feel 
that apply to you.
British Irish Other (please specify)
English Scottish
European W elsh
4. In political matters people talk of “the left“ and “the right“. How would you place your 
views on this scale? Please place an “X” in appropriate box. There are also boxes 
provided if you don’t want to answer this question or if you don’t know where to place 
your views on this scale.
Left
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
Right
10
M y v iew s are:
I don’t want to answer this question
1 don’t know
5. On a scale from 1 to 10, how strongly would you rate your interest in ... Please place 
an “X” in appropriate box.
Low
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
High
10
British politics?
European
politics?
6. Finally, suppose someone were to ask you how much do you feel British and how
much do you feel European, what would you reply? Please place an “X” in the
appropriate box.
Entirely
British
1 2 3 4 5 6
Entirely
European
7
I feel
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1-4 Debrief Sheet (English)
European Perceptions -  Christine Dobbs -  University of Wales Swansea
De-briefing
You have now completed the study. Thank you again for your participation, which is greatly 
appreciated. Perhaps you might be interested to read a little more about the nature of the 
study at this point.
We are interested in how people feel about their country’s membership in international 
organizations, here in NATO and in the European Union. For example, does membership 
make us feel more secure in our daily lives, or would we be happier if our governments 
made their decisions with national interests only in mind? The second issue was to examine 
how we feel about other member states. Do we feel, perhaps, that they are over-advantaged, 
or does their membership make us feel stronger as a larger, common group?
If you have any further questions concerning this study or my area of research in general, . 
please feel free to contact me.
Christine Dobbs 
Department of Psychology 
University of Wales Swansea 
Tel:++44- 1792-513140
Email: Christine.dobbs@ntlworld.com OR c.dobbs.182177@swan.ac.uk
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1-5 Form of Consent (German)
Einwilligungsblatt
Sehr geehrte Teilnehmerin, sehr geehrter Teilnehmer!
Ich bin Doktorandin in der Fakultat der Psychologie an der University of Wales Swansea in 
Grofibritannien. Mein Hauptinteresse liegt auf dem Gebiet von Europaischen 
Wahmehmungen; wie wir liber unsere Nation und liber unsere europaischen Nachbam 
denken, und was das Leben in Europa uns personlich bedeutet.
Dies -  das Einwilligungsblatt -  ist das erste von zwei Dokumenten. Ich mochte Sie bitten, 
das unten stehende Kastchen anzukreuzen und das heutigte Datum einzugeben. So erklaren 
Sie sich bereit, an diese Studie teilzunehmen. Erst nachdem ich Ihre Einwilligung erhalten 
habe, darf ich Ihren Beitrag zu dieser Studie miteinbeziehen.
Im zweiten Dokument werden Sie eine Reihe von Fragen beantworten und ich bitte Sie, die 
Fragen in der Reihenfolge zu beantworten wie sie erscheinen. Das Ausfiillen diirfte nicht 
langer als 20 Minuten dauem.
Falls Sie mit einer Teilnahme einverstanden sind, werden Ihre Daten vollig vertraulich 
erhoben. Das Einwilligungsblatt wird ausgedruckt und dann geloscht. Mit anderen Worten 
werden es keine Verbindungen zwischen Ihrer Person und Ihren Anworten bestehen. Alle 
gesammelten Informationen werden streng vertraulich behandelt und nur im Rahmen dieser 
Dissertation und in eventuell daraus entstehenden Veroffentlichungen verwendet werden.
Denken Sie bitte stets daran:
-  Ihre Teilnahme ist absolute freiwillig.
-  Es gibt keine richtigen oder falschen Antworten.
-  Es bleibt Ihnen jederzeit ffei, sich von der Teilnahme zuriickzuziehen.
Wenn Sie zur Teilnahme bereit sind, erteilen Sie mir nun Ihre informierte Einwilligung. 
Dann offnen Sie das zweite Dokument und fiillen Sie es am Bildschirm aus. Wenn Sie mit 
dem Ausfiillen fertig sind, versenden Sie bitte beide Dokumente per Email an mich zuriick.
Herzlichen Dank fur Ihre Teilnahme.
Christine Dobbs
Department of Psychology -  University of Wales Swansea 
Tel:++44-1792-513140
E-mail: Christine.dobbs@ntlworld.com oder c.dobbs.182177(Stswan.ac.uk
Indem ich dieses Kastchen ankreuze:
Datum:
bin ich mit derTeilnahme einverstanden.
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1-6 Instruction Sheet and Questionnaire (German)
Europaische Wahrnehmungen
Wir leben in einer europaischen Demokratie und unsere Regierung trifft Entscheidungen in 
unserem Namen. Einige Entscheidungen im Interesse der Nation beziehen sich darauf, 
inwieweit wir mit anderen Nationen zusammenarbeiten, z.B. bei Handelsabkommen, 
gemeinsamer Umweltschutzpolitik und Sicherheits- und Verteidigungsangelegenheiten. Seit 
kurzem zeigen Psycholog/innen ein verstarktes Interesse daran, wie die Burgerinnen und 
Burger zu der Zusammenarbeit mit anderen Nationen stehen, und auch wir mochten in der 
vorliegenden Studie mehr zu diesem Thema herausfinden. Im Folgenden werden wir Sie, als 
deutschen Staatsburger oder -biirgerin, iiber Ihre Einstellungen und Meinungen zum Leben 
in Europa beffagen.
Bitte beachten Sie, dass Sie die folgenden Fragen der Reihe nach beantworten. Wichtig: es 
gibt weder richtige noch falsche Antworten. Wir sind an Ihren Empfindungen und 
personlichen Meinungen interessiert. Versuchen Sie, die Fragen moglichst ehrlich, schnell 
und spontan zu bearbeiten. Friihere Studien haben ergeben, dass zu langes Nachdenken die 
Antworten verzerren kann. Wir versichem Ihnen, dass Ihre Daten streng vertraulich 
behandelt werden.
Wie Sie den Fragebogen ausfiillen
Der Fragebogen kann direkt am Computer ausgefullt werden, das heiBt er braucht NICHT 
extra ausgedruckt zu werden. Bitte vergewissem Sie sich, dass Sie das Dokument 
GESPEICHERT (<speichem unter>) haben (zum Beispiel auf dem DESKTOP), und es dann 
wie angegeben ausfiillen. Um das Lesen zu erleichtem, vergewissem Sie sich, dass Sie im 
Menu <Ansicht> den Punkt <Seitenlayout> aktiviert haben und dass die 
Formatierungszeichen (z.B. fl) ausgeblendet sind.
Bitte nehmen Sie sich einen Augenblick Zeit, um diese Einleitung zu lesen.
Ihnen werden ein Reihe von Fragen gestellt. Fur alle Fragen steht jeweils ein Kastchen fur 
Ihre Antwort zur Verfugung. Klicken Sie mit der linken Maustaste auf das Kastchen und 
tragen Sie Ihre Antwort ein. In den meisten Fallen, sollen Sie das AusmaB Ihrer Zustimmung 
zu einer bestimmten Aussage angeben. Dies geschieht anhand einer Zahlenskala, dessen 
Zahlen von 1 bis 7 reichen und den Grad Ihrer Zustimmung von „Stimme entschieden nicht 
zu“ bis „Stimme entschieden zu“ veranschaulichen. Bitte beachten Sie das unten aufgefuhrte 
Beispiel zur Veranschaulichung. (Hier hat die Teilnehmerin ihre Antwort (6) bereits 
eingegeben und stimmt somit der Aussage zu.)
Stimme 
entschieden 
nicht zu
Stimme nicht 
zu
Stimme eher 
nicht zu
Stimme 
weder zu 
noch nicht zu
Stimme eher 
zu
Stimme zu Stimme
entschieden
zu
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 .
Mir ist es wichtig, fit zu bleiben. 6
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Wenn Sie den Fragebogen vollstandig ausgefullt haben, <speichem> Sie bitte das 
Dokument. Dann senden Sie es zusammen mit Ihrer Einwilligungserklarung zuruck an 
Christine.dobbs@ntlworld.com 
oder
c.dobbs.182177@swan.ac.uk
Nochmal herzlichen Dank fur Ihre Kooperation! Wir sind Ihnen fur Ihre Teilnahme sehr 
dankbar.
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Wir mochten damit beginnen, dass wir Sie uber Ihre Meinungen zur NATO befragen. Wenn 
Sie die unten stehende Frage beantworten, schreiben Sie bitte deutlich und In Kiirze, was 
Ihnen spontan einfailt. Denken Sie daran, dass es keine richtigen oder falschen Antworten 
gibt. Dies sind Ihre personlichen Einstellungen und Meinungen.
Wenn Sie an die NATO denken, was fallt Ihnen dazu ein? (Zum Beispiel Dinge, die Sie mit 
der NATO in Verbindung bringen, oder Merkmale der NATO, die Sie persdnlich als gut 
oder schlecht bewerten)
Bitte schreiben Sie Ihre Antwort hier:
Bitte lesen Sie die folgende Aussage und geben Sie im vorgesehenen Kastchen die Zahl an, 
die Ihre persdnliche Meinung am besten widerspiegelt.
Stimme 
entschieden  
nicht zu
Stimme nicht 
zu
Stimme eher 
nicht zu
Stimme 
weder zu 
noch nicht zu
Stim m e eher 
zu
Stim m e zu Stimme
entschieden
zu
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
Im Allgemeinen ruft die NATO bei mir ein positives Bild hervor.
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Als Nachstes mochten wir, dass Sie einen kurzen Text uber die NATO lesen. Wenn Sie ihn
gelesen haben, fahren Sie mit dem Fragenbogen fort.
Im Januar 1948 schlug das Vereinigte Konigreich (das heiBt, GroBbritannien und 
Nordirland) die Idee fur einen Westlichen Bund zwischen funf europaischen Landern vor. 
Dieser Bund, eine so genannte Union, -  the Brussels Treaty Powers -  wurde dann spater in 
diesem Jahre tatsachlich gegriindet. Gleichzeitig begannen Kanada und die USA Gesprache 
mit den BTP , um die North Atlantic Treaty Organization zu verhandeln. Der Vertrag wurde 
1949 von zwolf Landern unterzeichnet, darunter GroBbritannien. Die Bundesrepublik 
Deutschland trat im Mai 1955 als offizielles Miglied der NATO bei.
Bei ihrer Griindung bestand die NATO also aus zwolf Mitgliedstaaten. Heute ist die NATO 
eine Allianz aus 26 europaischen und nordamerikanischen Landern. Alle 26 Mitgliedstaaten 
behalten ihre voile Souveranitat. Alle NATO-Entscheidungen werden auf Abstimmungsbasis 
von alien Mitgliedslandern gemeinsam getroffen. Von den 26 Mitgliedem sind sowohl 
Deutschland als auch GroBbritannien in den wichtigsten Entscheidungsgremien vertreten.
Die grundsatzliche Rolle der NATO ist es, die Ereiheit und die Sicherheit ihrer 
Mitgliedstaaten mit politischen und militarischen Mitteln zu schutzen. Sie soil die 
gemeinsamen demokratischen Werte der Allierten, die Freiheit des Einzelnen, die 
Rechtsstaatlichkeit und die friedliche Beilegung von Auseinandersetzungen absichem.
Bitte beantworten Sie nun die folgenden Fragen, indem Sie Ihre Antwort in das jeweilige 
Kastchen eingeben. Selbstverstandlich konnen Sie dabei nochmals auf den Text 
zuruckgreifen.
Behalten NATO-Mitgliedstaaten ihre Souveranitat in vollem MaBe? Ja/Nein _____
Welches Land ist langer NATO-Mitglied? Deutschland oder GroBbritannien? ________
Wie viele Lander hat die NATO heute?
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Als nachstes lesen Sie bitte die folgenden Aussagen durch und geben Sie jeweils in das 
vorgesehene Kastchen diejenige Zahl ein, die Ihre Meinung am besten widerspiegelt. Die 
Skala reicht von 1 (stimme entschieden nicht zu) bis 7 (stimme entschieden zu).
Stimme 
entschieden  
nicht zu
Stim m e nicht 
zu
Stimme eher 
nicht zu
Stimme 
weder zu 
noch nicht zu
Stimme eher 
zu
Stimme zu Stimme
entschieden
zu
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
Die Mitgliedschaft in der NATO ist eine gute Sache fur Deutschland.
Wenn man alles berucksichtigt, hat Deutschland im GroBen und Ganzen davon 
profitiert, ein Mitgleid der NATO zu sem.
Im Allgemeinen ruft die NATO bei mir ein negatives Bild hervor.
Deutschland hat viele Dinge mit der NATO gemeinsam.
GroBbritannien hat viele Dinge mit der NATO gemeinsam.
Deutschland ist ein starkes NATO-Mitglied.
GroBbritannien ist ein starkes NATO-Mitglied.
Deutschland ist ein gutes Beispiel fur einen typischen NATO-Mitgliedstaat. 
GroBbritannien ist ein gutes Beispiel fur einen typischen NATO-Mitgliedstaat. 
Deutschland hat einen starken EinfluB auf NATO-Entscheidungen. 
GroBbritannien hat einen starken EinfluB auf NATO-Entscheidungen.
Ich betrachte Deuschland als einen typischen NATO-Mitgliedstaat.
Ich betrachte GroBbritannien als einen typischen NATO-Mitgliedstaat.
Eine starke NATO bedeutet ein starkes Deutschland.
Eine starke NATO bedeutet ein starkes GroBbritannien.
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Im Folgenden mbchten wir mehr uber Ihre Meinungen zur Europaischen Union (EU) 
erfahren. Beantworten Sie bitte die unten stehende Frage beantworten, indem Sie deutlich 
und in Kiirze schreiben, was Ihnen spontan einfallt. Denken Sie daran, dass es keine 
richtigen oder falschen Antworten gibt.
Wenn Sie an die Europaische Union (EU) denken, was fallt Ihnen dazu ein? (Zum Beispiel 
Dinge, die Sie mit der EU in Verbindung bringen, oder Merkmale der EU, die Sie personlich 
als gut oder schlecht bewerten)
Bitte schreiben Sie Ihre Antwort hier:
Bitte lesen Sie die folgende Aussage und geben Sie im vorgesehenen Kastchen die Zahl an, 
die Ihre Meinung am besten widerspiegelt.
Stimme 
entschieden  
nicht zu
Stim m e nicht 
zu
Stimme eher 
nicht zu
Stimme 
weder zu 
noch nicht zu
Stimme eher 
zu
Stim m e zu Stimme
entschieden
zu
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
Im Allgemeinen ruft die EU bei mir ein positives Bild hervor.
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Als Nachstes mochten wir, dass Sie einen kurzen Text uber die Europaische Union lesen.
Wenn Sie ihn gelesen haben, fahren Sie bitte mit dem Fragenbogen fort.
Die EU wurde aus der Gemeinschaft fur Kohle und Stahl begriindet, die seit 1951 aus sechs 
europaischen Landern inklusive Deutschland bestand. 1957 wurden zunachst zwei weitere 
Gemeinschaften (EURATOM und EWG) gegriindet, die sich zehn Jahre spater mit der 
Gemeinschaft fur Kohle und Stahl vereinigten. Das Vereinigte Konigreich (dass heiBt, 
GroBbritannien und Nordirland) trat 1973 bei. Bis 1992 gab es 10 Mitgliedstaaten, neue 
Formen der Zusammenarbeit zwischen den Mitgliedem wurden eingefuhrt und die 
Europaische Union (EU) war gegriindet.
Heute besteht die Europaische Union aus 25 Landern Ost- und Westeuropas. Mitgliedstaaten 
haben gemeinsame Institutionen eingerichtet. Teile ihrer einzelstaatlichen Souveranitat hat 
jeder Mitgliedstaat diesen Institutionen iibertragen, damit in bestimmten Angelegenheiten im 
gemeinsamen Interesse demokratische Entscheidungen auf europaischer Ebene getroffen 
werden konnen. Jedes Land hat eine bestimmte Anzahl von Stimmen, die sich ungefahr nach 
der GroBe der einzelnen Lander richtet. Mit jeweils 29 Stimmen sind Deutschland und 
GroBbritannien zwei der vier Lander mit der hochsten Stimmenzahl.
Die EU befasst sich mit vielen Fragen, wie zum Beispiel die Sicherung von Frieden und 
Sicherheit. Sie bemiiht sich heute zunehmend darum, angrenzende Lander zu stabilisiern. 
AuBerdem entwickelt sie eine gemeinsame AuBen- und Sicherheitspolitik, bei der eine 
engere Zusammenarbeit in Verteidigungsfragen geplant ist.
Bitte beantworten Sie nun die folgenden Fragen, indem Sie Ihre Antwort in das jeweilige 
Kastchen eingeben. Selbstverstandlich konnen Sie dabei nochmals auf den Text 
zuruckgreifen.
Behalten EU-Mitgliedstaaten ihre Souveranitat in vollem MaBe? Ja/Nein 
Welches Land ist langer EU-Mitglied? Deutschland oder GroBbritannien?
Wie viele Lander hat die EU heute?
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Als nachstes lesen Sie bitte die folgenden Aussagen durch und geben Sie jeweils in das 
vorgesehene Kastchen diejenige Zahl ein, die Ihre Meinung am besten widerspiegelt. Die 
Skala reicht von 1 (stimme entschieden nicht zu) bis 7 (stimme entschieden zu).
Stimme 
entschieden  
nicht zu
Stimme nicht 
zu
Stimme eher 
nicht zu
Stimme 
weder zu 
noch nicht zu
Stim m e eher 
zu
Stim m e zu Stimme
entschieden
zu
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
Die Mitgliedschaft in der EU ist eine gute Sache fur Deutschland.
Wenn man alles berucksichtigt, hat Deutschland im GroBen und Ganzen davon 
profitiert, ein Mitgleid der EU zu sein.
Im Allgemeinen ruft die EU bei mir ein negatives Bild hervor.
Deutschland hat viele Dinge mit der EU gemeinsam.
GroBbritannien hat viele Dinge mit der EU gemeinsam.
Deutschland ist ein starkes EU-Mitglied.
GroBbritannien ist ein starkes EU-Mitglied.
Deutschland ist ein gutes Beispiel fur einen typischen EU-Mitgliedstaat. 
GroBbritannien ist ein gutes Beispiel fur einen typischen EU-Mitgliedstaat. 
Deutschland hat einen starken EinfluB auf EU-Entscheidungen.
GroBbritannien hat einen starken EinfluB auf EU-Entscheidungen.
Ich betrachte Deuschland als einen typischen EU-Mitgliedstaat.
Ich betrachte GroBbritannien als einen typischen EU-Mitgliedstaat.
Eine starke EU bedeutet ein starkes Deutschland.
Eine starke EU bedeutet ein starkes GroBbritannien.
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Nun sind wir daran interessiert, mehr uber Ihre Einstellungen zu vier verschiedenen Gruppen 
zu erfahren. Wir mochten, dass Sie uns anhand der unten dargestellten Thermometerskala 
Ihre Einstellungen zu diesen Gruppen mitteilen. Zum Beispiel, eine Bewertung von 50°C 
wurde bedeuten, dass Ihre Einstellung zu dieser bestimmten Gruppe weder positiv noch 
negativ ist. Sie konnen jede Zahl zwischen 0 und 100 vergeben. Bitte versuchen Sie 
moglichst ehrlich, schnell, und spontan zu antworten. Denken Sie daran: es gibt weder 
Richtig noch Falsch!
Meine Einstellung gegeniiber Deutschland ist °C.
Meine Einstellung gegeniiber der NATO ist °C.
Meine Einstellung gegeniiber der Europaischen Union ist °C.
Meine Einstellung gegeniiber GroBbritannien ist
Positiv 100° AuBerst positiv
90° Sehr positiv 
80° Positiv 
70° Ziemlich positiv 
60° Eher positiv 
50° Weder positiv noch negativ 
40° Eher negativ 
30° Ziemlich negativ 
20° Negativ 
10° Sehr negativ 
Negativ 0° AuBerst negativ
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Betrachten Sie bitte die folgenden Wortpaare. Wir mochten, dass Sie daruber nachdenken, 
welche Ziele und Werte Sie als wichtig beispielsweise fur Deutschland erachten, und welche 
Ziele und Werte Sie als wichtig fur die NATO erachten. Wenn Sie sie vergleichen, wie 
ahnlich finden Sie sie? Um die Frage zu beantworten, bitte geben Sie bitten ein „X“ in eins 
von den sieben Kastchen ein. Die Skala reicht von sehr unahnlich (1) bis sehr ahnlich (7). 
Um die Aufgabe zu verdeutlichen, haben wir unten zwei Beispiele aufgefuhrt.
Ich glaube, dass die Ziele und Werte der folgenden Paare sind:
Betriebsrat - Geschaftsfuhrung sehr unahnlich
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
X sehr ahnlich
Miglied der Griinen -  Biobauer sehr unahnlich
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
X sehr ahnlich
Bitte schreiben Sie nun Ihre Bewertungen fur die unten aufgelisteten Paare:
Ich glaube, dass die Ziele und Werte der folgenden Paare sind:
Deutschland - NATO sehr unahnlich
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
sehr ahnlich
Deutschland -EU sehr unahnlich
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
sehr ahnlich
Deutschland -  GroBbritannien sehr unahnlich
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
sehr ahnlich
GroBbritannien -  NATO sehr unahnlich
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
sehr ahnlich
GroBbritannien -  EU sehr unahnlich
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
sehr ahnlich
Page 289
Welches dieser vier Bilder (A, B, C oder D) spiegelt gibt Ihrer Meinung nach am besten wider
wie Deutschland und GroBbritannien mit der NATO verbunden sind?
B .
N A T O
GroB­
britannien
Deutsch­
land
N A T O
Deutsch­
land
N A T O
Deutscb
land
Grofi-
britannien
D .
N A T O
GroB­
britannien
Deutsch-
Bild spiegelt am besten wider wie Deutschland und GroBbritannien mit der NATO
verbunden sind.
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Welches dieser vier Bilder (A, B, C oder D) spiegelt gibt Ihrer Meinung nach am besten wider
wie Deutschland und GroBbritannien mit der EU verbunden sind?
E u ro p a isch e  U nion
GroB­
britannien
Deutsch­
land
B .
E u rop a isch e U nion
Deutsch­
land
GroB­
britannien
E u rop a isch e U nion
Deutsch­
land
GroB­
britannien
D .
E u ro p a isch e  U nion
GroB­
britannien
Deutsch­
land
B ild  s p ie g e lt  a m  b e s te n  w id e r  w ie  D e u ts c h la n d  u n d  G ro B b rita n n ie n  m it d e r  E U
v e rb u n d e n  s in d .
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Sie haben den Fragebogen fast vervollstandigt. W ir mochten Sie bitten, eine lezte Reihe von 
Aussagen zu bewerten. Bitte lesen Sie jede Aussage sorgfaltig durch und geben Sie in dem 
dafur vorgesehenen Kastchen die Zahl an, die Ihre Meinung am besten widerspiegelt. Die 
Skala reicht von 1 (stimme entschieden nicht zu) bis 7 (stimme entschieden zu).
Stim m e 
entschieden  
nicht zu
Stimme nicht 
zu
Stimme eher 
nicht zu
Stimme 
weder zu 
noch nicht zu
Stimme eher 
zu
Stimme zu Stimme
entschieden
zu
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
In  e in e r  G ru p p e  v o n  D e u tsc h e n  h a b e  ich  d a s  G e fu h l, w irk l ic h  d a z u  zu  
g e h o re n .
D ie  T a ts a c h e ,  d a s s  ic h  D e u ts c h e r /D e u ts c h e  b in , is t  m ir  s e l te n  w irk l ic h  
b ew u B t.
D e r  e in f a c h e  G e d a n k e  d a ra n , d a s s  ic h  D e u ts c h e /r  b in , b e r e i te t  m ir  
m a n c h m a l e in  s c h le c h te  G e fu h l.
Ich  fu h le  m ic h  m it a n d e re n  D e u ts c h e n  s ta rk  v e rb u n d e n .
D e u ts c h  z u  se in  is t e in  w ic h tig e r  B e s ta n d te il  m e in e s  S e lb s tb i ld e s .
Im  a l lg e m e in e n  b in  ic h  fro h , D e u ts c h e / r  z u  se in .
Ic h  h a b e  n ic h t  s e h r  v ie le  D in g e  m it  a n d e re n  D e u ts c h e n  g e m e in s a m .
In  m e in e m  ta g l ic h e n  L e b e n  d e n k e  ich  o f t  d a ru b e r  n a c h , w a s  e s  fu r  m ic h  
b e d e u te t ,  D e u ts c h  z u  se in .
Ic h  b e d a u e re  e s  o f t , D e u ts c h e /r  zu  se in .
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Zum Schlufl mbchten wir ein wenig uber Sie erfahren.
1. Sind Sie ... m a n n lic h
2. W ie alt sind Sie?
w e ib lic h
3 . W ie wurden Sie sich beschreiben? K re u z e n  S ie  b it te  d a s  K a s tc h e n  o d e r  d ie  K a s tc h e n  an , 
d a s /d ie  S ie  a ls  z u tr e f fe n d  e m p f in d e n .
D eutsch Ostdeutsch Andere (bitte dazuschreiben)
Europaisch W estdeutsch
4. In  p o l i t i s c h e n  Z u s a m m e n h a n g e n  s p r ic h t m a n  v o n  „ l in k s “ u n d  „ re c h ts “ . Wo wurden Sie 
Ihre Ansichten auf dieser Skala platzieren? H ie r  s in d  a u c h  K a s tc h e n  v o rg e s e h e n , fa lls  
S ie  d ie s e  F ra g e  n ic h t b e a n tw o r te n  m o c h te n  o d e r  fa ils  S ie  s ic h  n ic h t s ic h e r  s in d , w o  Ih re  
A n s ic h te n  a u f  d ie s e r  S k a la  lie g e n .
Links
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
Rechts
10
M eine Ansichten sind
D iese Frage mochte ich nicht beantworten.
WeiB nicht
5. A uf einer Skala von 1 bis 10, wie stark wurden Sie Ihre Interesse in ...  bewerten?
N iedrig
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
Hoch
10
Deutschlandpolitik
Europapolitik
6. W enn Sie jemand fragen wurde, ob Sie sich eher deutsch oder eher europaisch 
fiihlen, wie wurden Sie antworten?
Ganz Deutsch  
1 2 3 4 5 6
Ganz Europaisch 
7
Ich fiihle mich
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1-7 Debrief Sheet (German)
Europaische Wahrnehmungen -  Christine Dobbs -  University of Wales
Swansea
Zum SchluB
Sie haben an dieser Studie teilgenommen. Haben Sie nochmal herzlichen Dank 
dafur! Vielleicht mochten Sie an dieser Stelle etwas mehr uber die Hintergrundfragen 
der Studie erfahren.
Wir sind daran interessiert, mehr tiber die Meinungen von Burgem und Burgerinnen 
zum Thema Mitgliedschaft der eigenen Nation in intemationalen Organisationen -  
hier in der NATO und in der Europaischen Union -  zu erfahren. Zum Beispiel, 
fuehlen wir uns durch die Mitgliedschaft Deutschlands in einer intemationalen 
Organisation sicherer oder sollte sich die Regierung ausschliesslich Entscheidungen 
im nationalen Interesse treffen?: Das zweite Ziel war es zu untersuchen, wie wir zu 
anderen Mitgliedstaaten stehen. Weiterhin haben wir untersucht, wie unsere Nation 
zu anderen Mitgliedstatten stehen. Meinen wir beispielsweise, dass sie bevorzugt 
werden, oder fuhlen wir uns aufgrund ihrer Mitzugehorigkeit gemeinsam starker?
Wenn Sie weitere Fragen zu dieser Studie oder zu meinem Forschungsgebiet im 
Allgemeinen haben, wiirde ich mich sehr freuen, von Ihnen zu horen.
Christine Dobbs 
Department of Psychology 
University of Wales Swansea 
Tel: ++44 -1792  -513140
Email: Christine.dobbs@ntlworld.com ODER c.dobbs.182177@swan.ac.uk
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1-8 Qualitative Responses
Sample responses supporting each identified connotation are reported in the tables 
below. Each statement is followed by participant number, where E = British 
participant and G = German participant, asdasd
Sample responses supporting positive NATO connotations
Connotation Response
shared goals and values Alliance, western values (019E) 
Commonality ... one goal (013G)
together we are strong We have allies in the other members of NATO which helps 
us in times of conflict. Having this alliance makes us 
stronger and more confident, knowing that we have support. 
(ONE)
Fusion of European states and the USA to secure peace 
(009G)
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Sample responses supporting positive EU connotations
Connotation Response
shared goals and values Standard democratic law and order. (001G)
A common understanding of certain basic values, the 
growing together and the cultural exchange between 
member states etc. (021G)
promotes diversity Important to continue sharing experiences and developing 
shared culture (010E)
A common understanding of certain basic values, the 
growing together and the cultural exchange between 
member states etc. (021G)
together we are strong Good things: breaking down boundaries, euro, easing travel 
with the EU and extending the numbers of member states, 
coming into the Union -  all leading to a stronger Europe. 
(008E)
stronger economic power against the USA (+) (015G)
supportive of weaker members Increasing prosperity for poorer European countries (013E) 
European integration (019G)
freedom of movement Breaking down boundaries ... easing travel within the EU 
(008E)
No border controls ... opportunity to work in all EU states 
(020G)
Sample responses supporting negative NATO connotations
Connotation Response
too powerful In the interim plays at being the World police (020G)
too bureaucratic, unwieldy As an organisation too large and unwieldy to react quickly 
or decisively (005G) .
In my opinion, perhaps due to the large number of members, 
too unwieldy in its decisions, too long-winded, until it can 
take necessary action if required (e.g. war in Yugoslavia). 
(014G)
too much intersubgroup rivalry [Members] fighting for competencies, conflicting interests 
(010G)
needs a detailed concept about its ... internal power 
relationship (02OG)
too little power Largely unable to take action in conflict situations (009G)
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Sample responses supporting negative EU connotations
Connotation Response
too bureaucratic, unwieldy It seems to be a remote bureaucracy which affects our lives 
and we don’t really understand it. (ONE)
I get the strong feeling that the basic idea of a European 
Union has turned into a bureaucratic institution. (007G)
too expensive A lot of very highly paid bureaucrats in Europe milking the 
system (002E')
Too high in costs (009G)
too much intersubgroup rivalry Lots of infighting amongst member states each with its own 
agenda. E.g. fishing quotas (005E)
Too many conflicts of interests, many nation-specific 
interests which are supposed to be pushed through (022G)
irrelevant goals Straight bananas -  not very beneficial to us (004E) 
Furthermore when I see what the Europe-civil servants are 
producing for crap (norming bananas, developing standard 
sizes for apples) (007G)
too large or enlargement bad The EU is currently getting too big (014G) 
Eastern enlargement (-) (015G)
Sample responses supporting threat connotations in NATO
Connotation Response
Threat to peace Aggression. (007E)
Duty to participate in conflicts. A bad feeling when thinking 
of the American dominance. (018G)
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Sample responses supporting threat connotations in the EU
Connotation Response
Threat to sovereignty
Threat to ingroup identity
Threat to ingroup wealth & 
prosperity
Great Britain has become subservient to Europe and has 
forsaken her allies in the commonwealth. (006E)
Los of sovereignty (017E)
Through the EU several members states have merged, which 
in my opinion is supposed to boil down to some sort of 
uniformity at the end of the day. The cultures of the 
European member states are becoming increasingly similar. 
(007G)
Too much globalisation and adjustment [assimilation] 
means the loss of one’s own identity. (017G)
I thing the Euro is an economic catastrophe for Germany 
and others. (014G)
Loss of purchasing power through the introduction of the 
Euro. (009G)
Appendix II to Study 2 
II-l Ethics Approval
PSYCHOLOGY
DEPARTMENT
ETHICS COMMITTEE
Memo
To: -Christine Dobbs
Copy: Professor Russell Spears and Dr. Gordon Hodson (Supervisors)
From Professor David Clark, Chair of Departmental Ethics Committee
Date: 6th January, 2005
Re: European Perceptions
The above study has now been reviewed by the departmental Ethics Committee and it is 
agreed that no substantive ethical issues are raised, provided the information obtained from the 
questionnaires is kept absolutely confidential and that no personally identifiable information is 
entered on computer. You may therefore proceed with your study.
A copy of this memo together with a copy of your Ethics Application Form and Risk 
Assessment Form should be included in the final version of your thesis.
A copy of this memo has also been produced for your project supervisors.
•  Page 2
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II-2 Form of Consent (English)
Dear Participant
I am a PhD student at the Department of Psychology at the University of Wales Swansea. 
My main area of interest looks at European perceptions; how we feel about our country, our 
European neighbours, and what living in Europe means to us personally. The enclosed 
questionnaire should take around 25 minutes or less to complete.
If you agree to take part in this study, your questionnaire will remain entirely anonymous. 
All data collected are treated with confidentiality and used only within the framework of this 
thesis and any resulting publications.
Please remember:
-  Participation is entirely voluntary
-  There are no right or wrong answers
-  You are free to break off your participation at any time
If you agree to participate, please give your informed consent by signing below. Then place 
this Form of Consent into the small envelope provided and seal it. When you have filled in 
the questionnaire, please make sure that this is returned together with the sealed envelope.
Thank you very much for your participation.
Christine Dobbs 
Department of Psychology 
University of Wales Swansea 
Tel:++44- 1792-513140
E-mail: Chri stine. dobbs@ntl world .com or 182177@swan.ac.uk
I agree to participate in this study. 
Name:____________________
Signed: Date:
II-3 Instruction Sheet and Questionnaire (English, EU version)
NB: Only one English questionnaire is replicated here; the EU version. In the NATO 
version, The EU etc. was substituted for NATO throughout. The NATO priming text 
was an exact replication of the text employed in Study 1 (see App. i). Those 
measures administered in the control condition only are asterisked in the Method 
section.
European Perceptions
Instructions
Please take time to read this sheet carefully.
1. Answer each question as it appears before moving on to the next item. This is very
important for us! The questionnaire is designed so that boxes are provided for all your
answers. Simply write your answer in the appropriate box.
2. Also, remember that there are no right or wrong answers. Try to answer the
questions without too much deliberation. Past studies suggest that our initial responses 
are likely the truest responses.
3. We would also appreciate it if you could be completely honest in your responses. We 
assure you again that your responses are entirely anonymous.
4. When you have completed the questionnaire, please make sure you return it together 
with the sealed envelope.
Again, many thanks for your cooperation! It is greatly appreciated.
Please read the following statements and write the number which best reflects your opinion
in the box next to each statement. The scale ranges from 1 (strongly disagree) to 7 (strongly
agree). _______________________
Strongly
disagree
Disagree Tend to 
disagree
Neither 
agree nor 
disagree
Tend to 
agree
Agree Strongly
agree
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
In a group of British people, I really feel that I belong.
The fact that I’m British rarely enters my mind.
Just thinking about the fact that I’m British sometimes gives me bad feelings. 
I feel strong ties to other British people.
Being British is an important reflection of who I am.
In general, I’m glad to be British.
I don’t have a lot in common with other British people.
In my everyday life, I often think about what it means to be British.
I often regret that I’m British.
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W e’d like you to read a short text about the European Union.
The European Union was bom out of the European Coal and Steel Community formed in 
1951 by six European countries including Germany. The United Kingdom (that is, Great 
Britain and Northern Ireland) joined in 1973. By 1992 there were 10 members, new forms of 
co-operation between the member state governments were introduced and the European 
Union (EU) was created.
Today, the European Union comprises 25 countries from Eastern and Western Europe. 
Member States have set up common institutions to which they delegate some of their 
sovereignty so that decisions on specific matters of joint interest can be made democratically 
at a European level. Each country has a certain number of votes which roughly reflects its 
population. Holding 29 votes each, Great Britain and Germany are two of the four countries 
with the highest number of votes.
The EU deals with many subjects, including ensuring freedom and security. It is now 
increasingly involved in creating stability in neighbouring countries, and it is developing its 
common foreign and security policy, with plans for more co-operation between members on 
defence questions.
Please answer the following questions by writing your response in the appropriate box. You 
may, of course, refer back to the text if you want.
Do EU member states retain their full sovereignty?
Which state has been a member of the EU longer; Great Britain or Germany? 
How many countries are members of the EU today?
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Next, please read the following statements and write the num ber which best reflects your
opinion in the box next to each statement. The scale ranges from 1 (strongly disagree) to 7
(strongly agree).
Strongly
disagree
Disagree Tend to 
disagree
Neither 
agree nor 
disagree
Tend to 
agree
Agree Strongly
agree
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
Membership in the EU is a good thing for Great Britain.
Taking everything into consideration, Great Britain has on balance benefited 
from being a member of the EU.
In general, the EU conjures up a negative image for me.
Great Britain has a lot in common with the EU.
Great Britain does not have a powerful influence on EU decisions.
I regard Great Britain as a typical EU member state.
A strong EU makes for a strong Great Britain.
Great Britain is not a very good example of a typical EU member state.
Great Britain is a strong member in the EU.
Germany has a lot in common with the EU.
Germany does not have a powerful influence on EU decisions.
I regard Germany as a typical EU member state.
A strong EU makes for a strong Germany.
Germany is not a very good example of a typical EU member state. 
Germany is a strong member in the EU.
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Currently, discussions are underway to introduce a series of projects within the EU. Each of 
the projects shall be funded by two or three member states, and the projects will benefit all 
EU members. Great Britain has been paired with Germany and together they form one of the 
12 planned Patron Scheme Teams. Each team will be expected to contribute an annual total 
of:
€ 10,000,000 (€ 10 million).
The Great Britain-Germany Patron Scheme Team will finance a project to increase safety 
awareness amongst member states. How much do you think Great Britain should contribute 
towards the € 10 million, and how much do you think Germany should contribute towards 
the € 10 million? In other words, what do you feel would be a fair distribution?
Great Britain should contribute towards the total of € 10 million: €
Germany should contribute towards the total of € 10 million: €
Below are three projects that other Patron Scheme Teams are funding. Tell us how much you 
think Great Britain and how much Germany should receive from these funds. A reminder: 
the TOTAL SUM available for all three projects together is € 10 million.
Project One: To fund six-monthly Conferences to discuss future policies on border 
controls. The Conferences are to be held in rural regions with low employment rates and will 
hopefully boost the local economies.
Great Britain should receive from the total € 10 million available: €
Germany should receive from the total € 10 million available: €
Project Two: To fund the introduction of local Information Centres where citizens may 
find out more about the EU. These centres are to be installed in urban regions with low 
employment rates and will hopefully boost the local economies.
Great Britain should receive from the total € 10 million available: €
Germany should receive from the total € 10 million available: €
Project Three: To boost social communication within member states, this scheme focuses 
on our children. Trained teams will go into schools and organise M ulti-Cultural- 
Schooldays. This scheme will promote student exchange visits between member states.
Great Britain should receive from the total € 10 million available: €
Germany should receive from the total € 10 million available: €
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We’d like to learn more about your attitudes towards certain groups, and we’d like you to 
use the thermometer scale on the right to do this. For example, a rating of 80° would be quite 
favourable, and 20° quite unfavourable. You may give any number between 0 and 100. 
Please be honest. Remember that your answers are strictly confidential.
My attitude towards Great Britain is 3C.
My attitude towards Germany is 3C.
My attitude towards the European Union is °C.
100° Extremely favourable 
90°
80°
70°
60°
50° Neither favourable nor unfavourable 
40°
30°
20 °
10°
0° Extremely unfavourable
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Please look at the following pairs. For example, we’d like you to think about which goals 
and values you think are important for Great Britain and about the goals and values you 
think are important for the European Union. If you compare these, how similar do you think 
they are? Please tick or cross the appropriate box on the scale of 1 (very dissimilar) to 7 
(very similar). To show you what we mean, we’ve provided two examples below.
I think the goals and values of the following pairs are:
shop steward <-> managing director very dissimilar
Green Party member organic very dissimilar
farmer
X
X
very simila
very simila
Please provide your ratings for the pairs listed below:
I think the goals and values of the following pairs are:
Great Britain <-* the European Union very dissimilar 
Great Britain Germany very dissimilar
Germany <-> the European Union very dissimilar
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
very simila 
very simila 
very similar
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Below are four pictures (A -  D) which show how Great Britain and Germany might be 
linked to the EU. Please tell us in which order you think these boxes best reflect Great 
Britain and Germany’s relationship to the European Union.
E u rop ean  U nion
Great
Britain
E u rop ean  U nion
Great
Britain
Germany >
E u rop ean  U nion
Great
Britain
E u rop ean  U nion
Great
Britain
B ox | | show s best how  Great Britain and Germany are linked to the EU.
B ox | | show s second best how  Great Britain and Germany are linked to the EU.
B ox | | show s third best how  Great Britain and Germany are linked to the EU.
B ox | | show s least w ell how  Great Britain and Germany are linked to the EU.
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The European Union means different things to different people. What does the European 
Union mean to you personally? The scale ranges from 1 (not at all) to 7 (very much so).
Not at all Very much so
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
Peace
Bureaucracy and/or waste of money 
Helps protect Western values 
Threat to our identity 
Economic prosperity
Too much rivalry amongst member states
Makes us stronger in the world
Too many members from poorer countries
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Next, please read the following statements and place the number which best reflects your
opinion in the box next to each statement. The scale ranges from 1 (strongly disagree) to 7
(strongly agree).
Strongly
disagree
Disagree Tend to 
disagree
Neither 
agree nor 
disagree
Tend to 
agree
Agree Strongly
agree
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
British success in sports makes me feel proud.
Great Britain’s democratic institutions make me feel proud.
When I criticize Great Britain, I do that out of allegiance to my country.
The fact that Britain is number one in Europe makes me feel proud.
The possibilities for political participation in Great Britain make me feel proud.
Due to Britain’s economic superiority, we rightly dominate international decisions.
For me, Great Britain is the best country in the world.
I appreciate the British democratic system very much, but I am willing to criticize it 
in order to achieve further improvement.
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Please read through the following list o f characteristics:
conventional loud loyal to family ties
courteous domineering honest
reserved materialistic extremely nationalistic
straightforward sophisticated generous
humorous efficient tradition-loving
Please write in
Column 1: the five characteristics from the above list that you feel are most typically 
British.
Column 2: your best estimation of what percent of British people you feel share this 
characteristic
Column 3: whether you think this is a positive, negative or neutral characteristic 
Column 4: How well do you feel this characteristic describes you on a scale from 1 (not at 
all) to 7 (very much so).
Column 1 
Characteristic
Column 2 
% of British
Column 3 
Positive, negative 
or neutral?
Column 4 
This describes me:
(1 = not at all; 7 = very much so)
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
Please read through the list again and tell us:
Column 1: the five characteristics from the above list that you feel are most typically 
German.
Column 2: your best estimation of what percent of German people you feel share this 
characteristic
Column 3: whether you think this is a positive, negative or neutral characteristic 
Column 4: How well do you feel this characteristic describes you on a scale from 1 (not at 
all) to 7 (very much so).
Column 1 
Characteristic
Column 2 
% of Germans
Column 3 
Positive, negative 
or neutral?
Column 4 
This describes me:
(1 = not at all; 7 = very much so)
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
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You’ve nearly completed this questionnaire. We’d like you to imagine that you are the only 
British person working on a team with people from Germany. Also please assume that there 
are no language barriers. How would you feel working in this team compared to occasions 
when you were working with a group of British people? The scale ranges from 1 (not al all) 
to 7 (very much so).
Not at all Very much so
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
I would feel:
Awkward
Happy
Suspicious
Confident
Defensive
Comfortable
Accepted
Self-conscious
Wary
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Finally, we’d like to know a little about yourself.
1. Are you ... male
2. How old are you?
female
3. Are you a student? yes/no Which Faculty or Department?
4. How would you describe yourself? Please tick ALL OF THE BOXES you feel that 
apply to you.
British Irish Other (please specify)
English Scottish
European Welsh
5. Have you ever lived abroad for a period of longer than six months?
yes/no If so, where?
6. In political matters people talk of “the left“ and “the right“. How would you place 
your views on this scale?. (Boxes are provided if you don’t want to answer this question or 
if you don’t know where to place your views on this scale.)
Left
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
Right
10
My views are:
I don’t want to answer this question
I don’t know
7. On a scale from 1 to 10, how strongly would you rate your interest in ... ?
Low
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
High
10
British politics
European politics
Don’t
know
8. One final question: If someone were to ask you how much you feel British and how 
much you feel European, what would you reply? The scale ranges from 1 (not at all) to 7 
(very much).
Not at all 
1 2 3 4 5 6
Very much 
7
I feel British
I feel European
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II-4 Debrief Sheet (English)
NB: Participants received one of two debrief sheets, dependent upon the condition they were 
allocated to. Below is an integrated version of both sheets.
European Perceptions -  Christine Dobbs -  University of Wales Swansea
You have now completed the study. Thank you again for your participation, which is greatly 
appreciated. Perhaps you might be interested to read a little more about the nature of the 
study at this point.
We are interested in how people feel about their country’s membership in international 
organizations such as NATO and the European Union. For example, does membership make 
us feel more secure in our daily lives, or would we be happier if our governments made their 
decisions with national interests only in mind? Do we feel that these organisations are too 
large?
EU and control conditions:
The second issue was to examine how we feel about other member states. Do we feel, 
perhaps, that they are over-advantaged, or does their membership make us feel stronger as a 
larger, common group? In order to investigate this, we devised a task asking you to allocate 
monies within a Patron-Scheme. The Patron-Scheme was entirely of our own creation, and, 
to our knowledge, the EU is not planning to introduce a scheme such as this.
NATO condition:
The second issue was to examine how we feel about other member states. Do we feel, 
perhaps, that they are over-advantaged, or does their membership make us feel stronger as a 
larger, common group? In order to investigate this, we devised a task asking you to allocate 
monies within a Patron-Scheme. The Patron-Scheme was entirely of our own creation, and, 
to our knowledge, NATO is not planning to introduce a scheme such as this.
If you have any further questions concerning this study or my area of research in general, 
please feel free to contact me.
Christine Dobbs 
Department of Psychology 
University of Wales Swansea
Tel:++44-1792-513140
Email: Christine.dobbs@ntlworld.com -  OR -  182177@swan.ac.uk
Page 314
II-5 Form of Consent (German)
Sehr geehrte Teilnehmerin, sehr geehrter Teilnehmer!
Ich bin Doktorandin in der Fakultat der Psychologie an der University of Wales Swansea in 
GroBbritannien. Mein Hauptinteresse liegt auf dem Gebiet von Europaischen 
Wahmehmungen; wie wir fiber unsere Nation und fiber unsere europaischen Nachbam 
denken, und was das Leben in Europa uns personlich bedeutet. Wenn Sie sich entscheiden 
sollten, an dieser Studie teilzunehmen, dtirfte das Ausftillen nicht langer als 25 Minuten 
dauem.
Falls Sie mit einer Teilnahme einverstanden sind, werden Ihre Daten vollig anonym erhoben. 
Alle gesammelten Informationen werden streng vertraulich behandelt und nur im Rahmen 
dieser Dissertation und in eventuell daraus entstehenden Veroffentlichungen verwendet 
werden.
Denken Sie bitte stets daran:
-  Ihre Teilnahme ist absolute freiwillig.
-  Es gibt keine richtigen oder falschen Antworten.
-  Es bleibt Ihnen jederzeit frei, sich von der Teilnahme zuriickzuziehen.
Wenn Sie zur Teilnahme bereit sind, erteilen Sie mir nun Ihre informierte Einwilligung, 
indem Sie unten unterschreiben. Dann verschlieBen Sie dieses Einwilligungsblatt in den 
kleinen, beigefugten Umschlag. Wenn Sie den Fragebogen ausgefullt haben, vergewissem 
Sie sich, dass sowohl der Fragebogen als auch der verschlossene Umschlag abgegeben 
werden.
Herzlichen Dank fur Ihre Teilnahme.
Christine Dobbs
Department of Psychology -  University of Wales Swansea 
Tel: ++44- 1792-513140
E-mail: Christine.dobbs@,ntlworld.com oder 182177@swan.ac.uk
Ich bin mit der Teilnahme an dieser Studie einverstanden.. 
Name:___________________________________
Unterschrift: Datum:
II-6 Instruction Sheet and Questionnaire (German, EU version)
Europaische Wahrnehmungen
Anweisungen
Bitte nehmen Sie sich Zeit, diese Anweisungen sorgfaltig durchzulesen.
1. Fiillen Sie bitte den Fragebogen aus. Fiir uns ist sehr wichtig, dass Sie alle Fragen in 
der Reihenfolge beantworten, in der sie erscheinen. Der Fragebogen ist so konzipiert, 
dass Kastchen fur alle Ihrer Antworte zur Verfligung stehen.
2. Denken Sie bitte daran, dass es keine richtigen oder falschen Antworten gibt. 
Versuchen Sie, die Fragen ohne groBes Zogem zu beantworten. Fruhere Studien deuten 
darauf hin, dass unsere ersten Reaktionen haufig auch die ehrlichsten Reaktionen sind.
3. Wir wiirden es sehr schatzen, wenn Sie uns Ihre Meinungen vollig offen mitteilen. Seien 
Sie bitte nochmal versichert, dass Ihre Daten absolut anonym gesamelt werden.
4. Wenn Sie den Fragebogen ausgefiillt haben, vergewissem Sie sich, dass er 
ZUSAMMEN mit dem Umschlag abgeben wird.
Nochmal herzlichen Dank fur Ihre Kooperation!
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Bitte lesen Sie die folgende Reihe von Aussagen und schreiben Sie in das jew eils dafiir
vorgesehene Kastchen die Zahl, die Ihre M einung am besten widerspiegelt. Die Skala reicht
von 1 (stimme entschieden nicht zu) bis 7 (stimme entschieden zu).
Stimme 
entschieden 
nicht zu
Stimme 
nicht zu
Stimme 
eher nicht 
zu
Stimme 
weder zu 
noch nicht 
zu
Stimme 
eher zu
Stimme zu Stimme
entschieden
zu
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
In einer Gruppe von Deutschen habe ich das Gefiihl, wirklich dazu zu gehoren.
Die Tatsache, dass ich Deutscher/Deutsche bin, ist mir selten wirklich bewuBt.
Der einfache Gedanke daran, dass ich Deutsche/r bin, bereitet mir manchmal ein 
schlechtes Gefiihl.
Ich fiihle mich mit anderen Deutschen stark verbunden.
Deutsch zu sein ist ein wichtiger Bestandteil meines Selbstbildes.
Im allgemeinen bin ich froh, Deutsche/r zu sein.
Ich habe nicht sehr viele Dinge mit anderen Deutschen gemeinsam.
In meinem taglichen Leben denke ich oft dariiber nach, was es fur mich bedeutet, 
Deutsch zu sein.
Ich bedauere es oft, Deutsche/r zu sein.
Page 317
Wir mochten Sie bitten, einen kurzen Text iiber die Europaische Union zu lesen.
Die EU wurde aus der Gemeinschaft fur Kohle und Stahl begriindet, die seit 1951 aus sechs 
europaischen Landern inklusive Deutschland bestand. Das Vereinigte Konigreich (dass 
heiBt, GroBbritannien und Nordirland) trat 1973 bei. Bis 1992 gab es 10 Mitgliedstaaten, 
neue Formen der Zusammenarbeit zwischen den Mitgliedern vvurden eingefiihrt und die 
Europaische Union (EU) war gegriindet.
Heute besteht die Europaische Union aus 25 Landern Ost- und Westeuropas. Mitgliedstaaten 
haben gemeinsame Institutionen eingerichtet. Teile ihrer einzelstaatlichen Souveranitat hat 
jeder Mitgliedstaat diesen Institutionen ubertragen, damit in bestimmten Angelegenheiten im 
gemeinsamen Interesse demokratische Entscheidungen auf europaischer Ebene getroffen 
werden konnen. Jedes Land hat eine bestimmte Anzahl von Stimmen, die sich ungefahr nach 
der GroBe der einzelnen Lander richtet. Mit jeweils 29 Stimmen sind Deutschland und 
GroBbritannien zwei der vier Lander mit der hochsten Stimmenzahl.
Die EU befasst sich mit vielen Fragen, wie zum Beispiel die Sicherung von Frieden und 
Sicherheit. Sie bemiiht sich heute zunehmend darum, angrenzende Lander zu stabilisiern. 
AuBerdem entwickelt sie eine gemeinsame AuBen- und Sicherheitspolitik, bei der eine 
engere Zusammenarbeit in Verteidigungsfragen geplant ist.
Bitte beantworten Sie nun die folgenden Fragen, indem Sie Ihre Antwort in das jeweilige 
Kastchen schreiben. Selbstverstandlich konnen Sie dabei nochmals auf den Text 
zuriickgreifen.
Behalten EU-Mitgliedstaaten ihre Souveranitat in vollem MaBe?
Welches Land ist langer EU-Mitglied? Deutschland oder GroBbritannien?
Wie viele Lander hat die EU heute?
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Als nachstes lesen Sie bitte die folgenden Aussagen durch und schreiben Sie jew eils in das
vorgesehene Kastchen diejenige Zahl, die Ihre M einung am besten widerspiegelt. Die Skala
reicht von 1 (stimme entschieden nicht zu) bis 7 (stimme entschieden zu).
Stimme 
entschieden 
nicht zu
Stimme 
nicht zu
Stimme 
eher nicht 
zu
Stimme 
weder zu 
noch nicht 
zu
Stimme 
eher zu
Stimme zu Stimme
entschieden
zu
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
Die Mitgliedschaft in der EU ist eine gute Sache fur Deutschland.
Wenn man alles beriicksichtigt, hat Deutschland im GroBen und Ganzen davon 
profitiert, ein Mitgleid der EU zu sein.
Im Allgemeinen ruft die EU bei mir ein negatives Bild hervor.
Deutschland hat viele Dinge mit der EU gemeinsam.
Deutschland hat keinen starken EinfluB auf EU-Entscheidungen.
Ich betrachte Deuschland als einen typischen EU-Mitgliedstaat.
Eine starke EU bedeutet ein starkes Deutschland.
Deutschland ist kein gutes Beispiel fur einen typischen EU-Mitgliedstaat. 
Deutschland ist ein starkes EU-Mitglied.
GroBbritannien hat viele Dinge mit der EU gemeinsam.
GroBbritannien hat keinen starken EinfluB auf EU-Entscheidungen.
Ich betrachte GroBbritannien als einen typischen EU-Mitgliedstaat.
Eine starke EU bedeutet ein starkes GroBbritannien.
GroBbritannien ist kein gutes Beispiel fur einen typischen EU-Mitgliedstaat. 
GroBbritannien ist ein starkes EU-Mitglied.
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Zur Zeit wird diskutiert, ob eine Reihe von Projekten innerhalb der EU eingefiihrt werden 
sollte. Jedes Projekt soil von jeweils zwei oder drei der Mitgliedsstaaten fmanziert werden, 
und alle diese Projekte sollen alien Mitgliedsstaaten der EU zugute kommen. Deutschland 
kooperiert mit GroBbritannien und zusammen bilden sie eins der zwolf geplanten 
Schirmherrschaftsprogramm-Teams (SPTs). Es wird erwartet, dass sich jedes Team jahrlich 
mit einer Gesamtsumme in Hohe von
€ 10.000.000 (€10 Millionen) beteiligt.
Das SPT Deutschland-GroBbritannien fmanziert ein Projekt, das auf das Thema Sicherheit 
innerhalb der EU aufmerksam machen soli. Mit welchem Beitrag zur Gesamtsumme von € 
10 Millionen sollte sich Deutschland daran beteiligen und mit welchem Beitrag zur 
Gesamtsumme von € 10 Millionen sollte sich GroBbritannien daran beteiligen? Anders 
ausgedruckt; was ware Ihrer Meinung nach eine faire Kostenverteilung?
Deutschland sollte zur Gesamtsumme von € 10 Mio. beitragen: €
GroBbritannien sollte zur Gesamtsumme von € 10 Mio. beitragen: €
Im Folgenden sind drei Projekte beschrieben, die von anderen SPTs fmanziert werden.
Sagen Sie uns bitte, wie viel von den verfiigbaren Geldern Deutschland und wie viel von den 
verfugbaren Geldern GroBbritannien zugute kommen sollten. Zur Erinnerung: Fur alle 
drei Projekt zusammen stehen insgesamt € 10 Millionen zur Verfugung!
Projekt Eins: Die Finanzierung von halbjahrlichen Konferenzen iiber kUnftiges Vorgehen 
in Bezug auf Grenzkontrolle. Es ist geplant, diese Konferenzen in landlichen Regionen mit 
hohen Arbeitslosigkeitsraten zu halten. Somit wird gehofft, zur hiesigen Volkswirtschaft 
positiv beizutragen.
Deutschland sollte von den insgesamt verfugbaren € 10 Mio. erhalten: €
GroBbritannien sollte von den insgesamt verfugbaren € 10 Mio. erhalten: €
Projekt Zwei: Die Finanzierung von lokalen Informationszentren, wo Burger und 
Biirgerinnen Auskunfte iiber die EU einholen konnen. Diese Zentren sollen in stadtischen 
Regionen mit hohen Arbeitslosigkeitsraten eingerichtet werden. Somit wird gehofft, zur 
hiesigen Volkswirtschaft positiv beizutragen.
Deutschland sollte von den insgesamt verfugbaren € 10 Mio. erhalten: €
GroBbritannien sollte von den insgesamt verfugbaren € 10 Mio. erhalten: €
Projekt Drei: Eine Finanzierung, um soziale Kommunikation zwischen den 
Mitgliedsstaaten zu erhohen. Dieses Projekt fokussiert auf unsere Kinder. Geschulte Teams 
werden jeweils vor Ort ,Multi-Kulti-Schultage’ organisieren. Somit werden 
Schiileraustauschmoglichkeiten zwischen Mitgliedsstaaten gefordert.
Deutschland sollte von den insgesamt verfugbaren € 10 Mio. erhalten: €
GroBbritannien sollte von den insgesamt verfugbaren € 10 Mio erhalten: €
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Nun sind wir daran interessiert, mehr iiber Ihre Einstellungen zu verschiedenen Gruppen zu 
erfahren. Wir mochten, dass Sie uns anhand der unten dargestellten Thermometerskala Ihre 
Einstellungen zu diesen Gruppen mitteilen. Zum Beispiel, eine Bewertung von 80°C ware 
ziemlich positiv und 20° ziemlich negativ. Sie konnen iede Zahl zwischen 0 und 100 
vergeben. Bitte versuchen Sie moglichst ehrlich zu antworten und denken Sie daran: Ihre 
Angaben werden streng vertraulich behandelt!
Meine Einstellung gegeniiber Deutschland ist 3C.
Meine Einstellung gegeniiber GroBbritannien ist
Meine Einstellung gegeniiber der Europaischen Union ist 5C.
Positiv 100° AuBerst positiv
90° Sehr positiv
80° Positiv
70° Ziemlich positiv
60° Eher positiv
50° Weder positiv noch negativ 
40° Eher negativ
30° Ziemlich negativ
20° Negativ
10° Sehr negativ
0° AuBerst negativ
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Betrachten Sie bitte die folgenden Wortpaare. Wir mochten, dass Sie daruber nachdenken, welche 
Ziele und Werte Sie als wichtig beispielsweise fur Deutschland erachten, und welche Ziele und 
Werte Sie als wichtig fur die EU erachten. Wenn Sie sie vergleichen, wie ahnlich finden Sie sie? Urn 
die Frage zu beantworten, bitte kreuzen Sie das entsprechende Kastchen an. Die Skala reicht von 
sehr unahnlich (1) bis sehr ahnlich (7). Um die Aufgabe zu verdeutlichen, haben wir unten zwei 
Beispiele aufgefiihrt.
Ich glaube, dass die Ziele und Werte der folgenden Paare sind:
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
Betriebsrat <-> Geschaftsfiihrung sehr
unahnlich
sehr ahnlicl
Mitglied der Griinen <-> Biobauer sehr
unahnlich
X sehr ahnlicl
Bitte teilen Sie nun Ihre Bewertungen fiir die unten aufgelisteten Paare mit:
Ich glaube, dass die Ziele und Werte der folgenden Paare sind:
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
Deutschland die EU sehr unahnlich sehr ahnlich
Deutschland GroBbritannien sehr unahnlich sehr ahnlich
GroBbritannien die EU sehr unahnlich sehr ahnlich
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Unten sehen Sie vier Bilder (A -  D) aus denen hervorgeht, wie Deutschland und GroBbritannien mit 
der EU verbunden sein konnten. In welcher Reihenfolge, Ihrer Meinung zufolge, reprasentieren 
diese Bilder Deutschlands und Groftbritanniens Verhaltnis mit der EU am besten?
B .
E u rop a isch e U nion
Deutsch­
land
GroB­
britannien
E u rop a isch e U nion
GroB­
britannien
Deutsch­
land
E u ro p a isch e  U nion
GroB­
britannien
D .
E u ro p a isch e  U nion
GroB­
britannien
Deutsch­
land j
Bild spiegelt am besten wider, wie Deutschland und GroBbritannien mit der EU
verbunden sind.
Bild spiegelt am zweitbesten wider, wie Deutschland und GroBbritannien mit der EU
verbunden sind.
Bild spiegelt am drittbesten wider, wie Deutschland und GroBbritannien mit der EU
verbunden sind.
Bild spiegelt am wenigsten wider, wie Deutschland und GroBbritannien mit der EU
verbunden sind.
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Die EU hat unterschiedliche Bedeutungen fur verschiedene Menschen. Was bedeutet die EU fur Sie 
personlich? Die Skala reicht von 1 (gar nicht) bis 7 (sehr sogar).
Gar nicht Sehr sogar
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
Fneden
Biirokratie und/oder Geldverschwendung
Hilft, westliche Werte zu schiitzen
Bedrohung unserer nationalen Identitat
Wohlstand
Zu viel Konkurrenz zwischen Mitgliedsstaaten
Macht uns starker in der Welt
Zu viele armere Mitgliedsstaaten
Page 324
Bitte lesen Sie die folgende Reihe von Aussagen und schreiben Sie in das jew eils daftir
vorgesehenen Kastchen die Zahl, die Ihre M einung am besten widerspiegelt. Die Skala reicht von 1
(stimme entschieden nicht zu) bis 7 (stimme entschieden zu).
Stimme 
entschieden 
nicht zu
Stimme 
nicht zu
Stimme 
eher nicht 
zu
Stimme 
weder zu 
noch nicht 
zu
Stimme 
eher zu
Stimme zu Stimme
entschieden
zu
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
Ich bin auf die deutschen Erfolge im Sport stolz.
Ich bin auf die demokratischen Institutionen Deutschlands stolz.
Wenn ich die Bundesrepublik Detuschland kritisiere, tue ich dies aus Verbundenheit 
mit meinem Land.
Ich bin stolz darauf, dass Deutschland in Europa die Nr. 1 ist.
Ich bin auf die politischen Mitbestimmungsmoglichkeiten in Deutschland stolz.
Angesichts der deutschen wirtschaftlichen Uberlegenheit ist es nur recht und billig, 
dass wir in intemationalen Entscheidungen das Sagen haben.
Die Bundesrepublik Deutschland ist fur mich das beste Land auf der Welt.
Ich schatze das demokratische System in der Bundesrepublik sehr, aber ich bin auch 
bereit zur Kritik, wenn es um weitere Verbessserungen geht.
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Lesen Sie bitte die folgende Liste von Eigenschaften:
konventionell laut familientreu
hoflich dominant ehrlich
zuriickhaltend materialistisch extrem nationalistisch
direkt anspruchsvoll groBzugig
humorvoll effizient traditionsliebend
Schreiben Sie in
Spalte 1. die fiinf Eigenschaften aus der obigen Liste, die Ihrer Meinung nach am typischsten 
deutsch sind
Spalte 2. auf wieviel Prozent der Deutschen diese Eigenschaften Ihrer Schatzung nach zutreffen. 
Spalte 3. ob Sie diese Eigenschaften als positiv, negativ oder neutral bewerten.
Spalte 4. inwiefem diese Eigenschaften auf Sie zutreffen. Die Skala reicht von 1 (gar nicht) bis 7 
(sehr).
Spalte 1 
Eigenschaft
Spalte 2 
% der Deutschen
Spalte 3 
Positiv, negativ 
oder neutral?
Spalte 4 
Trifft auf mich zu:
(1 = gar nicht; 7 = sehr)
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
Nun lesen Sie bitte die Liste nochmal und schreiben Sie in
Spalte 1. die fiinf Eigenschaften aus der obigen Liste, die Ihrer Meinung nach am typischsten 
britisch sind
Spalte 2. auf wieviel Prozent der Briten diese Eigenschaften Ihrer Schatzung nach zutreffen. 
Spalte 3. ob Sie diese Eigenschaften als positiv, negativ oder neutral bewerten.
Spalte 4. inwiefem diese Eigenschaften auf Sie zutreffen. Die Skala reicht von 1 (gar nicht) bis 7 
(sehr). ____________________________
Spalte 1 
Eigenschaft
Spalte 2 
% der Briten
Spalte 3 
Positiv, negativ 
oder neutral?
Spalte 4 
Trifft auf mich zu:
(1 = gar nicht; 7 = sehr)
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
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Sie haben den Fragebogen fast vervo 11 standigt. Stellen Sie sich nun bitte vor, Sie arbeiten als 
einzige/r Deutsche/r in einem Team von Briten. Gehen Sie auBerdem davon aus, dass es keinerlei 
sprachliche Probleme gibt. Geben Sie bitte auf der folgenden Skala an, wie Sie sich in einem 
solchen Team ftihlen wiirden im Vergleich zu einem rein deutschen Team. Die Skala reicht von 1 
(gar nicht) bis 7 (sehr).
Gar nicht Sehr
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
Ich wiirde mich ftihlen:
Unbehaglich
Glucklich
Misstrauisch
Vertraut
Unterlegen
Wohl
Akzeptiert
Verlegen
Vorsichtig
Page 327
Zum SchluB mochten wir ein wenig Uber Sie erfahren.
1. Sind Sie ... mannlich
2. Wie alt sind Sie?
3. Studieren Sie? ja/nein
weiblich
In welcher Fakultat?
4. Wie wiirden Sie sich beschreiben? Kreuzen Sie bitte ALLE KASTCHEN an, die Sie als 
zutreffend empfinden.
Deutsch Ostdeutsch Andere (bitte dazuschreiben)
Europaisch Westdeutsch
5. Haben Sie schon mal uber einen Zeitraum von langer als sechs Monate im Ausland gelebt?
ja/nein Falls ja, wo bitte?
6. In politischen Zusammenhangen spricht man von „links“ und „rechts“. Wo wiirden Sie Ihre 
Ansichten auf dieser Skala platzieren? Hier sind auch Kastchen vorgesehen, falls Sie diese Frage 
nicht beantworten mochten oder falls Sie sich nicht sicher sind, wo Ihre Ansichten auf dieser Skala 
liegen.
Links
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
Rechts
10
Meine Ansichten sind
Diese Frage mochte ich nicht beantworten.
WeiB nicht
7. Auf einer Skala von 1 bis 10, wie stark wiirden Sie Ihre Interesse in ... bewerten?
Niedrig
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
Hoch
10
Deutschlandpolitik
Europapolitik
8. Zum SchluB: Wenn Sie jemand fragen wiirden, wie sehr Sie sich deutsch und wie sehr Sie sich 
europaisch ftihlen, wie wiirden Sie antworten? Die Skala reicht von 1 (gar nicht) bis 7 (ganz).
Gar nicht 
1 2 3 4 5 6
Ganz
7
Ich ftihle mich deutsch
Ich fUhle mich europaisch
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II-7 Debrief Sheet (German)
For German participants, there was one single Debrief Sheet handed out.
Europaische Wahrnehmungen -  Christine Dobbs -  University of Wales Swansea
Zum Schluss
Sie haben an dieser Studie teilgenommen. Haben Sie nochmal herzlichen Dank daftir! Vielleicht 
mochten Sie an dieser Stelle etwas mehr uber die Hintergrundfragen der Studie erfahren.
Wir sind daran interessiert, mehr uber die Meinungen von Burgem und Burgerinnen zum Thema 
Mitgliedschaft der eigenen Nation in intemationale Organisationen -  beispielsweise in der NATO 
oder in der Europaischen Union -  zu erfahren. Zum Beispiel bereitet unsere Mitgliedschaft ein 
Gefuhl von groBerer Sicherheit im taglichen Leben, oder waren wir zufriedener, wenn unsere 
Regierungen Ihre Entscheidungen im Sinne von ausschlieBlich nationalem Interesse treffen wiirden?
Unsere Haltung gegeniiber anderen Mitgliedstaaten ist der zweite Untersuchungsschwerpunkt dieser 
Studie. Meinen wir beispielsweise, daB andere Mitgliedsstaaten bevorzugt werden oder iiberwiegt 
das Gefuhl, aufgrund der Mitgliedschaft gemeinsam starker zu sein? Um dies zu untersuchen, 
entwickelten wir eine Aufgabe, wobei Sie gebeten wurden, im Rahmen von 
Schirmherrschaftsprojekten Gelder zu verteilen. Diese Projektreihe haben wir frei erfunden, und 
unseres Wissens nach beabsichtige die EU nicht, Projekte wie diese einzufiihren.
Wenn Sie weitere Fragen zu dieser Studie oder zu meinem Forschungsgebiet im Allgemeinen haben, 
wiirde ich mich sehr freuen, von Ihnen zu horen.
Christine Dobbs 
Department of Psychology 
University of Wales Swansea 
Tel:++44-1792-513140
E-Mail: Christine.dobbs@ntlworld.com ODER 182177@swan.ac.uk
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II-8 High and low identifiers based on median splits
A preliminary analysis using median splits determined high and low ingroup, and high and 
low superordinate category identifiers. The split was defined as 4.33 for ingroup 
identification (thus 48.6% of participants were low ingroup identifiers) and at 2.00 for 
superordinate category identification (thus 51.3% of participants were low superordinate 
category identifiers). As shown in the table below, 56 of the 116 participants were not 
double-high or double-low identifiers. Also, there was a significant association between 
national groups and high identification with the ingroup = 7.25, d f = l , p <  .01) and with 
the superordinate category ( ^  = 8.57, df= I ,p  < .01), where high ingroup identification was 
weighted towards the British sample, and high superordinate category identification towards 
the German sample.
Distribution of high, mixed and low dual identifiers based on median splits
Identification with ingroup-superordinate category
LO-LO LO-HI HI-LO HI-HI Total
British 8 6 28 18 60
German 11 15 7 22 55
Total 19 21 35 40 115
Note: In the above abbreviations, the first term of reference refers to the ingroup, the second to the 
superordinate category. Thus LO-HI, for example, indicates low ingroup and high superordinate 
category identification.
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Appendix III to Study 3
III-l Ethics Approval
NB: Approval signature bottom right
F T H IC A L  C O M M IT T E E  A P P L IC A T I O N
Title of investigation: g % r O l p b o ^
N a m e s  a n d  s t a t u s e s  o f  i n v e s t i g a t o r s - i :
(U\a)C>s G p l i f *  CiV
Category of application:
p r a c t ic a l  c l a s s  -  p r o g r a m  o f  s t u d y  -  s in g le  e x p e r i m e n t  -  g r a n t  a p p l ic a t io n  -  o th e r  ( p l e a s e - s p e c i f y )
‘ *m
Foutine - non-routine
Brief description of purposes: ^  ^
So»& \JjA >  a J t t o f e  (S °\ ^ T '
U k a V ^ n ^  z a s C tM s e d ^
skUjrty**-'
f t u *  ^
Methods,: 5LbjCcfe. '• W d U k  < V #- « = g ^ U
^ Cp s^ . u u c )
s i  “ adr ~
E t h ic a l  c o n s i d e r a t i o n s ^  D o e s  t h e  s tu d y  in v o lv e  a n y  o f  t h e  p o te n t ia l ly  c o n t r o v e r s i a l  p r o c e d u r e s  
li s te d  b e lo w ?
a d m in is t r a t io n  o f  d r u g s  -  c o l le c t io n  o f  b o d y  f lu id s  o r  t i s s u e  -  u n p l e a s a n t  s t im u la t io n  o r  p r o c e d u r e s  
-  c o l le c t io n  o f  c o n f i d e n t i a r in f o r m a t io n  - d e p r iv a t io n  -  a c t i v e  d e c e p t i o n -  w i th h o ld in g  in f o r m a t io n  -
p a y m e n t  — S^ juLoStJ
A re  a n y  o t h e r  p o te n t ia l ly  c o n t r o v e r s i a l  p r o c e d u r e s  i n v o l v e d ?  P l e a s e  s p e c i f y :
In d ic a te  o n  a  s e p a r a t e  s h e e t - h o w  it is  i n t e n d e d  to  m i n im i s e  a n y  r i s k  o f  h a r m  o r  d i s t r e s s  w h ic h  
c o u ld  a r i s e  f r o m  e a c h  in d e n t i f i e d  p r o c e d u r e .
I n f o r m e d  c o n s e n t :  P l e a s e  s t a t e  h o w in f o r m e d  c o n s e n t  w ill b e  o b t a in e d .  A t ta c h  c o p i e s  o f  t h e  
c o n s e n t  f o r m  to  b e  u s e d  p lu s  a n y  p a r t i c ip a n t  in f o r m a t io n  s h e e j ts .
k
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III-2 Form of Consent
NB: There are two versions of paragraph one; one for CU students, one for SU and SI students.
Form of Consent
Dear Participant 
CU version:
I am a PhD student at the Department of Psychology at the University of Wales Swansea studying 
under the supervision of Prof. Russell Spears at Cardiff University. My main area of interest looks at 
European perceptions; how we feel about our country and our neighbours. The enclosed 
questionnaire should take around 20 minutes or less to complete.
SU and SI version:
I am a PhD student at the Department of Psychology at the University of Wales Swansea. My main 
area of interest looks at European perceptions; how we feel about our country and our neighbours. 
The enclosed questionnaire should take around 20 minutes or less to complete.
If you agree to take part in this study, your answers will remain entirely anonymous. All data 
collected are treated with confidentiality and used only within the framework of this thesis and any 
resulting publications.
Please remember:
-  Participation is entirely voluntary
-  There are no right or wrong answers
-  You are free to break off your participation at any time
If you agree to participate, please give your informed consent by signing below. Then place this 
Form of Consent into the small envelope provided and seal it. When you have filled in the 
questionnaire, please make sure that this is returned together with the sealed envelope.
Thank you very much for your participation.
Christine Dobbs 
Department of Psychology 
University of Wales Swansea
E-mail: Christine.dobbs@ntlworld.com or 182177@swansea.ac.uk
I agree to participate in this study. 
Name:_________  ________
Signed: Date:
III-3 Instruction Sheet and Questionnaire (English/EU version)
NB: Only one questionnaire is replicated here; the EU version for English participants 
where ingroup items were administered before outgroup items. In the GB version, ‘The EU, 
‘Europeans’ etc. were substituted for ‘Great Britain’ ‘British’ etc. throughout. The control 
condition contained those items asterisked in the Method section. In the Welsh versions (in 
the English language), ‘England’, ‘English’ etc. and ‘Wales’, ‘Welsh’ etc. were transposed.
The framing texts in both conditions were identical, except where ‘Elections are held as laid 
out in the Constitution’ (EU-version) was replaced with ‘Elections are held as laid out in the 
statutes’ (GB-version)
European Perceptions 
Instructions
Please take time to read this sheet carefully.
5. Answer each question as it appears before moving on to the next item. This is very 
important for us! The questionnaire is designed so that boxes are provided for all your 
answers. Simply write your answer in the appropriate box.
6. Also, remember that there are no right or wrong answers. Try to answer the questions 
without too much deliberation. Past studies suggest that our initial responses are likely the 
truest responses.
7. We would also appreciate it if you could be completely honest in your responses. We assure 
you again that your responses are entirely anonymous.
8. When you have completed the questionnaire, please make sure you return it together with the 
sealed envelope.
Again, many thanks for your cooperation! It is greatly appreciated.
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Please read the following statements and write the num ber which best reflects your opinion in the box
next to each statement. The scale ranges from 1 (strongly disagree) to 7 (strongly agree).
Strongly
disagree
Disagree Tend to 
disagree
Neither 
agree nor 
disagree
Tend to 
agree
Agree Strongly
agree
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
In a group of English people, I really feel that I belong.
The fact that I’m English rarely enters my mind.
Just thinking about the fact that Tin English sometimes gives me bad feelings. 
I feel strong ties to other English people.
Being English is an important reflection of who I am.
In general, I’m glad to be English.
I don’t have a lot in common with other English people.
In my everyday life, I often think about what it means to be English.
I often regret that I’m English.
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Next, please read the following statements. Again and on the same scale, place the number which best 
reflects your opinion in the box next to each statement.
England’s success in sports makes me feel proud.
If I criticize England, I do that out of allegiance to my country.
There is no better place to live in Europe than in England.
The broad scope for political participation in England make me feel proud.
For me, England is the best country in the world.
I appreciate the democratic system in England very much, but I am willing to 
criticize it in order to achieve further improvement.
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W e’d like you to read a short text about the European Union.
The European Union was bom out of the European Coal and Steel Community formed in 1951. The 
United Kingdom (that is, Great Britain and Northern Ireland) joined in 1973. Member states share 
their borders with other member states.
The people: Life expectancy is 78.38 years and the infant mortality rate extremely low (0.005%). 
Furthermore, it is estimated that 99% of the population is literate.
The economy: From an economic standpoint, the EU is a leading trading power and financial centre 
world-wide. Agriculture is intensive and highly mechanized. Services, particularly banking, 
insurance and business services, account by far for the largest proportion of GDP. By world 
standards, the economy is strong.
The political system: Democratic decision making lies at the heart of the system. Elections are held 
as laid out in the Constitution. All citizens aged 18 and over are entitled to vote in parliamentary 
elections and are eligible to stand for election themselves.
Please answer the following questions by writing your response in the appropriate box.
True or false? The European Union is a strong trading partner.
What is the minimum legal voting age?
What percentage of the population is estimated as being illiterate?
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Next, please read the following statements and write the number which best reflects your opinion in
the box next to each statement. The scale ranges from 1 (strongly disagree) to 7 (strongly agree).
Strongly
disagree
Disagree Tend to 
disagree
Neither 
agree nor 
disagree
Tend to 
agree
Agree Strongly
agree
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
Membership in the EU is a good thing for England.
Taking everything into consideration, England on balance benefits from being a 
member of the EU.
In general, the EU conjures up a negative image for me.
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Please read through the following list of characteristics. For each characteristic, please tick the appropriate box 
to tell us how much you think it is typical for English people in general. The scale ranges from 1 (not at all)
to 7 (very much so).
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
advantaged
broadminded
generous
competitive
genuine
rude
driven
community-spirited
honest
high achieving
caring
nationalistic
powerful
warm
intelligent
And how much do you think each characteristic is typical for Welsh people in general?
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
advantaged
broadminded
generous
competitive
genuine
rude
driven
community-spirited
honest
high achieving
caring
nationalistic
powerful
warm
intelligent
And how much do you think each characteristic is typical for Europeans in general? Here, please also 
indicate in the shaded right column whether you think this characteristic is positive (+), negative (-) or neutral
(0).
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
advantaged
broadminded
generous
competitive
genuine
rude
driven
community-spirited
+, - or 0?
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honest
high achieving
caring
nationalistic
powerful
warm
intelligent
[In the original questionnaire, all three tables were on the same page]
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The EU would like to see smaller regions working together to promote regional development. 
Currently, discussions are underway to introduce a series of projects to do this. The projects are 
known collectively as the Patron Scheme, and each project will be funded entirely by two EU 
regions. The regions England and Wales have been paired as a team to fund one of these projects. At 
the same time, England and Wales will receive monies for three projects funded by other Patron 
Scheme teams. In other words, all regions both contribute to the scheme and benefit from the
scheme.
The total amount each Patron Scheme team will receive is:
€ 15,000,000 (€ 15 million).
How much do you think England should receive for these three projects, and how much do you 
think Wales should receive for these three projects? What do you feel would be a fair distribution?
Project One -  € 8 million available in total 
To fund brownsite developments across each region.
England should receive from the total € 8 million available: €
Wales should receive from the total € 8 million available: €
Project Two -  € 4 million available in total 
To promote tourism within each region.
England should receive from the total € 4 million available: €
Wales should receive from the total € 4 million available: €
Project Three -  € 3 million available in total
To introduce First-Stop-Free-Lance Centres offering advice and financial assistance to local 
people wishing to start up a business. The Centres are to be distributed across each region.
England should receive from the total € 3 million available: €
Wales should receive from the total € 3 million available: €
GRAND TOTAL: f  15.000.000
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We’d like to learn more about your attitudes towards certain groups, and we’d like you to use the 
thermometer scale on the right to do this. For example, a rating of 80° would be quite favourable, 
and 20° quite unfavourable. You may give any number between 0 and 100. Please be honest. 
Remember that your answers are strictly confidential.
My attitude towards the English is °C.
My attitude towards the Welsh is 3C
My attitude towards Europeans is 5C
100° Extrem ely favourable 
90°
80°
70°
60°
50° Neither favourable nor unfavourable 
40°
30°
20 °
10°
0° Extrem ely unfavourable
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Please look at the following pairs. For example, we’d like you to think about which goals 
and values you think are important for England and about the goals and values you think are 
important for Wales. If you compare these, how similar do you think they are? Please tick or 
cross the appropriate box on the scale of 1 (very dissimilar) to 7 (very similar). To show you 
what we mean, we’ve provided two examples below.
I think the goals and values of the following pairs are:
shop steward <-> managing director very dissimilar
police officer <-» judge very dissimilar
X
X
very similar
very similar
Please provide your ratings for the pairs listed below:
I think the goals and values of the following pairs are:
England Wales very dissimilar
England <-> the European Union very dissimilar
Wales <-> the European Union very dissimilar
very similar 
very similar 
very similar
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Below are four pictures (A -  D) which show how England and Wales might be linked to the 
EU. Please tell us in which order you think these boxes best reflect England’s and Wales’
relationship to the European Union.
B .
European Union
England
Wales
European Union
England
European Union
England Wales
D .
European Union
Wales
England
Box
Box
Box
Box
□
□
□
□
shows best how England and Wales are linked to the EU. 
shows second best how England and Wales are linked to the EU. 
shows third best how England and Wales are linked to the EU. 
shows least well how England and Wales are linked to the EU.
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Please think again about England and Wales, and answer the following questions.
On a scale from 1 (very little) to 7 (very much):
how much power do you think England has in the EU? 
how much power do you think Wales has in the EU?
On a scale from 1 (very unfair) to 7 (very fair):
how fair do you personally find the amount of power that England has in the EU? 
how fair do you personally find the amount of power that Wales has in the EU?
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And how much you agree with the following statements? The scale ranges from 1 (strongly
disagree) to 7 (strongly agree).
Strongly
disagree
Disagree Tend to 
disagree
Neither 
agree nor 
disagree
Tend to 
agree
Agree Strongly
agree
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
Overall, English people generally enjoy higher prestige than Welsh people, irrespective 
of whether it is justified or not.
Within the EU, English people generally enjoy higher prestige than Welsh people, 
irrespective of whether it is justified or not.
When it comes to matters directly important for England, we have too little power in the 
EU.
In the EU, English culture is treated with respect.
England’s interests are underrepresented in the EU.
The EU does not take England seriously.
England has too little impact on matters in the EU.
The English are treated fairly within the EU.
When it comes to matters directly important for Wales, they have too little power in the 
EU.
In the EU, Welsh culture is treated with respect.
Wales’ interests are underrepresented in the EU.
The EU does not take Wales seriously.
Wales has too little impact on matters in the EU.
The Welsh are treated fairly within the EU.
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The European Union means different things to different people. What does the European 
Union mean to you personally as an English person? The scale ranges from 1 (not at all) to
7 (very much so).
Not at all Very much 
so
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
Helps protect our values 
Too much rivalry amongst member states 
Economic prosperity 
Threat to our identity 
Makes us stronger in the world 
If wealthier regions subsidise poorer regions, this is a bad thing.
Are there any other things that come to mind when you think of the EU? Please use the space 
below to tell us in a few words what else comes to mind.
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You’ve nearly completed the questionnaire. Next, we’d like to know what being European 
means to you personally. Again, please read the following statements and write the number 
which best reflects your opinion in the box next to each statement. The scale ranges from 1
(strongly disagree) to 7 (strongly agree).
Strongly
disagree
Disagree Tend to 
disagree
Neither 
agree nor 
disagree
Tend to 
agree
Agree Strongly
agree
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
In a group of Europeans, I really feel that I belong.
Just thinking about the fact that I’m European sometimes gives me bad feelings. 
I feel strong ties to other Europeans.
In general, I’m glad to be European.
I don’t have a lot in common with other Europeans.
I often regret that I’m European.
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Finally, we’d like to know a little about yourself.
1. Are you... male
2. How old are you?
female
3. Are you a student? yes/no Which Faculty or Department?
4. How do you think of yourself? Please tick ALL OF THE BOXES you feel that apply to 
you.
British Irish Other (please specify)
English Scottish
European Welsh
5. In political matters people talk of “the left“ and “the right“. How would you place 
your views on this scale?. (Boxes are provided if you’d prefer not to answer this question 
or if you don’t know where to place your views on this scale.)
Left
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
Right
10
My views are:
I would prefer not to answer this question I don’t know
6. If a general election were to be held tomorrow, which party would get your vote?
I would vote for:
I would prefer not to answer this question I don’t know
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7. On a scale from 1 to 10, how strongly would you rate your interest in ... ?
Low
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
High
10
English politics
British politics
European politics
8. One final question: If someone were to ask you how much you feel English, how much 
you feel British and how much you feel European, what would you reply? The scale ranges 
from 1 (not at all) to 7 (very much).
Not at all 
1 2 3 4 5 6
Very much 
7
I feel English
I feel British
I feel European
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III-4 Debrief Sheet
European Perceptions 
Christine Dobbs 
University of Wales Swansea
De-briefing
You have now completed the study. Thank you again for your participation, which is greatly 
appreciated. Perhaps you might be interested to read a little more about the nature of the 
study at this point.
We are interested in a) how people feel about being English or being Welsh, b) how the 
Welsh and the English might view each other, and c) how well placed each group feels 
within Great Britain and within the European Union. For example, do both groups feel that 
they are being well-represented in Great Britain/in the EU? Does either group feel 
disadvantaged or feel they have too little say in British/European matters?
To look at these issues, we handed out several versions of our questionnaire. For example, 
some participants were asked to read a text regarding Great Britain, some a text regarding 
the EU, and some read neither text.
As is sometimes the case in psychological studies, we fabricated information in some 
parts of the study in order to obtain the measures that we required. Here, we would like to 
draw your attention to two issues. Firstly, the figures quoted in the text on the European 
Union (e.g. GDP, life expectancy) were, in fact, the figures for Great Britain. Also, the 
description of Great Britain’s democratic system was highly simplified. Secondly, one 
section that was completed by all participants required that you divide monies between 
England and Wales within a ‘Patron Scheme’. The Patron Scheme was entirely of our own 
creation, and, to our knowledge, neither the EU nor the British government are planning to 
introduce a scheme such as this.
If you have any further questions concerning this study or my area of research in general, 
please feel free to contact me. And good luck in the prize draw! [included where data 
collection was at SU or SI]
Christine Dobbs 
Department of Psychology 
University of Wales Swansea
Email: Christine.dobbs@ntlworld.com OR 182177@swansea.ac.uk
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